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An Approach to Estimating Market Value and
Duration of Interest-Sensitive Whole Life Contracts
Thomas j. Merfeld*

Abstract t
A fixed premium interest·sensitive whole life contract is analyzed in order
to estimate its market value. In addition, using various definitions of duration,
we determine the duration of the contract for each definition. The results of
this analysis have implications for market value accounting of life insurance
liabilities and for life company portfolio management.
Key words and phrases: cash flow, accounting, assets, liabilities, surrender ben·
efits, yield curve

Introduction
American life insurance companies traditionally have not assessed
the market value of their liabilities. Ufe actuaries compute statutory
reserves under strictly defined rules. Neither state regulatory bodies
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nor the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) have required or
allowed market value liability reporting.
Until recently, neither the nature of the life insurance products sold
nor the financial markets have made it necessary for companies to assess the market risk or the market value of their liabilities. Market values are sensitive to exogenous factors such as changing interest rates.
For much of this century financial markets enjoyed enough stability
that risk assessments were not necessary. life products were relatively
simple and margins relatively wide; insolvencies were generally not due
to the lack of liability market risk measurements.
But needs have changed. The U.S. Congress is applying pressure
on state regulators to tighten statutory reporting requirements. Financial reporting under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)
is moving in a market value direction. Complicated new products funding complex new securities are accentuating the effects of the heightened financial market volatility of the last 15 years. The market value
of life company surplus has become volatile enough that effective "insolvencies" can result. These insolvencies can be masked by traditional
accounting standards, but are revealed by market value methods.
Life company financial management generally has not implemented
the technology necessary to measure the risk of surplus volatility. Although statutorily defined cash flow testing procedures adequately reveal certain cases of financial ruin, they also can provide false indications of problems. Most valuation actuary certifications are designed
to protect contract holders without regard to stockholders; as a consequence, these certifications constitute another test of solvency rather
than of surplus volatility. Even internal portfolio managers remain too
far removed from liabilities to apply established market value assessment and risk management procedures to liabilities.
Securities-type valuation and risk management methodologies can
be applied to a particularly complex type of life product: the interestsensitive whole life contract (ISWL). Over the past decade, American
life companies have added these and similar universal life contracts
with an aggregate face amount of approximately $1.5 trillion. As a
result, interest-sensitive products represent a significant portion of life
company obligations. It is not clear that either the literature or the
industry has assessed the valuation or risk of this particular liability in
a thorough way.
This article analyzes a fixed premium interest-sensitive whole life
contract with the intent to:
• Develop an approach to estimating its market value; and
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• Assess various notions of its duration.
The results of these analyses have implications for market value accounting life insurance liabilities and for life company portfolio management.
The FASB, through Statement of Accounting Standard (SFAS) 115,
has taken dramatic steps to implement mark-to-market accounting for
securities portfolios. The typical insurance company has responded
by holding about 80 percent of its bond portfolio in the "available for
sale" category, with annual changes in the market values reflected in
GAAP surplus adjustments. The problem for insurance companies is
that SFAS 115 does not provide for a parallel market value accounting
of liabilities. As a consequence, a company can have no economic exposure to changing interest rates (Le., be perfectly matched) and yet be
reporting enormous changes in GAAP surplus from year to year. This
hardly serves investor needs, which is one of the objectives of GAAP accounting. Some analysts call for a return to amortized cost accounting
for bonds. A better approach may be to encourage the FASB to adopt
market value accounting for insurance liabilities. This paper attempts
to further the discipline of liability fair valuation.
Many product managers and portfolio managers attempt to durationmatch their assets with their liabilities. These managers believe that
interest rate risk is not adequately compensated for by markets. In
the past life contracts were generally considered to call for a very long
bond portfolio. That is not necessarily the case with interest-sensitive
business, due to the resetting feature of the crediting rate. Having developed a methodology to estimate the fair value of liabilities, we can
then re-estimate their values after shocking market rates. The relationship can then inform portfolio managers on how to invest bonds to
match the value sensitivities.

2
2.1

The Contract
Provisions

ISWL contracts are similar to traditional whole life contracts. Whole
life products are structured to produce a level premium at any issue
age for a large pool of insureds. This premium can be regarded as the
periodic contribution to a fund that, when accumulated at an implicit
rate of interest, is expected to produce periodic death benefits and is
exhausted at the end of the pool of lives. This condition holds after allowing for loadings for coverage of company issuance and maintenance
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expenses and a competitive return to capital. An ISWL contract initially
is structured with a level premium.
ISWL contracts differ from traditional whole life contracts in two
ways. First, although the contracted premium must be paid in order to
avoid nonforfeiture status, ISWL premiums can have a more complex
structure. Much of this complexity can be considered as discrete contract owner options to adjust the mix of premium paid and coverage
amount within constraints imposed by the issuer and tax code. The
contract owner uses private information in exercising these options.
The issuer can respond by adjusting the cost of insurance assessment
within contractual and legal constraints. In a yet more general type of
permanent life contract, universal life (i.e., flexible premium interestsensitive life), the contract owner effectively has continuous options to
adjust the premium/coverage mix. I
Second, in an ISWL contract the accumulation interest rate is explicit
and adjustable. Whatever rate structure the issuer originally used to
price the premium structure, the contract fund value is credited with
a rate that resets periodically at the option of the issuer, subject to a
floor.
ISWL contracts also allow the contract owner to remove the accumulated fund value by:
• Taking a loan (which continues to commit the policy owner to the
premium schedule and can expose the loaned portion of the fund
value to a lower crediting rate);
• Making a partial withdrawal; or
• Canceling the entire contract (which typically exposes the policy
owner to a schedule of surrender assessments).
ISWL contracts also provide the standard array of nonforfeiture options,
ignored in this analysis. See the appendix for a summary of terms and
in force assumptions of the ISWL contracts analyzed.

2.2

Cash Flow Components

Contract cash flows belong to four classes:
• Premium inflow;
• Surrender benefit;
1 The application of game theoretic modeling to this field could provide rich insights
into the optimum use of this option.
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• Death benefit; and
• Servicing expense and commission.
Projecting surrender benefit cash flows entails certain complexities.
First, the industry comparable product crediting rate must be modeled.
Second, the company crediting strategy must be established. Third, a
function of contract holder surrender behavior with respect to these
differential rates must be integrated into the overall model.

2.2.1

Industry Interest-Sensitive Life Crediting Function

Industry interest-sensitive life crediting rates track fixed income market rates with lags for several institutional reasons:
• Company investment committees often establish crediting rates
as a spread to the asset book value earnings rate. Once a particular asset is on the books at a given rate of return for purposes
of accruing interest income, its rate of return will be assumed to
remain constant until those particular assets are rolled into a new
security with a new rate of return. This practice delays the recognition that market rates have changed;
• The institution then needs to declare the new rate;
• Companies are reluctant to change rates too often for marketing
purposes; and
• The effective crediting rate can be delayed further due to certain
contractual provisions allowing new rates to be credited only at
the policy's anniversary; hence, contracts containing this provision have a built-in expected delay of six months.
The crediting rate series comes from monthly data from January 1985
through December 1992 from the TULAS industry survey published by
the actuarial consulting firm Tillinghast. 2 The period covers a substantial fall in rates and changes in yield curve shape.
Let ICR t be the industry crediting rate at month t, T3Mt be the three
month risk-free bill rate at month t; and T5Yt be the five year risk-free
note rate at month t. The subscript t - m refers to the rate m months
prior to the interest-sensitive life crediting rate. A linear regression with
2For more information of the TULAS industry survey, write to: Tillinghast, 245 Park
Avenue, 18th Floor, New York NY 10167-0128, USA.
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ICRt as the dependent variable and T3Mt -6, T5Yt and T5Yt-18 yields the
following equation:
ICR t

=

3.78 + 0.119 x T3Mt -6 + 0.342 x T5Yt + 0.146

X

T5Yt -18

(1)

with R2 = 0.72. Equation (1) is not useful in describing the response of
the crediting rate to a change in market rate because the nonconstant
term coefficients sum to significantly less than one. For example, the
model indicates that the crediting rate would never fully respond to a
permanent parallel shift in rates.
The following is a similar model, fit without the constant term, and
weighs recent observations more heavily. This regression yields the
following equation:
ICR t

=

0.424 x T5Yt + 0.297

X

T5Yt -6 + 0.328

X

T5Yt -18

(2)

with R2 = 0.99. In this case equation (2) also appears to give a good
fit; in addition, because its coefficients sum nearly to one, the equation merely describes the timing by which the crediting rate will reflect
changed market rates.

2.2.2

Company Crediting Strategy

The crediting rate structure that a company establishes is the result of myriad marketing, investment, legal, and game theory considerations. Crediting rate rationale is not well understood from a theoretical perspective. Companies attempting to establish market share
often credit above-market rates. Companies often engage in "bait and
switch tactics" (Le., crediting above-market rates on new money and
below-market rates at subsequent policy years). When a company has
closed a block and is running off the reserves, it often credits low rates.
Company crediting rates are often not closely related to the company's
claims-paying capacity. For this analysis the rate is set at the industry
rate less 125 basis points. 3 .

2.2.3

Contract Holder Surrender Profile

Contract holder behavior is affected fundamentally by the spread
between the rate earned by a particular contract and the rate provided
30ne basis point is the smallest measure used in quoting yields on mortgages, bonds
and notes. It represents 0.01% of yield. Thus a 5.77%rate that drops by 125 basis points
becomes 4.52%.
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by a similar contract issued by an industry competitor. Surrenders also
are relatively higher during the early stages of the contract. Surrender behavior can be volatile at critical points in the life of the contract,
such as premium redetermination periods and the end of the surrender charge period. Furthermore, it is affected by critical ages, such as
retirement, of the contract holder.
The analysis assumes baseline surrenders of 7.5 percent annually
with adjustments for:
• Early policy years due to buyer remorse;
• Later policy years, when surrender charges are lower;
• Higher insured ages, when contract owners typically have a postretirement need for cash and when they find surrender to be taxefficient; and
• Policy-crediting rates that are different from rates on poliCies of
competitor companies. Over the projection horizon the crediting
rate is set at the projected industry rate less 125 basis points.
The low crediting rate used in this analysis produces moderately
higher surrenders.
To date, little empirical analysis has been done on contract holder
surrender profile. There are significant barriers to conducting such
research:
• Lack of product homogeneity;
• Differences in sales methods;
• Differences in product management;
• Differences in perceived insurance company risk; and
• Absence of usable historical data maintained by companies.
Contrast this with the extensive analytic work that has been conducted
on the prepayment behaviors of single family homeowners. The mortgage is relatively a homogeneous product. Good data are available for
at least 15 years, and there are few company-specific issues related to
them.
This asymmetric behavior reveals the fundamental interest rate option that the contract holder owns. When market rates rise there is the
potential problem of disintermediation, i.e., the insured can surrender

12
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to pursue higher new money rates elsewhere (subject to a declining surrender charge). Consequently, the company needs to choose between
raising the crediting rate to keep the policy or to maintain the rate and
cash out the policy. In the former case the company pays more interest
over time, perhaps even a greater rate than it earns on its investment.
In the latter case the company fails to recoup a portion of its acquisition
cost and tends to liquidate bonds at depressed prices.
If rates fall, however, the results are not symmetrically bad for the
contract holder. The insured merely keeps the policy knowing that the
company can reduce its rate only to the guaranteed rate.
The value of this interest rate option is affected by the same two fundamental variables that affect all other interest rate options: interest
rate volatility and time to expiry. Greater market rate volatility provides a greater range of opportunity for the insured to exercise. New
money rates can become higher, providing more incentive to pursue
them. They also can be driven lower, increasing the chance that the
insured enjoys a guaranteed rate in excess of new money rates. In addition, these contracts often have long lives, which provides further opportunity for rates to move to the insureds' advantage. The effect of this
option on insurance company surplus is exacerbated by the likelihood
that the company has written similar options in its mortgage-backed
security and callable bond portfolios.
This analysis uses a quadratic function to derive excess surrenders
(Le., surrenders in excess of baseline) stimulated by the contract holders' desire to earn higher rates. Thus
ESt = (1

+ p x TD t ) 2 - 1

where
ESt

p

Excess surrenders at time t;
Propensity to achieve higher rates through surrender;

~~Rd-SPt ]

o}

TD t

max {[ CRt - PR t - 0.0115 _ SCt(l

CRt

Identified competitor's credit rate at time t;
Product credit rate at time t;
Remaining surrender charge at time t;
Number of surrender charge periods remaining at time t.

PRt
SCt
SPt

,

Note that the rate of differential must exceed 115 basis points (0.0115)
before any excess surrenders occur, and that the remaining surrender
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charge is then amortized off. This paper uses the 125 basis points
spread between the competitor rate and the product rate. The effect
is to moderate excess surrenders in most forward rate and surrender
charge environments.
Surrender cash flows include new policy loans. Policy loans typically
do not pay cash interest and, in any case, are usually not repaid. Instead,
interest is capitalized, increasing the loan amount. New policy loans are
modeled as a premature cash outflow from the fund. When the contract
is extinguished by surrender, the surrender benefit is reduced by the
amount of the loan; when it is extinguished by ultimate death of the
insured, the death benefit is reduced by the amount of the loan.
We assume future loan balances to be a constant proportion of contract cash values. Under older whole life policies the policy loan was
a further powerful option enjoyed by the contract holder. In high rate
environments the insured withdrew the policy's cash value at a rate
fixed at policy inception and invested in high market rates elsewhere.
Under newer interest-sensitive contracts the loan rate depends on market rates. Consequently, there may be no further benefit to taking the
loan in high or low rates. In high interest rate scenarios, however, cash
values increase quickly, loan balances capitalize quickly, and cash paid
upon death of the insured is reduced.
In high interest rate scenarios our model shifts cash flows to earlier
periods and from the death benefit component to the surrender benefit
component. This modeling assumption does not distort aggregate contract duration, but may affect the respective durations of the surrender
component and death benefits component.

2.2.4

Cash Flow Generation

Various interest rate scenarios are generated in estimating market
values and durations. Each scenario is associated with a yield curve.
Under each scenario for each projected month premium cash flows into,
and benefit and expense cash flows out of, the fund are generated for
each contract remaining in force. In addition, the fund accumulates
by capitalizing interest at the credited rate and is reduced by the cost
of insurance and expense charges deducted for each policy in force.
Industry and company crediting rates are functions of medium term
forward rates implied by the scenario yield curve. Contract surrenders
are triggered, generating surrender cash flows. Finally, mortality cash
flows are generated, further reducing the number of policies in force.
The process is repeated for each month and each yield curve.

14
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Duration

The market value of financial instruments is sensitive to interest
rates at various points on the yield curve. The concept of duration provides a measure of the extent of this sensitivity. The basic duration
measure is the Macaulay duration; see, for example, Boyle (1992, Chapter 3). It is defined as follows for an arbitrary series of cash flows Ck
paid at time k, k = 1,2, ... , n with yield-to-maturity rate of Yn

.

Macaulay DuratIOn =

Ir=l kCk(l + Yn)-k
In
(
)k .
k=l Ck

1 + Yn -

(3)

For example, a one year Treasury bill has only one cash flow; its duration is explained by what happens to the one year rate. A five year
investment grade corporate bond's duration is explained largely by the
five year rate, but also by the change in rates at the same term as coupon
payments. A mortgage-backed security can be affected by medium term
rates because its cash flow is centered in that region, and also because
refinance rates, which affect the amount and incidence of cash flow itself, an: centered there. Interest-sensitive life contracts can have highly
complex cash flow magnitude and incidence of cash flow profiles.
In general, the duration of a financial instrument can be calculated
as follows: let Po be the current price of the financial instrument, P+ be
the price after a very small increase of Y + in the interest rate, and P_
be the price after a very small decrease of Y - in the interest rate. The
duration D is defined as:

(4)
For example, if a bond currently trading at par (Le., Po = 100) is subjected to an instantaneous rate increase of one half of one percent
(Y+ = 0.005) and its price drops to 98 (P+ = 98), while if it is subjected to an instantaneous rate decrease of one half of one percent
(y_ = 0.005) and its price increases to 102 (P- = 102), then D = 4.
Duration increases as the time to maturity increases, other things
being equal. Floating rate instruments usually have quite short durations. Although duration was initially introduced for fixed income
instruments, all financial instruments have a duration as defined in
equation (2).
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Market Value Estimate

Consider a comparison to corporate debt whereby the accumulating
ISWL fund represents the proceeds from company debt issuance in the
same way as an industrial firm can issue debt as part of the financing
structure for a capital project. In either case the issuer is accumulating
assets with the promise to repay the debt, with interest, at a future date.
The issuing firm (in the case of debt issuance) and the life company (in
the case of contract issuance) are charged a certain number of basis
points as a risk premium by entities providing the funds. Issuers in both
cases incur issuance costs and enjoy related tax advantages. Because
the ISWL contract provides risk-reducing services to the provider of
funds (the contract holders), some or all of such cost of funds is offset.
The insurance company is rewarded for providing risk intermediation
services. Consider the aggregate of these costs and their offsets to be
a cost of funds basis point spread to Treasury.
The spread can be estimated for a line of business or a block of
policies at any time in its life. To accomplish this, solve for the spread
that when added to the respective risk-free zero coupon rates discounts
all future expected contract cash flows to the market value of funds
that insureds willingly provide to the insurer. Immediately prior to
issuance such assets equal zero; after the initial premium such assets
equal the premium reduced by the commission and other acquisition
costs incurred in issuance; at any time such assets equal the sum of all
net cash flows and their investment earnings at risk-adjusted rates.
Let CFc •t be the cash flow of component c at projection month t
where c is a nominal integer parameter taking possible values from
1 to 4 (1 = premium, 2 = surrender benefit, 3 = death benefit, and
4 = expense), and t = 1,2, ... ,480 (that is, 40 years). Thus, we are
interested in projecting cash flows component by component over 40
years. The cash flows can depend on the level and shape of the yield
curve at any projection month, and each month's discount rate also can
be different. This component by component approach is consistent
with pricing of mortgage-backed securities and derivatives that have
been in place for about a decade. See, for example, Roll (1988).
Let Zt be equal to the risk-free zero coupon rate at projection month
t, and ~k.t be an instantaneous shift in the zero coupon rate at time t for
key rate k, k = 1,2, ... ,9. The shift is applied to Zt at all t near the term
of a Treasury on-the-run instrument. Finally, let 5 be the spread. In this
analysiS the resultant presumed spread is set to 20 basis points for the
entire projection period. Using the semi-annual coupon convention of
the investment literature, let d be the market price discounting factor

16
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such that, at any month t,
dt

=

(

1 + Zt + ~;,t + 5

-t/6
)

(5)

A simple procedure provides the market value (MY) of ISWL,
4

MV=

I

00

ICFc,tdt.

(6)

c=lt=l

This analysis uses 480 months as a practical analog for infinity. Applying the methodology produces Table 1. Because this market value
measure is that of a liability, cash flows of the premium component
have a negative sign.
Table 1
Base Market Value ISWL
Component
Market Value
(71,687,488)
Premium
Surrender Benefit
53,262,613
34,190,301
Death Benefit
Expense
7,852,738
Aggregate
23,618,164
A few points are worth noting about these values relative to the
various in force values in the appendix:
• The aggregate market value is only about 50 percent of the statutory reserve, reflecting the conservative nature of statutory accounting principles;
• The surrender benefit is even higher than the fund or cash values
due primarily to the inclusion of future premiums in this component; and
• The death benefit is only about 5 percent of face amount, indicating the impact of withdrawals and the time value of money.

4

Notions of Duration

In general duration is a measure of the sensitivity of a stream of cash
flows to an interest rate change. Different notions of interest rate shifts
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are depicted graphically in Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 shows parallel and
nonparallel (Le., dampened) shifts from a base case yield curve. Figure
2 shows a piecewise dampened shift. Each shift produces a different
sensitivity, or duration, of the present value of the product cash flow.
Consider the following four concepts of duration.
Spread Duration: Spread duration is the percent sensitivity of market
value to a shift in s. This is similar to Macaulay duration and
modified duration which are measures of sensitivities to changes
in yield for fixed and certain cash flows. It is useful as an average
life index and as a measure of the capitalized value of a unit of
higher cost of funds. Mathematically,
.

Sprea dD uratlOn

= -

1 dMV

MV

-d.
s

(7)

Parallel Effective Duration: Parallel effective duration is the percent
sensitivity of market value to a parallel shift in z simultaneously
over all k. That is, ~k,t are equal at all k. This is the type of duration
customarily used in asset and liability matching. Mathematically,
Parallel Effective Duration

=

~ d=.

(8)

Dampened Effective Duration: Dampened effective duration is the percent sensitivity of market value to a function f that produces
nonparallel shift vector in z over all k such that: ~k,t > ~k+l,t.
Rates for months within a region also are shifted according to
the nonparallel function f. This is similar to effective duration,
but recognizes that short rate volatility typically exceeds long rate
volatility. In this analysis the average shift over the region k = 9
is about 60 percent of the average shift over the region k = l.
Mathematically,
Dampened Effective Duration

=

~ ~~

(9)

where the vector z is produced according to f.
Key Region Effective Duration: Key region effective duration is the percent sensitivity of market value to a set of shifts in z sequentially
over each k. Measures under either of the following two subsets
of this notion can be considered partial durations:
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Figure 1
Base and Shifted Yield Curves
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Parallel: This duration measures shifts by region of the curve.
Mathematically,
Parallel Duration =

~ dd~.
MV

(10)

",k,t

The methodology developed in this paper provides a duration, termed piecewise duration, to each significant point on
the yield curve. It effectively decomposes overall duration to
assess the impact of changes of pieces of the yield curve. For
example, the duration of a five year bond is about 4.2 percent;
about 70 percent of this duration can be attributed to the five
year rate. For instruments with fixed cash flows, piecewise
durations approximately sum to the aggregate durations. For
instruments whose cash flows are interest contingent piecewise durations may sum to a different number. The piecewise
(region-by-region) shifts in the yield curve are similar to Ho's
(1992) key rate duration methodology. This analysis shifts
entire segments of the yield curve by cutting and excising
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these portions. This happens over all t within a given region
k. Ho uses a series of triangle functions in shifting Treasury
on-the-run rates. Both methodologies create kinked undifferentiable curves. The curves used in this paper are also
discontinuous. This key region methodology, however, improves the performance of the aggregation of piecewise duration.
Dampened Duration: Dampened duration is similar to dampened
effective duration, but relates to the effect of dampened shifts
by region of the curve. Mathematically,
·

D ampene dD uratlOn

=:

1 dMV
MV---.

(11)

d~k,t

Figure 2
Base and Shifted Yield Curves: Key Rates
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Duration Calculations

Consider point estimates of these measures shown in Table 2. These
figures are scaled to a 100 basis point shift. Under dampened measures
figures are scaled to reflect an approximately 100 basis point shift over
the region k = 1. We show only the dampened category of key region
measurements.

Table 2
Point Estimate Durations
Component

Spread

Parallel
Effective

Dampened
Effective

Premium
Surrender Benefit
Death Benefit
Expense
Aggregate

-5.94
10.86
14.15
5.49
28.79

-5.94
3.78
7.93
5.49
3.82

-4.94
3.55
6.51
4.59
3.95

1
2
3
4
5
Component
-0.01 -0.03 -0.11 -0.02 -0.44
Premium
Surrender Benefit 0.01 0.05 0.12 0.35 0.5
o 0.02 0.06 0.17 0.29
Death Benefit
Expense
0.01 0.04 0.12 0.24 0.44
Aggregate
o 0.05 0.06 0.42 0.37

6

7

8

9

Total

-1.11
1.92
1.37
1.08
3.31

-1.85
1.32
3.45
1.58
2.89

-0.99
0.02
2.13
0.88
0.34

-0.16
0.45
0.21
0.19
1.75

-4.94
4.74
7.71
4.59
9.18

Premium duration figures are provided with respect to their effect
on the value of the liability. For example, at a higher discount spread
of 100 basis points the market value of premium will become less negative, producing a higher overall liability. In this sense premium has a
negative duration as well as a negative market value.
Consider also the more intuitive market value change by component
shown in Figure 3. See also the aggregate market value changes by
effective and dampened effective-type shifts shown in Figure 4. Each
of the figures shows a market value change from the base case resulting
from the indicated shift.
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Figure 3
Market Value Changes By Component Parallel Effective Shifts
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6

Discussion

Estimating the cost of funds is a complex process_ The rate credited
to the fund accumulations explains less of such cost than do analogous
rates in depository institution or corporate bond environments_ A simplistic comparison between a life company's asset earning rate and its
crediting rate provides inadequate information with respect to its net
spread_ Such comparison in a depository context, however, provides
much more significant information_ Market value approximations for
complex insurance liabilities, however, can be made_ Actuaries can provide market value estimates using the ideas presented in this paper-
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Figure 4
Aggregate Market Value Changes By Shift Type
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The death benefit component is highly positively convex4 due to
the mere length of the cash flows and to the effect of policy loans.
Our model of policy loans causes the death benefit component to have
greater absolute cash flows in lower interest rate environments, a combination sure to produce convexity. Liability convexity is not desirable.
The surrender benefit component is also highly positively convex due
primarily to the presence of the guaranteed rate in the contracts, which
acts as an interest rate floor. The effective duration of the surrender
benefit component, primarily a floating rate set of cash flows, is long
due to the lagged nature of adjustments to crediting rates.
4The concept of convexity refers to the extent that the price function changes over
greater yield intervals. A financial instrument is said to be positively (negatively) convex
when its duration increases (decreases) as the yield decreases. Positive convexity is
desirable for assets but not for liabilities.
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Financial managers need to decide whether to use the dampening
notion of effective duration or whether to use the strictly parallel approach. The alternative methods can give significantly different results. Long-tailed cash benefits and the customary front-loaded premium structure of whole life combine to produce a net asset at the beginning of contract time and a net liability at the end of such time. The
present value of this configuration is subject to yield curve twists such
as are emphasized in the difference between effective and dampened
effective durations.
Spread duration, indicating average lives of cash flow components,
are long with respect to the following components:
• Surrender benefits, as interest is capitalized rather than paid currently on the surviving contracts;
• Death benefits, because as the insureds of surviving contracts
grow older, cash flow increases; and
• Aggregate, because it is leveraged, in a sense, by negative premium
flows in earlier periods. The leveraged characteristic of this component renders its spread duration a less reliable measure of cash
flow life. It remains a measure of the value of a basis point change
in discounting spread.
Spread and effective durations are equal for fixed cash flow components such as premium and expense, and are different for interest
rate-sensitive cash flows such as surrender and death benefits.
Dampened effective durations and aggregate dampened effective
partial durations are equal for fixed cash flow components and different for cash flow components. Premium cash flows are fixed over
different scenarios even though surrender cash flows change. We have
fixed the incidence of surrender in the analysis by leaving the crediting
strategy unchanged-hence the constant premium cash flows. On the
other hand, the amount of surrender cash flows can change dramatically under different forward rate scenarios.
Because the partial durations with respect to interest-sensitive cash
flows are relatively high compared to an equivalent dampened effective
duration (in the context of Reitano (1990)), it appears that the interestsensitive nature of the cash flows has the effect of adding durational
leverage to the component. Other elements capable of causing the
effect include negative partial durations, portfolios of securities, and
short positions. Option-adjusted spread methodology would provide
yet additional texture to the duration results. Additionally, analogous
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shocks can be made in mortality and surrender scenarios to reveal additional risk measures.
A further consideration is the duration of cash flows distributable to
the stockholders. Under life insurance accounting conventions in most
states, dividends generally can be paid without restriction to the extent
of the prior year statutory earnings. In this case statutorily defined accounting and legal conventions actually drive a cash flow stream. In
most cases these conventions have a significant historical cost component that stabilizes earnings. As a result, intracompany durations and
the durations of returns to the ownership rights to such company may
diverge substantially. Management and stockholders rarely synthesize
an optimal duration position.

7

Conclusions

Life insurance companies can adapt market pricing methodologies
that customarily are used in the financial area to the cash flow provisions of their particular contracts. Adapting such methodologies can
provide rich insight into the market value of liabilities. These modeling
methodologies can guide investment strategies and provide management with measures of the market value of life company surplus.
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Appendix-Hypothetical ISWL Contract Terms and In
Force Assumptions
Following is a sample cell of the ISWL model used in the analysis.
Table Al
Representative Cell Information
Field
Gender
Weighted Average Issue Age
Smoking Classification
Premium Mode
Underwriting Class
Weighted Average Policy Age
Number of Policies
Basic Annual Premium
Total Face Amount (Policy yrs 1-10)
Total Face Amount (Policy yrs 11 +)
Total Fund Value
Total Cash Value
Total Statutory Reserve
Total Policy Loan

Value
Male
32
Nonsmoker
Monthly
Nonmedical
10 Years
70
$5.60/$1000
$7,605,500
$6,844,950
$266,633
$226,639
$250,740
$22,664

Common to all 102 cells of the analysis are a guaranteed crediting rate of 5.5 percent; a 15 year declining surrender charge schedule
as a percentage of existing fund value; a provision whereby interest
crediting on loaned balances can be less than on unloaned balances; a
specified agent commission schedule; and a standard servicing expense
structure. The descriptive statistics for the insured groups, weighted
by face amount, are: (i) issue age = 41.5, and (ii) months seasoned =
55.0.
Other beginning characteristics of the model contract are a face
amount of $709,585,000; cash value of $36,348,600; fund value of
$50,426,020; statutory reserve of $47,150,500; annualized premium
in projection month one of $5,886,800; and 6,951 policies. The analysis assumes a simple mortality experience equal to 80 percent of the
1975-80 basic select and ultimate mortality table.
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Participating GICs: Performance Attribution Analysis
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Abstract
The increasing popularity of participating GICs has created a need for an
objective understanding of their performance. The fixed income attribution
techniques are not adequate for measuring participating GIC performance because they typically restrict performance measurement to concepts such as
duration management, sector rotation, and issue selection. We develop an attribution technique based on four components or effects that are helpful in
explaining the changes in credited rates. They are the constant duration effect, the reinvestment effect, the cash flow effect, and the investment effect.
The underlying mathematical approach to calculating these effects is presented
along with examples.
Key words and phrases: investment, duration, yield, spread, cash flow, investment manager
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Introduction
Defined contribution plans often offer a stable value fund as an investment alternative. Stable value funds provide a fixed credited rate
and a guarantee of principal to participants. Plan sponsors historically
have invested in nonparticipating insurance company contracts called
GICs (guaranteed investment contracts) to support the principal plus
interest guarantees to participants. The Stable Value Association estimates that aggregate stable value funds currently account for approximately $300 billion in assets'! Recent years have seen the advent of
participating GIC products (often referred to as synthetic or separate
account GICs). These products reflect the investment experience of a
specific asset or portfolio of assets. Participating GICs now command
over half of all stable value sales, according to a recent Stable Value
Association survey.2
The increasing use of participating GICs within GIC/stable value
portfolios has created a need for an objective understanding of participating GIC performance. Performance measures were not required for
traditional GICs because performance essentially was guaranteed (ignoring default risk) in the form of a fixed credited rate. Fixed income
attribution techniques 3 are not sufficient for measuring participating
GIC performance. Such techniques typically restrict performance measurement to concepts such as duration management, sector rotation,
and issue selection. These techniques decompose portfolio experience
into components in order to isolate the performance effect of various
investment strategies.
Other concepts are often more important, however, in explaining
changes in participating GIC credited rates. Rennie (1994) deals with
some of these concepts but he does not explain the mechanics of an
attribution. As a result we have developed an attribution technique for
explaining changes in participating GIC credited rates. In particular, we
develop four key components or effects that are helpful in explaining
the changes in credited rates:
• The constant duration effect;
1 For more information on this survey, see the Stable Value Association's Guaran·
teed/Stable Value Product Sales: 1996 Sales-Participants Report. Hartford, Conn.: Life
Insurance Marketing & Research Association (LIMRA), June 30, 1996.
2 Again, see the Stable Value Association's Guaranteed/Stable Value Product Sales:
1996 Sales-Participants Report. Hartford, Conn.: Life Insurance Marketing & Research
Association (LIMRA), June 30, 1996.
3Fixed income attribution techniques decompose income security total returns into
components based on the sources or factors that contributed to the return. See, for
example, Dietz, Fogler and Hardy (1980) and Fong, Pearson and Vasicek (1983).
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• The reinvestment effect;
• The cash flow effect; and
• The investment effect.
Likewise, the investment effect consists of five subcomponents: investment market, spread; investment manager, time-weighted and nonconstant duration.
This approach described in this paper is not the only way to attribute
changes in credited rates, but we believe our approach offers several advantages. It helps plan sponsors to manage their stable value portfolios
by explaining, in an intuitive way, why credited rates on participating
GICs change. The framework can be integrated with the investment
manager's attribution of investment performance. The framework provides a mechanism to compare the participating GIC products of different providers.
To explain the conceptual framework behind our approach, we discuss the characteristics of participating GICs, the basic resetting formula and introduce our notation in Section 2. In Section 3 we develop our attribution methodology, which is based on the four key
components or effects described above that are helpful in explaining
the changes in credited rates. Section 4 consists of two detailed hypothetical examples illustrating our attribution methodology.

2

Background

2.1

Participating GIC Characteristics

Participating GIC products typically have these characteristics:
• They combine a market value fixed-income portfolio (bond fund)
with a book value guarantee (wrapper) that covers benefit payments to participants. A credited interest rate is established at the
inception of the contract and reset periodically (quarterly, semiannually, or annually) to reflect contract experience.
• They are similar to bond funds in that performance is recognized
immediately in the market value. In addition, participating GICs
possess other characteristics of bond funds: active management,
total return, market value, yield, and duration. Unlike bond funds,
however, performance is not immediately passed to participants
but is reflected prospectively in the form of adjustments to the
credited interest rate.
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• They possess some of the characteristics of traditional GICs: a
credited rate and a guarantee of principal. Unlike traditional GICs
that have a fixed credited rate that is guaranteed for the term of
the contract, participating GICs have a credited rate that changes
to reflect contract experience .
• Most participating GICs are designed as evergreen products with
no maturity date and assets managed around a constant duration.
We discuss only this common form of participating GICs, although
our framework can be modified to accommodate participating GICs
with a target maturity date.

2.2

The Resetting Formula

The formula used for resetting the credited rate for participating
GICs at time t (t = 0,1,2, ... ) typically is:
(1nVt + wefd

x (1 + Yt - ed d

=

(CVt + wefd

x (1 + CYd d

(1)

where the variables below are defined with respect to portfolio values
at time t:
1nVt
CVt
weft
Yt
et
dt
CYt

Market value of assets in fixed income portfolio;
Contract value or book value of liability;
Cash flow expectation for the period between resets;
Actual annualized market yield to maturity of the assets;
Contract expenses/fees;
Duration in years (usually the portfolio duration); and
Credited rate

with 1nVo = CVo and CYo = Yo - eo at the inception of the contract.
Equation (1) can be solved directly for CYt as a function of several
variables:

(2)
Equation (2) illustrates that the credited rate reflects current investment yields plus the amortized effect of any differences between market value and contract value.
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Notation

Throughout the rest of this paper, the following notation is used
in subscripts and superscripts to denote quantities subjected to the
particular effect:
CD
RI
CF
IV
1M

SP
IX
MG

ND

Constant duration;
Reinvestment;
Cash flow;
Investment;
Investment market;
Spread;
Investment index;
Investment manager; and
Nonconstant duration.

In addition, without loss of generality, we will change our time reference point from the time of the inception of the contract to the time
of the prior (previous) reset, i.e.,
• as time t - 1 represents the prior (previous) reset, events at time
t - 1 are denoted with the subscript 0; and
• as time t represents the current reset, events at time t are denoted
with the subscript 1.
Also, fees are assumed to be held constant between the prior reset and
the current reset, i.e., et = eo = e for 0 :::; t < 1.

3 The Attribution Methodology
3.1

The Four Components

Let ~cro denote the change in the credited rate that occurs from
prior reset (time 0) to current reset (time 1), i.e.,
(3)

The values of the variables 11tVo, CVo, wefo, Yo, eo, and do serve as the
starting point for credited rate reset attribution. All effects are measured relative to these values. Each of the intermediate steps involved
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in changing the values of these variables at time 0 to their respective
values at time 1 corresponds to a component or effect.
The change in the credited rate can be decomposed into four components: a constant duration effect, a reinvestment effect, a cash flow
effect and an investment effect. The fundamental equation for the decomposition of the change in the credited rate is as follows:

(4)
where

t. cr6CD )

The constant duration effect;

t.cr(RI)

The reinvestment effect;

t. cr6

)

The cash flow effect; and

)

The investment effect.

o

CF

t.crg

V

In addition, the investment effect is decomposed further into five subcomponents as follows:
t.crg V )

t.crg M) + t.cr6SP) + t.cr6MG) + t.cr6TW) + t.cr6ND)

=

(5)

where
t.cr(IM)

o

6)
t. cr6MG )
t. cr

SP

t. cr6TW )
t.cr6ND )

The investment market effect;
The spread effect;
The investment manager effect
The time-weighted effect; and
The nonconstant duration effect.

This attribution framework is sufficiently flexible to accommodate
a wide variety of methods of measuring yields and durations including:
• Portfolio, index, or model yields and durations;
• Duration-weighted or market value-weighted yields;
• Option-adjusted yields and durations; and
• Macaulay or modified durations.
In our examples in Section 4, we use duration-weighted portfolio yields,
Macaulay portfolio durations as the amortization period, and annual
resets. We do not use time-weighted cash flows.
Next we develop the formulas needed to compute magnitude of each
effect.
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The Constant Duration Effect

Participating GICs have a constant duration product design, i.e., they
do not have a maturity date. Assets are managed around a constant (or
target) duration, d, which is consistent with plan sponsor objectives.
As equation (2) shows, any difference between mvl and CVl is amortized over the constant duration, d. The amortization process acts as
a smoothing mechanism, reducing the volatility of returns to participants. It also will cause mvt and CVt to converge to each other (as
t - 00) in a stable interest rate environment.
Assume market value is below contract value. As equation (2) indicates, the credited rate will be lower than the market yield, as the
loss is amortized. In a constant duration product the difference grows
smaller each year, but is still amortized over the initial duration. This
creates a declining drag on the credited rate; see Figure 1. With a fixed
maturity product design (declining duration) the credited rate would
have remained unchanged until the end of the fourth year, at which
time market value would have equaled contract value.
With a constant amortization period the credited rate will change
even if all other prior reset assumptions are realized. Over time the
credited rate will approach the portfolio's net yield. In summary, the
constant duration effect captures the effect of a constant duration product design as opposed to a fixed maturity product design.
The constant duration effect is calculated by assuming that the portfolio returns its net yield and the contract value grows at the credited
rate. In mathematical notation,
rv(CD) - er(CD)

A
Ll<'-IO

1

-

-

CYi
0

(6)

where
mv(CD)
1

cviCD)
er(CD)
1

ero

3.3

(mvo
(cvo

+ wcfo) x (1 + Yo

- e)

+ wcfo) x (1 + ero)
CD)

er «mv 1

(CD)

'CV 1

,0,Yo - e,

d 0 ) an d

er(mvo, CVo, wcfo, Yo - e, do).

(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)

The Reinvestment Effect

As interest rates change, the effect on the bond portfolio is twofold.
A drop in interest rates tends to increase the portfolio's market value
and decrease the portfolio's yield. In an instantaneous interest rate
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Figure 1
Constant Duration Effect
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Time
shift these effects are largely offsetting, and the credited rate will remain stable.
As the portfolio moves through time in a lower interest rate environment, however, it tends to earn less coupon income. Thus, at the
end of the year the portfolio's market value will reflect the impact of
the lower coupon income. Consequently, the credited rate will be reduced. In other words, the overall impact on the credited rate should
be in the same direction as the movement in market interest rates. In
summary, the reinvestment effect captures the responsiveness of the
credited rate to the movement in market interest rates.
The reinvestment effect is calculated by assuming that the yield on
the portfolio changes by the change in interest rates and the portfolio
return reflects the change in yield. We use Treasury yields as a proxy
for interest rates. Using Treasury yields and temporarily ignoring the
effect of spread, credit, and prepayment factors, the portfolio return is
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given by:
R RI

= (1

+ Yo - e +

(T1-fex ))(
2

O

l+Yo-e
)d
- 1 (ll)
1 + Yo - e + (Tl - Tex)

where
Tt

fav

The Treasury rate at time t (0 :s; t :s; 1);
mvo x To + wefo x f av .
and
mvo + wefo
A weighted average of Treasury rates over time.

(12)

Note that fav is given in the examples that follow. Also, fex is the
weighted average of Treasury rates using the initial market value and
the expected cash flows as weights.
In mathematical notation,
(13)

where
(mvo + wefo)(l + RRI)

(14)

Yo + Tl - fex

(15)

and
cr(mviRI), cviCD), 0, yiRI) - e, do).

3.4

(16)

The Cash Flow Effect

Many participating GICs accept ongoing contributions and make benefit payments at book value. Cash flow expectations are reflected in the
reset formula, i.e., in the prior reset assumption wefo. If actual cash
flow experience (amount and timing) matches expectations, we define
the cash flow effect to be zero. Therefore, our cash flow effect incorporates deviations from both the expected amount of cash flow and
expected interest rates (at which the cash flow was invested). In summary, the cash flow effect captures the effect of unexpected cash flows
on the credited rate.
The cash flow effect is calculated by adjusting the market value and
contract value to reflect the actual as opposed to the expected cash
flows.
R CF = (1

ac
+ Yo - e + (T1-f )) (

2

l+yo-e 1 + Yo - e + (Tl - Tac)

)d

O

- 1 (17)
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where

-

Tae

=

mvo x To + Ii:oeii x Tt;
mvo + Ii=o eii
00

(18)

°

and eii is the actual i-th cash flow at time ti, with = to < tl < t2 < ....
Note that rae is the weighted average of Treasury rates using the initial
market value and the actual cash flows as weights.
In mathematical notation,
(19)

where
The actual cash flow received;

acio

mviCF )

+ acio) x (1 + RCF)
CVI
and
cr(mviCF), cviCF ), 0, yiRI) - e, do).
(mvo

cviCF )
cri CF )

3.5

(20)
(21)
(22)

The Investment Effect

This investment effect component can be further divided into five
subcomponents: investment market, spread, investment manager, timeweighted and nonconstant duration. From equation (4), we know that
/::,.crg V)

=

(cri - cro) - (criCD) - cro)
- (criRI) - criCD») - (cri CF ) - criRI))
(CF)
crI - crI

(23)

It follows that the sum of the effects of the five subcomponents must

satisfy equation (23). We now review each of these subcomponents
individually.
3.5.1

The Investment Market Effect

The investment market effect captures the impact of the chosen investment universe on the credited rate. The investment universe is
represented by the index or other benchmark selected to evaluate the
portfolio's performance. Participating GIC contracts allow for a variety
of portfolio structures and benchmarks, developed by mutual agreement between the plan sponsor and the investment manager.
The investment market effect is designed to provide a basis for evaluating benchmark performance by a manager. (The basis or proxy is
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indexed management or a manager whose return exactly matches the
chosen benchmark.) The performance of the index is compared to the
rate needed to support the initial credited rate. This is expressed in
terms of a Treasury-plus-spread benchmark. Treasuries are used because they are the universal underpinning of all fixed income prices
and returns.
We calculate the investment market effect by performing a rate reset
with a market value calculated using the index return. In mathematical
notation,
(24)
where
The index return.
(mvo + acjo)(l + RIX)
(IX)

(RI)

cr(mv 1 ,CV1, 0, Yl

and

(25)

)
- e, d o.

(26)

The comparison of a standard market index, such as the Lehman
aggregate or government/corporate index, to a Treasury-plus-spread
benchmark implicitly assumes the use of non-Treasury assets. The
actual impact on the credited rate is derived from the fact that the
total return of the index incorporates initial spread plus changes in
spreads, while the Treasury-plus-spread proxy only incorporates the
initial spread.
For example, the Lehman MBS index may yield 100 basis points over
Treasuries at the start of the year, with a four year index duration.
Assume that mortgage spreads widen 50 basis points during the year,
with Treasury rates and durations remaining unchanged. The mortgage
portfolio will underperformduration-matched Treasuries by roughly 75
basis points during the year (assuming spread change occurs uniformly
over the year). The investment market effect will be roughly -44 basis
pOints (-75 basis points actual performance versus +100 basis points
assumed performance produces a 175 basis point difference amortized
over four years). The spread widening will be reflected in the spread
effect (see below) of +50 basis points, more than offsetting the investment market effect.

3.5.2 The Spread Effect
Spread widening/tightening may offset the investment market effect
results because widening asset spread to Treasuries negatively impacts
portfolio return. The impact of spread changes on portfolio return is
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recognized in the investment market effect. The impact on the yield
to maturity is recognized in the spread effect. These effects therefore should be viewed together rather than individually. An increase
in spread translates directly into a like increase in yield which in turn
translates directly into a like increase in the credited rate. The opposite
holds for a decrease in spread. Thus
(27)

where
(SP)

crl

3.5.3

=

(

(IX)

cr ntVI

,CVI,O,YI -

e,do).

(28)

The Investment Manager Effect

The investment manager effect is designed to show the effect of a
manager's performance (relative to a benchmark) on the credited rate.
The manager's relative performance (also called the excess return) is
RMG - R,x where RMG is the portfolio return.
We compute the investment manager effect by performing a rate
reset with a market value calculated using the actual portfolio return.
In mathematical notation,
(29)

where
(ntVo

+ acio)( 1 + RMG) and

(30)

)
e, d o.

(31)

(MG)

cr ( ntVI

,CVI,

0, YI

-

This effect can be analyzed in further detail using standard portfolio management attribution techniques. These techniques typically allocate the manager's excess return to categories such as duration management, yield curve management, sector and security selection, and
other factors relative to the performance benchmark. This analysis can
be incorporated easily into the credited rate attribution framework by
applying a factor of (1/ do) to each category in the portfolio attribution
analysis. For example, if the manager added 15 basis points of return
through duration management for a five year duration portfolio, the
credited rate impact would be (15/5 =) 3 basis points.
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The Time-Weighted Effect

So far we have used the time-weighted rates of return4 adjusted for
the impact of actual cash flows for three previous effects (cash flow effect, the investment market effect, and the investment manager effect).
As a result, there is a residual effect, which we call the time-weighted
effect that is given by:
(32)

where
(33)

3.5.5

The Nonconstant Duration Effect

The duration of the portfolio at the current reset (time 1) probably
will change from the duration at the prior reset (time 0). Regardless of
the reason (rate anticipation strategy, revised client objectives, duration
drift), duration changes will affect both the portfolio return (investment
manager effect) and the amortization period. For example, duration
shortening will accelerate the recognition of any gains or losses. s
The duration effect is calculated by substituting the actual portfolio
duration at time 1. In mathematical notation,
(34)

where
(35)

3.6
3.6.1

Other Considerations
Investment Risks

Plan sponsors are accustomed to thinking in terms of investment
risks including reinvestment risk, credit risk, prepayment risk, liquidity
risk, and active management risk. These risks are inherent in one or
more of the four components or effects introduced in Section 2 above.
In particular,
4The dollar-weighted return may have been used instead, but it requires more complicated calculations.
5This effect refers to the end-of-year portfolio duration, not the management of the
portfolio duration during the year. Duration management has been accounted for in
the investment manager effect.
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• Reinvestment risk is captured by the reinvestment effect;
• Credit risk, i.e., a decline in credit quality, appears as a negative
impact in the investment market effect and a positive impact in
the spread effect;
• Prepayment (extension) risk appears as a negative impact in the
investment market effect and presumably a positive impact in the
spread effect. In addition, prepayments (extensions) reduce (increase) duration and thus the amortization period. The direction
of the impact on the duration effect depends on the ratio of market value to book value;
• The realization of liquidity risk appears as a negative impact in
the investment market effect and a positive impact in the spread
effect; and
• Active management risk affects the investment manager effect.

3.6.2

Treatment of Cash Flows

We ignore future cash flow expectations for the current reset, i.e.,
we assume wefI = O. If well does not equal zero, the future cash flow
assumption will affect the credited rate because it affects the ma.rket-tocontract value ratio. Positive assumed cash flow increases the credited
rate when market value is less than book value. Negative assumed cash
flow decreases the credited rate when market value is less than book
value. The effects are reversed in a situation where market value is
above contract value.
Though cash flow is not a significant element for most contracts,
some contracts have significant and frequent cash flows. For these
contracts cash flows can be handled more precisely by using dollarweighted portfolio returns instead of time-weighted portfolio returns.
Using dollar-weighted returns will eliminate the time-weighted effect
described in Section 3.5.4. Otherwise, the change in credited rate may
be incorrectly allocated between the cash flow effect, the investment
market effect, and the investment manager effect. The allocation problem concerns the timing of any market or manager outperformance
during the reset period.

3.6.3

Participant Equity

The smoothing mechanism raises the issue of equity among plan
participants. For instance, when the market value is below contact
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value, Le., mvt < CVt, the credited rate will be lower than current the
market yield, Le., crt < Yt as indicated by equation (2). A participant
who withdraws funds at contract value causes the portfolio to realize
a market value loss. As the remaining participants participate in the
experience of the portfolio, they will be hurt by the withdrawal in the
form of lower future credited rates.
The participant equity issue is inherent in any blended rate stable
value plan. The extent of the participant equity issue depends on the
overall plan design and operation, not just the characteristics of one
of the plan's investments. By helping plan sponsors to better understand the behavior of one possible investment (the participating GIC),
the attribution methodology can help plan sponsors better address the
equity issue.

4

Two Examples

4.1

Example 1: Prior Reset Assumptions Realized

4.1.1

Prior Reset Assumptions

These assumptions were made one year ago (Le., at time t
last time the credited interest rate was reset:

=

0), the

• The portfolio had a 2.1% market value loss. This implies that
mvo = (1 - 0.021) x CVo = 97.9% of CVo;

• mvo = 93.0 and CVo = 95.0;
• A $5 cash flow expected at t

=

0.5, Le., wefo

=

5.0;

• Cash flows are not time-weighted;
• The portfolio net yield will be Yo - e

=

8%;

• Interest rates will remain unchanged; and
• On average, funds are to mature in four years, making do
From equation (2) we have
cro

93.0 + 5.0) 1/4 x (1 + 0.08) _ 1
( 95.0 + 5.0

0.0746.

=

4.
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4.1.2

Actual Activity Since Prior Reset

As we prepare to reset the interest rate today (Le., at time t = 1), we
must review the actual performance of the contract. For this example,
let us assume all prior reset assumptions were realized, meaning:
• Actual cash flow of $5 at t

=

0.5;

• No change in interest rates;
• The portfolio actually returned a net yield of 8%; and
• On average, funds are now expected to mature in three years, making the duration d 1 = do - 1 = 3.

4.1.3

The Calculations

Once the assumptions are exactly realized, the credited rate must
be equal to the constant duration credited rate, Le.,
cr1 -- cr(CD)
1

So, using equations (7) and (8) we see that:
105.84 from equation (7);
107.46 from equation (8); and
Yo - e = 8%.
Equation (9) gives

crl

=

cr(105.84, 107.46,0,8%,3) = 7.46%.

As the assumptions were exactly realized, it is not surprising that
the credited rate is unchanged from the initial credited rate established
at time O.

4.2

Example 2: Prior Reset Assumptions Not Realized

In developing this example, we use the same set of prior reset assumptions that are described in Section 4.1.1. As a result cro = 7.46%
as before.
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Actual Activity Since Last Reset

As we prepare to reset the interest rate today, the actual activities
since last reset are listed below:
• Interest rates (using Treasuries as a proxy) declined 1% from time
o to time 1. Specifically, Treasury rates were To = 7.50%, To.s =
7.00%, Tl = 6.50%, and fay = 7.00%;
• The only actual cash flow received was $15 (acfo
ately following the prior reset at time 0;6

=

15) immedi-

• R,x = 0.11, i.e., the index returned 11% from time 0 to time 1 (net
of fees e)/
• The manager returned 11.50% from time 0 to time 1 (net of contract fees e), i.e., RMG = 11.5%. (The manager outperformed the
index by 50 basis points);
• The portfolio duration at time 1 is 4.25 years, i.e., d 1
other words, the portfolio lengthened by 1/4 year;

=

4.25. In

• The actual portfolio net yield at time 1 is 7.10%, i.e.,
Yl - e = 7.10%;8
This gives
(93 + 15) x 1.115 = 120.50
(95 + 15) x 1.0746 = 118.21 and
cr(120.50, 118.21,0,7.10%,4.25) = 7.58%.

rnvl
CVl

en
4.2.2

The Component Effects

Constant Duration Effect: From equation (6),
rnv(CD)
1
CV(CD)
1
cr(CD)

1

(93 + 5) x 1.08

=

105.84

(95 + 15) x 1.0746

=

107.46

cr(l05.84, 107.46,0,8%,4)

=

7.59%

6The additional cash flow was received while the contract was in deficit (market
value below contract value). This unexpected cash flow reduced the deficit and thus
increased the credited rate. The subsequent fall in interest rates during the year has
been captured in the reinvestment effect.
7The index returned 58 basis points less than the Treasury-plus-spread bogey.
8Thus, yields fell 90 basis points (from 8% to 7.10%) from time 0 to time 1 while
interest rates fell 100 basis points. In other words, spreads increased 10 basis points.
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giving
t.,.cr~CD)

=

7.59% - 7.46%

=

0.13%.

rex

Reinvestment Effect: From equation (12),
= 7.47, so RRI can be
calculated from equation (11) to give RRI = 11.47%. This rate ignores the
effect of spread, credit, and prepayment factors. Thus, from equations
(14), (15) and (16), we have
(93 + 5) x (1 + 0.1147)
Yo - e + Tl -

rex =

109.24

=

7.03%

cr(109.24, 107.46,0, 7.03%,4) = 7.47%

giving
t.,.cr~RI)

= 7.47% - 7.59% = -0.12%.

Cash Flow Effect: To isolate the effect of cash flows we adjust the
mv and
terms for the amount and timing of actual cash flow, acfo.
As there was only one cash flow and it occurred at time 0, then
=
To = 7.5%. Accounting for unexpected cash flow, the portfolio returned
11.58%, Le., RCF = 0.1158 (after using equation (17)).

cv

rae

(CF)

mv 1

cvi

CF

)

crfF)

(93.0 + 15.0) x (1 + 0.1158)
CVl =

=

120.51

118.21

cr(120.51, 118.21,0,7.03%,4) = 7.55%

giving
t.,.cr~CF) = 7.55% - 7.47% = 0.08%.

Investment Market Effect: Using equations (2), (25) and (26) to get:
(93.0 + 15.0) x (1 + 0.11)

=

119.88

cr(119.88, 118.21,0,7.03%,4) = 7.41%

giving
t.,.crg

M

)=

7.41% - 7.59%

=

-0.14%.
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Spread Effect: Using equation (2B) we find:
cr?P) = cr(l19.BB, 11B.21, 0,7.10%,4) = 7.4B%

giving
6.cr6SP) ~ 7.4B% - 7.41% = 0.07%.

Investment Manager Effect: Using equations (30) and (31), we find:
(93.0 + 15.0) x (1 + 0.115)

=

120.42

cr(120.42, 11B.21, 0,7.10%,4) = 7.60%

giving
6.cr6MG) = 7.60% - 7.4B% = 0.12%.

Time-Weighted Effect: Using equations (32) and (33), we find:
criTW ) = cr(l20.42, 11B.21, 0,7.10%,4) = 7.60%

giving
6.cr6TW) = 7.60% - 7.60% = 0.00%.

Note that the time-weighted return equals the dollar weighted return
since the only cash flow occurs at time O.
Duration Effect: Using equations (34) and (35) we find:
cri ND ) = cr(l20.42, 11B.21, 0, 7.10%,4.25) = 7.57%

giving
6.crt D )

4.3

= 7.57% - 7.60% = -0.03%.

Summary of Attribution

The credited interest rate in our example changed from 7.46 percent to 7.57 percent, a net increase of 11 basis points in a declining
interest rate environment. The credited rate benefited from the amortization of a previous market value loss, unexpected cash flow when
market rates were favorable, manager outperformance, and widening
spreads. Adverse factors included a declining interest rate environment, a longer portfolio duration, and underperformance by the portfolio's investment universe relative to initial assumptions.
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Table Al
Summary of Components

Prior Credited Rate
1. Constant Duration Effect
2. Reinvestment Effect
3. Cash Flow Effect
4. Investment Effects
A. Investment Market
B. Spread
C. Investment Manager
D. Time-Weighted
E. Duration
Total
New Credited Rate

7.46%
+0.l3%
-0.12%
+0.08%
-0.14%
+0.07%
+0.12%
0.00%
-0.03%
+0.02%

+0.02%
7.57%

5 Conclusion
The increasing use of participating GICs within GIC/stable value
portfolios has created a need for objective measures of performance
attribution. When a credited rate is reset, providers should expect to
provide detailed attribution analyses that explain how the new credited
rate was derived.
Current explanations discuss, in general terms, such concepts as issue selection and yield curve positioning. These explanations ignore,
however, other important concepts such as product design (constant
duration effect), credited rate responsiveness (reinvestment effect), cash
flows (cash flow effect), initial return assumption (investment market
effect), and amortization period (duration effect). We have presented a
framework to explain the performance of participating GICs by isolating the effects of all relevant factors.
Our approach analyzes these effects in static fashion and in a particular order. We recognize that in actuality these components are likely
to affect performance in a dynamic way.
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Historical Overview

Both financial economists and actuaries have been involved in the
development of quantitative asset allocation techniques for many years.
The two major asset allocation techniques examined are immunization
and mean/variance analysis.

1.1

Immunization

In 1952 Redington introduced the theory of immunization. Since
then, the theory of immunization has had a profound influence on
the way actuaries approach the valuation of insurance companies and
their assessment of solvency. As a practical asset/liability management
(ALM) model for insurance companies, immunization has had little competition to date. Tilley (1988) remarked that "a whole investment advisory business has grown up in the United States around immunization
concepts."
The idea of equating the duration l of assets with the duration of
liabilities has been used widely by insurance companies worldwide. Recently the notion of convexity (which is similar to duration, but with
second derivatives replacing first derivatives) has given immunization
new life. But immunization does have its limitations: (i) it has little relevance to interest-sensitive and performance-linked products; and (ii)
immunization immunizes against profits as well as against loss.
Redington's ideas today may be viewed as the classical actuarial approach to ALM. The success of the Redington model as an accepted
ALM tool lies in its relative simplicity and the ease with which the calculations necessary to test immunization can be made. As Buff (1989)
states "if you can't compute it, you can't compute it." It is not possible to
use theoretical advances unless it is feasible to execute the calculations
necessary in these advances.
Actuarial research into ALM modeling was muted for many years
after Redington, but the actuarial profession recently has found a new
interest in the subject. Some of the most interesting work has been in
the United Kingdom where pioneering stochastic investment modeling
has been done by Wilkie (1986). The focus of the U.K. work, however,
is in the area of solvency testing. See Hardy (1993) for an excellent
example of the usage of stochastic modeling in assessing solvency.
A new concept is beginning to appear in the ALM literature in the U.S.
concerning solvency in connection with ALM; this is the idea that ALM
1 Duration of a financial instrument is a measure of its sensitivity to interest rates
at various points on the yield curve.
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focuses on asset/liability surplus management (ALSM). ALSM refers to
ALM that focuses on the NAIC risk-based capital standards. These standards require certain minimum surplus amounts to be maintained in
respect of various classifications of risk. An ALSM model might assess
how well the required minimum surplus levels are likely to hold using the potential investment strategies under consideration. Hepokoski
(1994) gives an excellent introduction to ALSM as an extension of ALM.
In practice, an asset allocation model might view the risk-based capital
standards as constraints rather than defining risk purely in terms of
those standards.

1.2

Mean/Variance Analysis

The same year that Redington published his ideas on immunization,
one of the most important papers of modern financial economics also
was published. In 1952 Markowitz introduced the idea of asset allocation within a risk/reward tradeoff framework.
Markowitz notes that a reduction in risk, measured by the standard
deviation of return on assets, could be achieved by diversification (into
assets whose returns are uncorrelated) without any reduction in return.
Markowitz also introduced the idea of an efficient frontier, which is a
curve joining the risk/reward combinations of asset mixes that give the
highest reward for any given level of risk.
At the time the financial world was not ready for the concept of
an efficient frontier-to return to Buff's truism, computer power had
not reached the stage where Markowitz's ideas could be implemented.
A practical adaptation of these ideas had to wait over a decade, when
Sharpe (1963) introduced the diagonal model that suggests that the future price of a security depends on its alpha, the market return through
its beta, and a random error term, the values based on simple linear regression on historical data. This marked the birth of the now widely
used capital asset pricing model.
Sharpe (1970) suggests that mean and variance alone "may suppress
too much reality" and that a different utility curve may be needed to
compare different portfolios of different riskiness. Risk is not necessarily the same for all investors; in Arthur's words (1989), "risk is in the
eye of the beholder."
Many of Sharpe's ideas in the area of asset/liability management are
summarized in Managing Investment Portfolios (1990). In this volume
he presents the concepts of risk/reward indifference curves and states
that "the optimal asset mix lies at the point at which an indifference
curve is tangent to (Le., touches but does not intersect) the curve along
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which the efficient investment opportunities lie." He also presents a
complete ALM model for a defined benefit pension scheme in which reward is defined in terms of surplus return (equal to the change in value
of surplus divided by the initial asset value) and risk is the standard
deviation of the surplus return. Such a model is close to the model we
use in this paper.

1.3

Other Approaches to ALM

Other variations on the efficient frontier idea experiment with constraints that can be used to narrow acceptable portfolio mixes on the
efficient frontier. They also attempt to be dynamic in the sense that acceptable portfolio mixes change and reflect the particular market conditions present at any particular time.
A good example of such a model is developed by Leibowitz, Kogelman, Bader, and Dravid (1994). Looking at a one year time horizon,
their model updates the asset allocation strategy whenever interest
rates move. Their model does not just look at portfolios on the efficient frontier, but also introduces the constraint that portfolios must
have no more than a specified probability of generating one year returns
that fall below a certain level. This is incorporated by the introduction
of a shortfall line, such that all portfolios above the line of constraint
meet the maximum probability criterion.
If interest rates fall (with the equity risk premium, stock and bond
volatilities, and stock/bond correlations all held constant) the entire
risk/reward curve will shift down, decreasing the expected returns of
all potential portfolio mixes. With the shortfall line unchanged, market conditions make all portfolios riskier in shortfall terms, and few
portfolios will fall above the shortfall line. This requires revision of the
bond/equity mixes previously deemed acceptable.
1.4

Objectives of this Paper

We will develop a simple model of an insurance company and use
it to explore some of the basic concepts of ALM. The model is a true
ALM model where the two sides of an institution's balance sheet are
considered equally in setting or appraising long-term investment policy.
The nature of financial risk is briefly explored. Risk is related to
the chance of not meeting the rate of return that is required to support
a life insurer's liabilities, rather than the typical risk measures postulated by mean/variance models. A specific measure of risk, based on
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the probability of continued solvency rather than asset volatility, is introduced.
The company is assumed to invest only in domestic stocks and longdated government bonds. Stochastic simulation is used to create a large
number of future investment scenarios using historical total return data
for domestic stocks and long-dated government bonds. The ability of
the institution to meet its liabilities under each simulated scenario is
examined for each possible mix of assets and risk characteristic. Thus,
for each asset mix, the model produces a certain level of risk and a
certain level of reward.
We then assess the minimum level of risk for any particular level
of reward; the asset mix that produces such a level of risk is retained,
and all such retained risk/reward points are plotted to create an optimal risk/reward profile. The paper demonstrates that such optimal
risk/reward profiles-and hence the optimal asset allocation strategycan vary considerably by liability profile.

2 VVhat is Return?
Although the meaning of the term return on assets usually can be
taken for granted in financial modeling-it is based on market value
changes after allowing for positive and negatiye cash flows-this is not
the case in an ALM model. This extra consideration arises because definitions of return and risk must be consistent.
In our paper risk is viewed as the ability of the financial institution
to demonstrate, from time to time, that it is in a financially stable situation. This requires an assessment of the solvency of the institution by
comparing the actual value of assets with the value of assets required
for the institution to meet future liabilities.
For a U.S. life office a solvency valuation is required by regulation,
and asset values in such a solvency test are prescribed by state law or
by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). This
valuation generally requires carrying assets at market values, although
there are important exceptions such as amply secured bonds not in
default that are written up or down in order that the value at maturity
will equal the maturity value. To be consistent with the risk/solvency
assessment, return must be defined in terms of return on the actuarial
value of assets as carried in the solvency valuation, and these values
mayor may not be market values.
Our highly simplified model office is in a financially unstable condition if the office becomes insolvent, which will arise if the actual return
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on assets falls below the expected return on assets used in pricing the
liabilities. (The expected return is the terms on which the business was
sold.) In other words, risk is defined in terms of underperforming the
pricing assumptions over the lifetime of the policies. No reference is
made to valuation margins and capital (the reserves and, therefore, the
value of assets required from year to year are based purely on the assumptions used in setting the premium rates), and the values of assets
are based on market returns. In effect, risk is in terms of actual market
returns underperforming expected market returns, so both risk and return need to be defined in terms of market values. The actuarial value
of assets is defined as the market value of assets.
In practice, the risk of insolvency should not be judged against pricing assumptions with no valuation margins and no capital; if valuation
margins and capital were incorporated, it would be more appropriate
for the risk measures to be based on statutory results rather than simply on market values. Also, risk ideally should be measured not just by
the probability of underperforming, but by the amount of underperformance.

3 The Model
There are four important stages in the development and exploration
of the model:
• An assessment has to be made of the probability distribution of
the returns on assets available to the financial institution;
• An accurate cash flow projection must be made of the future liability outgo of the financial institution;

• Using the information about the probability distribution of asset
returns, large numbers of possible investment scenarios must be
derived. The performance of the fund in meeting the liabilities
under each scenario must be examined; and
• A large number of runs will enable an assessment of how a partic-

ular mix of the various asset classes will meet the liabilities. This
assessment forms the basis for the construction of a risk/reward
profile from which possible optimal asset mixes can be considered
for investment policy.
The means used to explore the model is via Simulation, where the simulated variable is the return on assets. Simulation is necessary because
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a mathematical solution to the model is too complicated. This complication is due not to the intractability of the return on assets, but is
due to the other variable in the model-the risk variable-which is not
necessarily a straightforward variable to handle mathematically. Even
the risk variable that we adopted for this paper, although simple in
concept, is difficult to express mathematically. More sophisticated definitions of risk that also incorporate constraints would pose even more
of a challenge.
As a result, the simulation process starts by generating random observations for the random variable with a known distribution (or at
least a distribution for which a reasonable assessment can be made)
that can be used to calculate random observations for the complicated
random variable. From these observations it is possible to make inferences about the distribution of the complicated variable.
We assume that the financial institution being assessed is a life office
that issues a large number of level annual premium whole life policies
on male lives age 50 at entry, and these policies all begin today. The
only decrement is mortality, and this is assumed to accord with the
Society of Actuaries (SOA) 75-80 15 Year Select and Ultimate Table (age
nearest birthday). All expenses and commissions are assumed to be
zero.
Let Ft be the fund at end of policy year t. The model tracks forward
for each of the years for which the whole life contracts are expected to
be in force and computes the following for t = 1, 2, ... :
Ft = (Ft -1

+ Pd(1 + i) - Ct(l + £)1/2

(1)

where
i
Pt
Ct

Interest rate used to determine the net premium;
Net premium received at start of policy year t; and
Aggregate claims in policy year t.

Claims are assumed to occur on average in the middle of the year.
Thus, the sequence {Ft } represents the target fund level to which
the office should strive, based on an investment return equal to that
assumed in the premium basis. If the actual fund falls persistently
below this target fund in practice, the office is heading toward financial
difficulties. It is therefore appropriate to examine the success of any
particular investment policy in generating a fund size consistently at
least as great as the target fund.
Let Nt be the Simulated fund at the end of policy year t, then
Nt = (Nt-1

+ Pd(1 + sd - Cdl + sd 1/ 2

(2)
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where St is the simulated annual rate of return in policy year t; and P t
and Ct are as previously defined. Mathematically, St is defined as the
weighted average of the simulated annual rates of return from stocks
and bond, Le.,
St

=

Pt X

Simulated Annual Return on Stocks

+ (1 - pd x Simulated Annual Return on Bonds

(3)

where Pt is the proportion of assets invested in stocks during policy
year t.
Thus, for example, suppose that in year 1 we have the following
information:
• There is a mix of 60 percent in stocks and 40 percent in bonds;
• The annual rates of return on stocks and bonds are 0.1507 and
-0.0014, respectively;
• The level net annual premium for a whole life policy covering a
male age 50, face amount of $1,000, using the SOA 75-8015 Year
Select and Ultimate Tables and assuming a rate of interest of 6
percent, is PI = $16.38; and
• The expected claims cost for year 1 is Cl

=

1.7.

We can determine Fl and Nl as follows:
Fl = (0 + 16.38) x 1.06 - 1.7 x (1.06)1/2 = $15.61
PI = 0.6 and
SI

= 0.6 x 0.1507 + 0.4 x -0.0014 = 8.986%

yielding
Nl = (0 + 16.38) x (1 + 0.08986) - 1.7 x (1 + 0.08986)1/2 = $16.08.

As the simulated fund is in excess of the target fund, the office may be
off to a good start.

4

The Probability Distribution of Asset Classes

The most difficult aspect of the construction of the model is determining the probability distribution of the available asset classes. To
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avoid complicated analysis, we consider exclusively common stocks
and long-dated government bonds. In our opinion this is a reasonable
starting point for any discussion of the basic asset allocation decision
process for a u.s. financial institution.
We use the annual total returns for common stocks and long-term
bonds compiled by Ibbotson Associates of Chicago. The data for these
returns go back as far as 1926 and are shown in Table l.
The first, and most critical, step in using this historical data is to
establish the framework in which the data set can be used as a forecasting tool. The objective is to use the historical data as a basis for
saying something about future returns. This raises three questions:
• How much emphasis do we place on old data?
• Do returns move randomly over time? And
• Is there a relationship between stock and bond returns?
Indeed, the question of whether the past is any indicator of the future
is contentious in itself. This last assumption is not justified by either
intuition or empirical evidence-it is a simplifying assumption for the
purposes of the example presented in this paper. The decision on how
to model returns could affect the results of the model materially.
Considerable evidence exists to justify that stock prices, like bond
prices, vary inversely with interest rate movements-see Solnik (1983)
and Peavy (1992) for good discussions on the subject-so that some
correlation should be recognized between stock and bond returns. In
order to keep the model Simple and to concentrate on illustrating ideas
outside those of modeling stock and bond returns, however, we employ
the assumption that both stock and bond returns move randomly and
independently of each other. Re-running the model to incorporate an
approach that correlates successive returns in some fashion or recognizes a relationship between stock and bond returns would introduce
a major layer of complexity to the modeling process.
To test the success of a fund in meeting its liabilities using any particular mix of stocks and bonds (assuming random returns), we derive a
large number of potential individual investment scenarios by creating
a set of random rates of return for each year for which the projection is made, where these random rates of return are based on cumulative probability distributions constructed from the historical data. The
projection period extends to the year in which all policyholders are expected to have died, in this case 52 years on the basis of the SOA 75-80
table for a portfolio comprising excluSively 50 year old males.
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Year
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958

Table 1
Annual Returns for Common Stocks
And Long-Term U.S. Government Bonds
Year Stocks (%)
Stocks (%) Bonds (%)
1959
11.96
11.62
7.77
1960
0.47
37.49
8.93
26.89
43.61
0.10
1961
(8.73)
(8.42)
1962
3.42
(24.90)
1963
22.80
4.66
(43.34)
(5.31)
1964
16.48
(8.19)
12.45
16.84
1965
(10.06)
(0.07)
1966
53.99
(1.44)
1967
23.98
10.03
47.67
4.98
1968
11.06
(8.50)
1969
33.92
7.52
(35.03)
1970
4.01
0.23
1971
14.31
31.12
5.53
(0.41)
1972
18.98
5.94
(9.78)
1973
(14.66)
6.09
(26.47)
(11.59)
1974
0.93
1975
37.20
20.34
3.22
23.84
25.90
2.08
1976
(7.18)
19.75
1977
2.81
1978
6.56
36.44
10.73
(8.07)
(0.10)
1979
18.44
(2.62)
1980
32.42
5.71
(4.91)
1981
5.50
3.40
21.41
1982
18.79
6.45
1983
22.51
31.71
0.06
(3.93)
1984
6.27
24.02
32.16
1985
18.37
1.16
18.47
(0.99)
1986
3.64
5.23
1987
52.62
7.19
(1.29)
16.81
1988
31.56
1989
31.49
(5.59)
6.58
(3.17)
(10.78)
1990
7.46
(6.09)
1991
30.55
43.36
7.67
1992

Bonds (%)
2.26
13.78
0.97
6.89
1.21
3.51
0.71
3.65
(9.18)
(0.26)
(5.07)
12.11
13.23
5.69
(1.11)
4.35
9.20
16.75
(0.69)
(1.18)
(1.23)
(3.95)
1.86
40.36
0.65
15.48
30.97
24.53
(2.71)
9.67
18.11
6.18
19.30
8.05

Source: Ibbotson, R.G. and Sinquefield, R.A. Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation, 1993 Yearbook. Chicago, Ill.: Ibbotson Associates, 1993. Used
with permission. All rights reserved.
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5 A Note on the Number of Simulations
We need a sufficiently large number of simulations to ensure that
a smooth curve can be drawn between any set of risk/reward points
at a particular interest rate assumption and to accurately estimate the
probability of insolvency, p. Suppose we perform n simulations and
X is the number of times insolvency results, then we can estimate the
probability of insolvency by p = X In. However, to ensure that our
estimate has a high probability, say 1 - E (for small E > 0), of being
within, say, a margin of 100()(% of the true value p, we must ensure that
n satisfies
Pr[(1- ()()p::::; Xln::::; (1 + ()()p] ;::: 1 - E.
As n is large, we can appeal to the central limit theorem and show
that the smallest value of n is given by:

(4)
where Zy is the 100(1 - y)% percentage point of the standard normal
distribution. Suppose p is calculated using n = 1,000 simulations and
the result is p = 0.1. Then if E = 0.05, equation (4) gives the minimum
value of ()( = 0.186, derived from
1000

=

r

C·!6 C~.~.1

) .

This is not small enough to make a credible graphical presentation of
a smooth risk profile. For example, if the values of p were plotted,
a smooth curve (shape) would not be achieved, but a sample of random points would result. If 25,000 simulations were used for p = 0.1,
however, the margin ()( would be 0.037, which is accurate enough for
graphical purpose. As a result, throughout this paper we use 25,000
simulations.

6 The Simulation Process
The life office's simulation process must be built into its liability
cash flow framework. This means the target fund needs to be compared with the simulated fund in each year of projection, as derived
under each simulated investment scenario. The progress of the target and simulated funds is tracked for the full expected future term
of the business in force. This is repeated for various simulated stock
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and bond returns-as discussed in Section 5, the model has been run
using 25,000 simulations-using all possible combinations of stocks
and bonds in steps of 1 percent and using liability profiles based on
actuarial interest rate assumptions of 0 percent, 2 percent, 4 percent,
6 percent, and 8 percent.
For each simulated investment scenario, the internal rate of return
for each mix of stocks and bonds is calculated as:

[fl l

l/n

rn

=

(1 + sd

-

1

(5)

where n is the projection period (in years). This return (rn ) is averaged over the 25,000 simulated scenarios to derive an expected rate of
return on the fund for any particular mix of stocks and bonds. This
expected rate remains the same regardless of the liability profile under
consideration.
The next step is to determine how risk should be specified within
the framework of the cash flow projections for any particular liability
profile. This assessment is critical to the modeling process. For the purposes of this paper, our measure of risk is defined as the probability of
the simulated fund being less than the target fund for three consecutive
years during the full projection period. A three year period (rather than
a one year time horizon) is chosen on the premise that if the fund has
gone this amount of time in an unbalanced financial position, it may
have long-term financial problems.
This definition of risk is a convenient way of assessing the real risk
in the example used (the real risk is underperforming the pricing assumptions over the lifetime of the policies) because of the way in which
solvency is defined (Le., in terms of market value of assets versus liabilities valued on the basis of original pricing assumptions). This would
not be the case in a more sophisticated model that incorporates valuation margins and capital in its computations. In such instances an
alternative measure of underperformance against pricing assumptions
may be more satisfactory, with the risk of insolvency incorporated as a
constraint. In addition, risk should be measured not just by the probability of underperforming, but by the amount of underperformance.
We now formally define our measure of risk, R, algebraically as follows: For t = 3,4, ... , n, let
Rt =

I
{ 0

if Nt-k < Ft-k for k
otherwise.

=

0,1,2; and
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n
R = Pr[U{R t = I}].

(6)

t=3

The measure of risk for any particular mix of stocks and bonds is the
sum of all values of R over the 25,000 simulations, divided by 25,000
to give an average probability of insolvency.

7 The Monte Carlo Sampling Method Used
In order to use Monte Carlo simulation, we first need to specify a
distribution function of asset returns. In our case this function is an
empirical function. If the rate of return on a particular asset class is
defined as a random variable, S, then the empirical probability distribution function (pdf), f(s) and the empirical cumulative probability
distribution (cdf), F(s), of S must be determined.
Suppose we have data on S and we construct a relative frequency histogram with m (a positive integer) distinct intervals such that a return of
Sk-l < S s Sk occurs with relative frequency fk :2: 0, for k = 1,2, ... , m
with
fk = 1. FollOwing Hogg and Klugman (1984, Chapter 3), we
can construct a continuous cdf using a piecewise linear approximation.
First we choose a sequence of points {Ck} such that Sk-l < Ck < Sk for
k = 1,2, ... , m - 1, and Co = So and Cm = Sm. The CkS do not have to be
equidistant. It can easily be verified that the cdf is given by

Ir

o

for

(5 - CO)!l / (Cl - Co)

5

<

Co

Co S 5 S Cl

(7)
(5 - cm-dfm/(C m - cm-d

1

+ I}:l l fj

Cm-l S 5 S Cm

5> Cm.

Having defined the cumulative distribution function of S, it is now
possible to demonstrate how the random variable S is simulated (Le.,
how samples of the observation of the variable S are generated). Let U
be a uniform distribution on [0,1]. The standard approach to generating a random variable S is as follows (see, for example, Bratley, Fox,
and Schrage (1983, Chapter 5.2.2)): Suppose Ui is a random observation from U. We must determine the Cj be such that Cj S Ui S Cj+l. It
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follows that the corresponding observation from S is Si where
Cj + [Ui - F(cj)] X Cj+l
F(cj+r) - F(cj)
.

S' _ [F(cj+r) - Uil x
t -

(8)

Table 2 shows the cumulative distributions for the two asset classes
(common stocks and long-term bonds) used in the model. Table 2 is
derived from the basic data of Table 1.
Table 2
Empirical Cumulative Distributions Functions
Common Stocks
Long-Term Bonds
k
F(Ck)
F(Ck)
Ck
Ck
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

-45
-40
-35
-30
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55

0.00%
1.49%
2.99%
2.99%
4.48%
5.97%
5.97%
11.94%
22.39%
29.85%
32.84%
43.28%
50.75%
62.69%
73.13%
76.12%
88.06%
92.54%
95.52%
97.01%
100.00%

-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45

0.00%
7.46%
26.87%
58.21%
80.60%
88.06%
95.52%
97.01%
97.01%
98.51%
98.51%
100.00%
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Results of the Simulation

The results for each liability profile under consideration (Le., for
each rate of interest assumption) using various combinations of stocks
and bonds are summarized in Figure 1. In particular, Figure 1 shows
the optimal risk/reward points for various possible combinations of
stocks and bonds under the various interest rate assumptions used in
pricing the underlying liabilities. A curve is drawn through the points
to create a risk/reward profile for each rate of interest. All points on
Figure 1
Stock/Long Bond Risk/Reward Profiles
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any line to the left of the minimum risk point can be ignored, because
it is possible to achieve simultaneously a higher return and a lower risk
by altering the mix of stocks and bonds.

The point at which the minimum level of risk is achieved depends
on the liability structure under consideration (Le., assumed interest rate
used for pricing). At a rate of interest of 2 percent the minimum risk is
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achieved where 32 percent of the fund is held in stocks and 68 percent
of the fund is held in bonds. This minimum risk point shifts toward
a heavier weighting in stocks as the rate of interest rises; at high rates
of interest the minimum risk point is not achieved until 100 percent is
held in stocks.
Our results are intuitive, Le., if there is a high minimum guarantee,
the office will be driven to more volatile assets (with higher potential
upside and downside) because they are the only assets with a chance
of outperforming the guarantee. An easy target is associated with a
conservative strategy, and a difficult target is associated with a not-soconservative strategy. Although the not-so-conservative strategy often
will miss the difficult target, it nevertheless has a higher probability of
exceeding the target than a more conservative strategy that never hits
the target. On the other hand, if a company is adequately capitalized,
a 2 percent minimum guarantee will not result in a low stock holding.
Further, there is a business risk associated with not being able to offer
competitive guarantees.
The curves based on the low rate of interest assumptions look like
traditional efficient frontiers. This is not surprising. At relatively low
rates of interest the nature of the liabilities becomes relatively unimportant, so the model reverts to the conventional asset-only model. But at
relatively high rates of interest the concept of an efficient frontier collapses, and at a rate of interest of 10 percent there is only one efficient
point (where 100 percent is held in stocks).
In practice the efficient frontier may be of limited use, because a
life office may be required to hold certain asset categories. For example, there may be an investment policy constraint within the office that
at least 50 percent of the portfolio must be held in long-term bonds.
Moreover, in many countries there are legal restrictions on the extent to
which certain categories of asset may be held by life offices. Thus, this
paper does not concentrate on analyzing the efficient combinations of
the various asset classes.
The final part of the exercise is to determine an acceptable level
of risk; having decided this, it is possible to derive a uniquely defined
optimal asset mix. For example, for the fund that has used a rate of
interest assumption of 2 percent in its pricing assumptions, it may be
appropriate to go 100 percent into stocks (and therefore go for the
maximum possible return) if a probability of insolvency level of around
30 percent were deemed acceptable.
Setting an acceptable level of risk is a largely subjective decision,
and in practice the usefulness of this model is in assessing the relative
riskiness of various portfolio mixes rather than in making any sense of
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the absolute values generated for the risk and reward of any particular
investment policy in isolation. The absolute values for the probability
of insolvency in the model look extremely high across the board, the
result of the relatively large probability of a market crash in anyone
investment scenario. See Hardy (1993) for similar findings when using
a stochastic model.
A highly artificial liability profile is being considered, and the fact
that the results drive toward a higher stock allocation than most companies hold in practice indicate the failings of the simplified model. A
significant shortfall of the model is that the RBC implications of any
particular asset allocation recommendation have not been considered;
in practice, this would be a major constraint on the asset allocation
decision.
Because the example in this paper has been highly simplified, the
liability structure is expressed entirely in terms of a pricing interest
rate. Similar efficient frontiers could be created by merely comparing
the simulated portfolio returns to the 0 percent to 8 percent pricing
rates.
Finally, the complete asset allocation model should incorporate the
full range of assets available to the financial institution, which for a
life office should include cash, property, and overseas stock and bond
investment in addition to domestic stocks and bonds.

9 Summary and Conclusion
This paper describes an approach to asset allocation modeling for
institutions that invest to meet liabilities. The model is consistent with
conventional financial economics. Traditional risk/reward profiles become apparent where the nature of the liabilities is not considered or
is relatively unimportant, but such traditional risk/reward profiles may
or may not become apparent once the nature of the liabilities is introduced. Thus, the traditional ideas of financial economics have been
shown to be a special case of the more general asset allocation system
using a true ALM model.
We have concentrated exclUSively on the applications of an ALM
model in the context of a highly simplified life office issuing purely
nonparticipating whole life assurance. The principles can be applied
equally, however, to any financial institution that is concerned with investing to meet liabilities.
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The critical element of the model is the definition of risk. It is not
important that risk is taken as some measure of exposure to insolvency,
but that it incorporates the liabilities.
Refinement of the model to incorporate the features of participating
business should not be problematic; this would be akin to lowering the
rate of interest assumption used in pricing the liabilities which implicitly means a general reduction in the risk profile and, hence, potentially
greater freedom in investment policy.
The application of our model to a pension fund poses some interesting issues, although these issues are specific to the particular country
under consideration. Although it is recognized that pension funds can
overcome deficit situations by increasing contribution rates from time
to time, pension fund trustees may be interested in knowing whether a
particular investment policy is more likely to lead to persistent deficits.
Alternatively, if a primary objective of pension fund investment policy
is to avoid unduly fluctuating contribution rates, then the ALM model
could use a refined definition of risk (say, the probability of the fund
falling outside a certain surplus or deficit range).
Incorporating the inflationary aspects of a pension fund model is
problematic. Possible approaches include linking inflation to the yield
curve or stochastically modeling inflation as an independent variable.
It is not obvious which of the two approaches may be more appropriate;
perhaps, given the major uncertainties associated with inflation, there
is no definitive model. Some innovative research in this area has been
done by Wilkie (1986).
There remains much exciting assetjliability modeling work to be
done. Dramatic developments can be expected as microcomputer processing power becomes more widely appreciated and makes the type
of stochastic model described in this paper a standard tool of financial
analysis.
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rate of return of portfolio, minimizing the risk of obtaining lower return, and
maximizing the possibility of reaching higher return. By using a triangular possibilistic distribution to describe the uncertainty of the return, we introduce a
possibilistic linear programming model which we solve by a multiple objective linear programming technique with two control constraints. We present
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Introduction
Asset allocation decisions are often reached through a three-step
process: first, the risk and return characteristics of available and relevant investment opportunities are identified; second, the investor's risk
tolerances or expected returns are parameterized; and finally, the riskreturn trade-offs of the investor are combined with those observed in
the market to produce an optimal asset allocation. A frequently used
tool for asset allocation problems is the mean-variance optimization
technique developed by Markowitz (1952).
Mean-variance optimization refers to a mathematical process to determine the security (or asset class) weights that provide a portfolio
with the minimum risk for a given expected return or, conversely, the
maximum expected return for a given level of risk. The inputs needed
to conduct mean-variance optimization are security expected returns,
expected standard deviations, and expected cross-security correlation.
The Markowitz model has been one of the methods widely used by institutional investors, retail brokerage houses, and pension fund managers.
Another type of asset allocation strategy is dynamic asset allocation,
which continually adjusts a portfolio's allocation in response to changing market conditions. The most popular use of these strategies is
portfolio insurance, which attempts to remove the downside risk faced
by a portfolio. A popular means of implementing portfolio insurance
is to engage in a series of transactions that give the portfolio the return
distribution of a call option. Black and Scholes (1973) show that under
certain assumptions, the payoff of an option can be duplicated through
a continuously revised combination of the underlying asset and a riskfree bond. Rubenstein and Leland (1981) extend this insight by showing
that a dynamic strategy that increases the stock allocation of a portfolio
in rising markets and reinvested the remaining portion in cash would
replicate the payoffs to a call option on an index of stocks.
Portfolio insurance concentrates on only two assets, both of which
are carefully predetermined. To the extent that its assumptions about
the behavior of uninsured investors turn out to be less than 100% correct, however, the increasing volatility of risky assets could drive insured portfolios to sell or buy even more aggressively than they would
have in the first place; see Sharpe (1992).
On the other hand, tactical asset allocation (active asset allocation) is
the process of diverging from the strategic asset allocation when an investor's short-term forecasts deviate from the long-term forecasts used
to formulate the strategic allocation. If the investor can make accurate
short-term forecasts, tactical asset allocation has the potential to en-
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hance returns. In practice, tactical asset allocators are the investors
providing portfolio insurance; see Sharp and Perrold (1988).
In this study, instead of the traditional mean-variance approach, we
describe the uncertainty of the rate of return by a triangular possibilistic distribution. A possibilistic linear programming model (see, Lai and
Hwang (1992, Chapter 5)) is formulated and then solved by introducing
two control constraints to the auxiliary multi-objective linear programming model. By selecting different values for the parameters in control
constraints, our method can be applied in solving the following problems:
• Maximizing the most possible return and minimizing the risk of
obtaining lower return as well as maximizing the possibility of
obtaining higher return.
• Minimizing the risk of obtaining lower return and maximizing the
possibility of obtaining higher return for a specified most possible
return.
• Maximizing the most possible return and maximizing the possibility of obtaining higher return for a given risk tolerance.

2

Models

Let us consider the problem of allocating capital C among Nasset
classes, S1, S2, ... , SN. In the mean-variance optimization method [Fong
and Fabozzi (1992)], the rate of return, Ri, of asset Si is assumed to
be a random variable with Ili and (Tj. denoting the mean and standard
deviation, respectively, of Ri for i = 1,2, ... , N, and Pij denoting the
correlation between Ri and Rj for i,j = 1,2, ... ,N.
If the N assets are combined linearly to form a portfolio, where the
allocation weight, Xi, for asset class Si, is equal to the dollar value of
the asset class relative to the dollar value of the portfolio, then the rate
of return of the portfolio is
N

Rp =

I

XiRi

i= 1

which is also a random variable. The expected return of the portfolio
is
N

IIp

=

I

i=l

Xilli
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and the variance of the portfolio is
N N

O"~

=

I I

XiXjO"iG"jpij.

i=lj=l

2.1

Mean-Variance Analysis

The mean-variance method for determining weights Xl, X2, ... , XN is
to fix the expected portfolio return J-lp to a desirable level J-l and determine the allocation weights Xl, X2, ... ,XN that minimize the risk level
O"J of the portfolio for the fixed J-l. The following quadratic programming model (1) is employed to accomplish this goal:
Modell:

N

min

0"2P -

"L.
i,j=l

subject to
i=l
N

I

Xi =

1

i=l

li :::; Xi :::; J-li,

i

=

1,2, ... , N

where li is the lower bound and Ui is the upper bound on funds allocated to the i-th asset class, i = 1,2, ... , N.
An equivalent approach is to fix the risk level O"J of a portfolio to
a tolerable level 0"2 and determine the weights XI. X2, ... , XN that maximize the expected portfolio return J-lp for the fixed 0"2. The following
quadratic programming model (2) is employed to accomplish this goal:
Model 2:

N

max

J-lp =

I

XiJ-li

i=l
N

subject to

I

XiXjO"iO"jPij = 0"2

i,j=l
N

I

Xi =

1

i=l

li:::;Xi:::;J-li,

i= 1,2, ... ,N.
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Mean-Variance-Skewness Analysis

The mean-variance method, which does not consider the skewness
of the return random variable R p , is frequently used in practice for
asset allocation. In a continuous time model with asset prices following a diffusion process, Ito's differentiation rule l implies the higher
moments are irrelevant to asset allocation decisions. In this case, the
mean-variance method provides optimal portfolio selection. In a discrete model, however, Samuelson (1970) shows that the mean-variance
efficiency becomes inadequate and the higher moments become relevant to the portfolio selection.
It has been shown empirically by Simkowitz and Beedles (1978) and
Singleton and Wingender (1986) that stock return distributions are often positively skewed. Under asymmetrically distributed asset returns,
it is important to take skewness into consideration in discrete models
of portfolio selection. Arditti and Levy (1975) have illustrated the important role of skewness in the pricing of stocks. As shown by Arditti
(1967), the investor's preference for more skewness is consistent with
the notion of decreasing absolute risk aversion, because a positiveskewness asset return refers to a right-hand elongated tail of density
function of asset return.
If the skewness of R p , defined as E[ (Rp _/1p)3] / uJ, is incorporated
in the mean-variance method, model (1) then becomes a multiple objective nonlinear programming model:
Model 3:
N

min

u~

L

=

XiXjUiO"jPU

i,j=l

max

E[(Rp _/1p)3]/UJ
N

subject to

L Xi/1i = /1
i=l

1 Ito's

differentiation rule states that if I
dX

=

I

(X, t)

and X follows

= adt + (TdW.

Then di can be written:
di

See Shimko (1992).

=

1

2

[aIx + 2(T Ixx + Itl dt + (T Ix dW.

Journal of Actuarial Practice, Vol. 4, No.1, 1996

72

N

LXi =

1

i=l

i

li ::; xi ::; J.li

=

1,2, ... , N

while model (2) becomes the following:
Model 4:

N

max

L XiJ.li

J.lp =

i=l

max

E[(R p - J.lp)3]/O'J
N

subject to

L

XiXjO'iO'jPij = 0'2

i,j=l
N

LXi =

1

i=l

li::;Xi::;J.li,

where

i=I,2, ... ,N

N

E[(Rp - J.lp)3] =

L

XiXjXkO'ijk

i,j,k=l

and

O'ijk

is defined as

The skewness of a portfolio of securities is not simply a weighted
average of the skewness of the component securities. Like variance, it
depends on the joint movement of securities. This means that to measure the skewness on a portfolio, a great number of estimates of joint
movement must be made. As indicated by Elton and Gruber (1995),
for these estimates to be feasible, it requires the type of single indexed
model or multiple indexed model development to calculate the correlation structure of security returns and some simple techniques for determining the three dimensional efficient frontier. This developmental
work has not been done.
In this paper, instead of dealing with models (3) or (4) directly, we
present a possibilistic linear programming model to implement the
idea of maximizing the expected return, minimizing the risk, and maximize skewness simultaneously without estimating the third moments
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of securities. Possibility theory studies primarily imprecise phenomena. Possibilistic decision making models handle practical decision
making problems where input data are imprecise. Applications of possibility theory to linear programming problems with imprecise coefficients have been discussed by Lai and Hwang (1992).

3 The Possibilistic Model
The possibility distribution TTX of an event X states the degree possibility of the occurrence of the event. To illustrate the difference
between the possibility distribution and the probability distribution,
we consider the following simple example due to Zadeh (1978, p. 8):
Consider the statement "Hans ate X eggs for breakfast," where X =
{I, 2, ... }. A possibility distribution as well as a probability distribution may be associated with X. The possibility distribution TTX (u) can
be interpreted as the degree of ease with which Hans can eat U eggs
while the probability distribution Px(u) might have been determined
by observing Hans at breakfast for 100 days. The values of TTX(U) and
Px(u) might be as shown in the following table: We observe that a

u
TTX(U)

Px(u)

1
1.0
0.1

234
1.0 1.0 1.0
0.8 0.1 0.0

5
0.8
0.0

6
0.6
0.0

7
0.4
0.0

8
0.2
0.0

high degree of possibility does not imply a high degree of probability.
If, however, an event is not possible, it is also improbable. Thus, in a
way the possibility is an upper bound for the probability. For a more
detailed discussion of possibility theory, readers are referred to Zimmermann (1991, Chapter 8) or Dubois and Prade (1988).
For our model, we use the possibility distribution to describe the uncertainty of the rate of return. Because uncertainty from the return of
assets can be regarded as the nature of imprecision, possibility distributions are suitable for characterizing such kinds of uncertainty. Moreover, using the possibility distribution may also reduce the impact of
the underlying structure of the asset market shifts.
For the i-th asset Si, i = 1,2, ... , N, we describe the imprecise rate
of return by i\ = (rf, rt, riO) , where rf, rt, and rt are the most pessimistic value, the most possible value, and the most optimistic value
for the rate of return, respectively. Assume that the imprecise rate of
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.
Iar
return, n- = (p
r i , r im ,ri0) ,WIt. h r iP < r im < r i°, h as t h e tnangu
bility distribution TTfi defined as:

o

for r < rj or r > riO
for r = rf

1
TTfi

(r) =

.
POSSI-

(r - rf)J(rf - rj)

(1)

for rj ::; r < rf

and is displayed in Figure 1.
Figure 1
The Triangular Possibility Distribution of i\

1

r

As shown in Figure 1, possibility distribution of the rate of return
describes the possibility degree of occurrence of each possible rate of
return. For example, if for i-th asset Si, TTfi(0.10) = 0.8, then the possibility degree of occurrence of n = 10% is 0.8.
Next, let Xi denote the allocation weight and ri = (r[, rf, rf) denote
the impreCise rate of return to asset Si for i = 1,2, ... , N. Then the
imprecise rate of return for the portfolio is
N

r

=

L rixi.
i~l
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Linear combinations of triangular possibility distributions are also triangular possibility distribution, and r = (r P, r m , rO) is given by
N

N

r P -_ L'" r iPX,t

,

N

rm -_ L'" r im Xl",

i,~l

rO =

L r?Xi.
i~l

i~l

Notice that the triangular possibility distribution ITf for r, as indicated
by a bold triangle in Figure 2, is determined byr P, r m , and rO according
to the definition of ITf.
Figure 2
The Triangular Possibility Distribution of r
ITf

1

r

We now select the optimal portfolio that maximizes the portfolio
return by solving the following possibilistic linear programming model:
Model 5:

N

max

L i\Xi
i~l

N

subject to

LXi.

=

1

ii. ::::; Xi. ::::; Ili,

i

=

1,2, ... , N.
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Solution Procedures

From Figure 2, we observe that rm has the highest degree of possibility to be the rate of return for the portfolio; we therefore define
portfolio return as rm. We also notice that, in Figure 2, the larger the
area of region (I) is, the more possible it is for the portfolio to obtain
lower return. As the area of region (I) is (r m - r P )/2, we define portfolio risk as (r m - r P). Similarly, (rO - rm) / 2 is the area of region (II)
in Figure 2. Larger values of (rO - rm) /2 indicate higher degrees of
possibility for the portfolio to reach higher return. We define portfolio
skewness as (rO - rm).
In order to maximize the imprecise rate of portfolio return, P, we
select the optimal portfolio in the sense of maximizing portfolio return,
minimizing portfolio risk, and maximizing portfolio skewness. Therefore model (5) can be approximated by the multiple objective linear
programming model (6):
Model 6:

N

max

z(l)

=

L rixi
i=l
N

min

z(2)

=

L (ri -

rj ) Xi

i=l
N

max

z(3) =

L (rf -ri)xi
i=l
N

subject to

f31 :s;

L rixi

:s; f3u

i.=l
N

Yl :s;

L (ri -

rj ) Xi :s; Yu

i=l
N

LXi = 1
i=l

li :s; Xi :s; fJi,

i

=

1,2, ... , N.

There are three objectives in model (6):
• The first objective is to maximize portfolio return;
• The second objective is minimizing portfolio risk; and
• The third objective is maximizing portfolio skewness.
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This strategy is essentially analogous to maximizing mean return, minimizing variance, and maximizing skewness for a random rate of return.
In Figure 2, the triangle made by the thin lines denotes the optimal triangular possibility distribution for the imprecise rate of return for the
portfolio.

4.1

Selecting the Parameters

Model (6) has two control constrains:
N

f31 :s;

I

rf'Xi :s; f3u.

i=l

and

N

Yl :s;

I

(rf' - rf ) Xi :s; Yu.·

i=l

By selecting parameters f31 and f3u., the decision makers could use the
first control constraint to assure portfolio return within the desirable
range. On the other hand, by selecting parameters Yl and Yu., the second control constraint can be used to adjust portfolio risk to a tolerable
range. In the following, we discuss three special cases for selecting parameters f31, f3u., Yl, and Yu.·
Case 1: If we set
= . min {rf'},
t=1,2, ... ,N

f3u.

= . max {rf'},
t=1,2, ... ,N

= . min {rf' - rf},
t=1,2, ... ,N

Yu.

= . max {rf' - rf},
t=1,2, ... ,N

f31

and
Yl

both control constraints become inactive and model (6) is reduced to
model (7), as proposed by Lia and Hwang (1992):
Model 7:

N

max

Z(l) =

I

rf'Xi

i=l
N

min

z(2) = L
" (r!"l
- r IP ) Xi
t
i=l

max

z(3) = L
" (r!7
- r!"l
) Xi
t
t
i=l

N
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N

subject to

LXi = 1
i=l

i

li .:::; Xi .:::; l1i,

Case 2: If we set {3I

=

{3u

YL

=

=

1,2, ... , N.

{3, a constant,

min

= .

1.=1,2, ... ,N

{rf' - r[},

and
)lu = . max
t=1,2, ... ,N

{rf' - r[},

then the first objective and the second control constraint in model (6)
become inactive. In this case, model (6) becomes the following:
Model 8:
min
i=l
N

max

z(3) =

L (rf -

rf' ) Xi

i=l
N

subject to

L rf'Xi = {3
i=l
N

LXi = 1
i=l

li':::;Xi':::;l1i,

i=I,2,···,N.

It is easy to notice the similarity between models (3) and (8).

Case 3: If we set
{31

)II = )lu = )I,

= .

min

a constant,

{rf'}

t=1,2,···,N

and (3u

= .

max

{r~m},

1.=1,2,···,N

then the second objective and the first control constraint in model (6)
become inactive. In this case, model (6) becomes:
Model 9:

N

max

z(1)

=

L rf'xi
i=l
N

max

z(3) =

L (rf -

i=l

rf' ) Xi

Guo and Huang: Possibilistic Linear Programming

79

subject to
i=1
N

LXi =
i=1

1

li ::;; Xi ::;; Pi,

i

=

1,2, ... ,N ..

Notice that model (9) is also analogous to model (4).
The selection of parameters Ih /3u, Yl, and Yu may be based on either
experience or managerial judgment. The examples given in Section 5
show the significance of our control constraints.

4.2

The Solution

In trying to find the solution to model (6), we must remember that
model (6) has three simultaneous objectives: (0 maximizing portfolio
return, (ii) maximizing portfolio skewness, and (iii) minimizing portfolio risk. With these multiple conflicting and competing objectives we
cannot expect to achieve the best values for all objectives simultaneously. Therefore trade-offs among conflicting objectives are necessary.
There are various techniques to handle these trade-offs. Examples
of such techniques include utility theory, goal programming, fuzzy
programming, or iterative approaches. In this paper, we use Zimmermann's fuzzy programming method (1978) with a normalization process to solve the multiple objective linear programming model (6).
Let X denote the set of feasible solutions satisfying all the constraints in programming model (6). Next, for the objective function
z(1) defined in model (6), we first calculate
N
(1)

zmin =

.
""
mm
L

XEX i=1

and

m
r i Xi

N

z(1)
= max "" ri'"Xj.
max
XEX L
i=1

Then we define the linear membership function
1

(z -

z(l~ )/(z(1)
mtn

m.ax

o

- z(1) )
mtn

pz(1)

as

if z >- Z(1)
max,•
if z(l~
< z < Z(1)
•
mtn
max,
'f <
1 Z -

(1)

Zmin'

(2)
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Now, for the second objective function

Z(2)

of model (6), we calculate

N
.
' " (m
rnm
L
r i

(2)

Zmin =

XEX

i=l

z(2)
= max
max
XEX

'"
L

and

- r i

p)

Xi

N
(rim - riP. ) Xi.

i=l

The corresponding linear membership function

if Z -< Z(2~
.
min'
'f (2)
1 Zmin < Z <

1
J-lz(2)

(z) =

z~1x-z(2)

1

m

(2)

J-lz(2)

Zmax-Zmin

1'f Z;::

o

Similarly, for the objective function

z(3)

(z)

(2)

is:

•

Zmax,

(3)

(2)

Zmax,

of model (6), we compute

N
(3)

Zmi.n =

, ' " (0
mm
L ri
XEX

and

i=l

m)

- r i

Xi

N
z(3)
= max
max
XEX

'" (rl~
L

- rim) Xi

i=l

and the corresponding linear membership function
1
J-l z(3) =

(3)
Z-Zmin
(3) _ (3)
Zmax Zmin

1

o

if Z >-

J-lz(3)

(z)

z(3)
m.ax,.

if Z(3~
< Z < Z(3)
,
min
max,
'f

(4)

(3)

1 Z::; Zmin'

Finally, we solve the following max-min problem
Y = max {min
XEX

XEX

(J-lz(l)

(x),

J-lz(2)

(x),

J-lz(3)

(x))}

(5)

to obtain the optimal allocation weights Xl, X2,.··, XN,
By introducing a variable y, equation (5) is then equivalent to a
single-objective linear programming problem:
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Model 10:
y

max
subject to

Ilz(l) (x) ~

y

Ilz(2) (x) ~ y
Ilz(3) (x) ~ y

x EX.
The optimal solution of model (10) provides a satisfying solution
under the strategy of maximizing portfolio return r P , minimizing portfolio risk (r m - r P ), and maximizing portfolio skewness (rO - rm).
Our algorithm for asset allocation is now summarized as follows:
Step 1: For each available asset Si, estimate the most possible return
rate rt, the most pessimistic return rf, and the most possible
return rate rio, i = 1,2, ... , N.
Step 2: Determine the initial values for parameters f31, f3u.,
calculated by:
f3z

= . min

t=I,2,. ..• N

{rt},

f3u.

= max

i=I,2, ... ,N

)'1,

and Yti.

{r!"'}
I.

and
)'1 =

.
mm

i=I,2,. .. ,N

{m
r· - r·p}
t

I.

)'u.

=

max

i=I,2,·· ·,N

{rf - ri}.

The parameters f3z, f3u., ;yz, and )'u. can also be determined by experience and managerial judgment.
Step 3: For each objective function z(j) (j = 1,2,3) in model (6), use
linear programming techniques to find its maximal value z~~x
and its minimal value z~~n subjected to the four constraints in
model (6).
Step 4: Solve the following linear programming model with N + 1 variables to determine allocation weights Xl, X2, ... ,XN:

max

y
N

subject to

L rtxi i.=l

(z·~~x

-

z~~n) y ~ z~;n
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N

L (rim -

rf)xi + (z~~x - Z~;n) y

:$

Z~~x

rim)Xi + (Z~~x - Z~;n) y

;:0:

Z~;n'

i=l
N

L (rf -

i=l

Step 5: For the optimal solution xi, xI, ... ,xtr, calculate
N

(r P )* =

L r;xt,

N

(rm)*

= ""

i=l

and

L

r:mx*
t
1

i=l

N

(rO)* = L"" rOx*.
t
1
i=l

If (rm)* - (r P )*

;:0: ~,where~istherisktolerancebound,then

decrease the value of )In and goto Step 2;
Else if (rm) * :$ 11, where 11 is the lower bound for the most possible rate of return, then increase f3l and goto Step 2;
else STOP! xi, xI, ... , xtr is the optimal solution.

5

Numerical Examples

5.1

Data Used to Construct Examples

Assume there are six asset classes in the market and the i-th asset class has mean and standard deviation of Pi and (Ti respectively,
i = 1,2, ... ,6. The values of Pi and (Ti are taken from Fong and Fabozzi
(1992, p. 145) and Lederman and Klein (1994, Chapter 2, p. 27). Next
.
P
2
m
d 0
· r P ,r mOb
we d ef me
i ,ri y settmg r i = Pi - (Ti, r i = Pi, an r i =
i
Pi + 3(Ti, i = 1,2, ... ,6, with some adjustment. Table 1 displays the
basic data used in the examples. The data are summarized in Table 1.
Example 1: We solve model (7) by setting f3l = 0.05, f3n = 0.17, YL =
0.008, and )In = 0.4. (See Case 1 of model (6).) The optimal allocation weights are Xl = 0.0061, Xz = 0.5, X3 = 0.0354, Xs = 0.4584, and
(r P , r m , rO) = (-0.0881,0.1078,0.4307). The optimal allocation is almost a combination of the second most risky asset and the second most
conservative asset.
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Table 1
Data For Examples
Stock 1
Stock 2
Bound 1
Bound 2
Cash
T-bill

f..l

(J"

yP

ym

yO

0.17
0.15
0.12
0.08
0.06
0.05

0.200
0.185
0.055
0.050
0.005
0.004

-0.230
-0.220
0.010
-0.020
0.050
0.042

0.17
0.15
0.12
0.08
0.06
0.05

0.800
0.750
0.270
0.200
0.090
0.075

Example 2: We solve model (3.3) by fixing portfolio return at 22 different values. (See Case 2 of model (6).) The computational results are
summarized in the following Tables 2 and 3.
The fifth column in Table 3 gives the set {y I Tffi (y) ;::: 0.85}, which
contains all the possible values of the return rate whose degree of occurrence is at least 0.85. This interval is called the acceptable event
with degree of occurrence at least 0.85. Similarly, the last column in
Table 3 gives the acceptable event with degree of occurrence at least
0.95.
We observe that both portfolio risk (ym -yP) and portfolio skewness
(yO - ym) increase as portfolio return ym increases, which is consistent
with the fact that as ym is pushed higher, more weight should be allocated to higher risk assets. We also observe that when ym increases
gradually, the weights are adjusted gradually, showing that our numerical results are stable.
Example 3: We solve model (9) by fixing portfolio risk for 22 different
values. (See Case 3 of model (6).) The computational results are summarized in Tables 4 and 5.
Example 4: We solve model (6) by adjusting i31 to control portfolio return. The computational results are summarized in Tables 6 and 7.
From these tables we observe that i31 controls portfolio return effectively.

Table 2
Solutions for Different Values of Portfolio Return
No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

(/31'

/3 u' Yz, ru>

(0.055, 0.055, 0.008, 0.4)
(0.060, 0.060, 0.008, 0.4)
(0.065, 0.065, 0.008, 0.4)
(0.070, 0.070, 0.008, 0.4)
(0.075, 0.075, 0.008, 0.4)
(0.080, 0.080, 0.008, 0.4)
(0.085,0.085,0.008,0.4)
(0.090, 0.090, 0.008, 0.4)
(0.095, 0.095, 0.008, 0.4)
(0.100, 0.100, 0.008, 0.4)
(0.105, 0.105,0.008, 0.4)
(0.110, 0.110, 0.008, 0.4)
(0.115, 0.115, 0.008, 0.4)
(0.120, 0.120,0.008, 0.4)
(0.125, 0.125, 0.008, 0.4)
(0.130, 0.130, 0.008, 0.4)
(0.135, 0.135, 0.008, 0.4)
(0.140, 0.140, 0.008, 0.4)
(0.145, 0.145, 0.008, 0.4)
(0.150, 0.150, 0.008, 0.4)
(0.155, 0.155, 0.008, 0.4)
(0.160, 0.160, 0.008, 0.4)

Optimal Solution X*

= 0.5, X6 = 0.5
= 0.0454, X3 = 0.0152, Xs = 0.4394, X6 = 0.5
x 2 = 0.0713, X3 = 0.0597, Xs = 0.3690, X6 = 0.5
~ = 0.0935, X3 = 0.1098, Xs = 0.2967, X6 = 0.5
x 2 = 0.1157, X3 = 0.1598, Xs = 0.2245, X6 = 0.5
x 2 = 0.1381, X3 = 0.2096, Xs = 0.1524, X6 = 0.5
X2 = 0.1605, X3 = 0.2593, Xs = 0.0802, X6 = 0.5
X 2 = 0.1829, X3 = 0.3089, Xs = 0.0081, X6 = 0.5
X2 = 0.2310, X3 = 0.3128, X6 = 0.4562
~ = 0.2801, X3 = 0.3142, X6 = 0.4057
X 2 = 0.3250, X3 = 0.3214, X6 = 0.3536
X2 = 0.3701, X3 = 0.3284, X6 = 0.3015
X 2 = 0.4150, X3 = 0.3357, X6 = 0.2493
X2 = 0.4601, X3 = 0.3428, X6 = 0.1972
Xl = 0.0092, x 2 = 0.5, X3 = 0.3415, X6 = 0.1494
Xl = 0.0504, X 2 = 0.5, X3 = 0.3421, X6 = 0.1074
Xl = 0.0956, x 2 = 0.5, ~ = 0.3361, X6 = 0.0683
Xl = 0.1410, x 2 = 0.5, ~ = 0.3296, X6 = 0.0293
Xl = 0.2204, X 2 = 0.4660, X3 = 0.3136
Xl = 0.3137, X 2 = 0.4771, X3 = 0.2092
Xl = 0.4067, X 2 = 0.4888, X3 = 0.1045
Xl = 0.5, X 2 = 0.5

Xs

X2

00
>1::0.

r ={rP, rm, r02
(0.046, 0.055, 0.0825)
(0.0331,0.6,0.1152)
(0.0244, 0.065, 0.1403)
(0.0164, 0.07, 0.164)
(0.0084,0.075,0.1876)
(0.0003,0.08,0.2113)
(-0.0077, 0.085, 0.2351)
(-0.0157,0.09, 0.2588)
(-0.0285, 0.095, 0.2919)
(-0.0414,0.1,0.3253)
(-0.0534, 0.105, 0.357)
(-0.0655, 0.11, 0.3889)
(-0.0775, 0.115, 0.4206)
(-0.0895,0.12, 0.4524)
(-0.1024, 0.125, 0.4858)
(-0.1137, 0.13, 0.5157)
(-0.1258, 0.135, 0.5473)
(-0.1379,0.14, 0.579)
(-0.1501,0.145,0.6105)
(-0.175, 0.15, 0.6653)
(-0.2,0.155, 0.7202)
{-0.225, 0.16, 0.7752
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No.
1

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

Table 3
Optimal Portfolio Return and Risk Analysis Using Table 2
rm
rm -rP r O -rm
85%
95%
0.055 0.0090
0.0275
(0.0537,0.0591) (0.0546, 0.0564)
0.0552
(0.0560, 0.0683) (0.0587, 0.0628)
0.060 0.0269
0.065 0.0406
0.0753
(0.0590, 0.0763) (0.0630, 0.0688)
0.070 0.0536
0.0940
(0.0620, 0.0841) (0.0673,.0.0747)
0.075 0.0666
0.1126
(0.0650, 0.0919) (0.0717, 0.0806)
0.080 0.0797
(0.0680, 0.0997) (0.0760, 0.0866)
0.1313
(0.0711, 0.1075) (0.0804, 0.0925)
0.085 0.0927
0.1501
(0.0741,0.1153) (0.0847,0.0984)
0.1688
0.090 0.1057
0.095 0.1235
(0.0765, 0.1245) (0.0888, 0.1048)
0.1969
(0.0788, 0.1338) (0.0929, 0.1113)
0.100 0.1414
0.2253
0.105 0.1584
0.2520
(0.0812, 0.1433) (0.0971, 0.1176)
0.110 0.1755
(0.0837,0.1518) (0.1012,0.1239)
0.2789
(0.0861, 0.1608) (0.1054, 0.1303)
0.3056
0.115 0.1925
(0.0886, 0.1699) (0.1095, 0.1366)
0.120 0.2095
0.3324
0.125 0.2274
0.3608
(0.0909, 0.1791) (0.1136, 0.1430)
(0.0934, 0.1879) (0.1178, 0.1493)
0.130 0.2437
0.3857
0.135 0.2608
0.4123
(0.0959,0.1968) (0.1220,0.1556)
(0.0983, 0.2059) (0.1286, 0.1620)
0.4390
0.140 0.2779
(0.1007, 0.2148) (0.1302,0.1683)
0.145 0.2951
0.4655
(0.1013, 0.2273) (0.1338, 0.1758)
0.150 0.3250
0.5153
(0.1018, 0.2397) (0.1323, 0.1832)
0.155 0.3550
0.5647
(0.1023, 0.2523) (0.1408,0.1908)
0.160 0.3850
0.6150

8S

Table 4
Solutions for Different Values of Portfolio Risk
No.

(f3I, f3u ' YI' Yu )

Optimal Solution X*

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

(0.05, 0.17, 0.009, 0.009)
(0.05, 0.17, 0.0269, 0.0269)
(0.05, 0.17, 0.0406, 0.0406)
(0.05,0.17,0.0536,0.0536)
(0.05, 0.17, 0.0666, 0.0666)
(0.05, 0.17, 0.0797, 0.0797)
(0.05,0.17,0.0927,0.0927)
(0.05,0.17,0.1057,0.1057)
(0.05, 0.17, 0.1235, 0.1235)
(0.05,0.17,0.1414,0.1414)
(0.05,0.17,0.1584,0.1584)
(0.05,0.17,0.1755,0.1755)
(0.05,0.17,0.1925,0.1925)
(0.05, 0.17, 0.2095, 0.2095)
(0.05,0.17,0.2274,0.2274)
(0.05, 0.17, 0.2437, 0.2437)
(0.05,0.17,0.2608,0.2608)
(0.05,0.17,0.2779,0.2779)
(0.05, 0.17, 0.2951, 0.2951)
(0.05, 0.17, 0.325, 0.325)
(0.05,0.17,0.355,0.355)
(0.05,0.17,0.385,0.385)

= 0.5, X6 = 0.5
x 2 = 0.0202, X3 = 0.1038, Xs = 0.5, X6 = 0.376
X 2 = 0.0359, X3 = 0.1824, Xs = 0.5, X6 = 0.2817
X 2 = 0.0506, X3 = 0.2577, Xs = 0.5, X6 = 0.1917
X 2 = 0.0746, X3 = 0.3001, Xs = 0.5, X6 = 0.1253
x 2 = 0.1061, X3 = 0.3167, Xs = 0.5, X6 = 0.0773
X 2 = 0.1382,x3 = 0.3301,x s = 0.5,x6 = 0.0317
x 2 = 0.1704, X3 = 0.3435, Xs = 0.4861
X 2 = 0.2189, X3 = 0.3469, Xs = 0.4342
X 2 = 0.2674, X3 = 0.3514, Xs = 0.3812
X 2 = 0.3139, X3 = 0.3538, Xs = 0.3322
x 2 = 0.3610, X3 = 0.3552, Xs = 0.2837
X 2 = 0.4071, X3 = 0.3596, Xs = 0.2333
x 2 = 0.4511, X3 = 0.3710, Xs = 0.1779
x 2 = 0.4975, X3 = 0.3831, Xs = 0.1194
Xl = 0.0411, x 2 = 0.5, X3 = 0.3765, Xs = 0.0823
Xl = 0.0911, x 2 = 0.5, X3 = 0.3529, Xs = 0.0561
Xl = 0.1476, X 2 = 0.5, X3 = 0.3034, Xs = 0.049
XI = 0.2042, x 2 = 0.5, X3 = 0.2546, Xs = 0.0412
XI = 0.3025, x 2 = 0.5, X3 = 0.1703, Xs = 0.0272
XI = 0.4013, X 2 = 0.5, X3 = 0.0848, Xs = 0.0139
Xs

Xl

= 0.5, x 2 = 0.5

00
Ol

r =(rP,rm,rO)
(0.046, 0.055, 0.0825)
(0.0408, 0.0643, 0.1164)
(0.0308, 0.0714, 0.1423)
(0.0245,0.0781,0.1669)
(0.0169, 0.0835, 0.1914)
(0.0081, 0.0878, 0.2159)
(-0.0008,0.0919,0.2402)
(-0.0097,0.0959,0.2643)
(-0.0230,0.1005,0.2969)
(-0.0363,0.1052,0.3297)
(-0.0489,0.1095,0.3608)
(-0.0617,0.1138,0.3922)
(-0.0743,0.1182,0.4234)
(-0.0867, 0.1229, 0.4545)
(-0.0996,0.1278,0.4873)
(-0.1116, 0.1321, 0.5169)
(-0.1246,0.1362,0.5482)
(-0.1385,0.1394,0.5794)
(-0.1524, 0.1427, 0.6108)
(-0.1765, 0.1485, 0.6654)
(-0.2008,0.1542,0.7202)
(-0.225,0.16,0.775)
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
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Table 5
Optimal Portfolio Return and Risk Analysis Using Table 4
rm.
rm. r P r O - rm.
85%
95%
(0.0537,0.0541) (0.0500, 0.0564)
0.0550 0.0090
0.0275
(0.0608,0.0721) (0.0631, 0.0669)
0.0643 0.0235
0.0521
(0.0653, 0.0820) (0.0694, 0.0749)
0.0714 0.0406
0.0709
0.0888
(0.0701, 0.0914) (0.0754, 0.0825)
0.0781 0.0536
(0.0735, 0.0997) (0.0802, 0.0889)
0.0835 0.0666
0.1079
(0.0758, 0.1070) (0.0838, 0.0942)
0.0878 0.0797
0.1281
0.0919 0.0927
(0.0780, 0.1142) (0.0873, 0.0993)
0.1483
(0.0801,0.1212) (0.0906, 0.1043)
0.0959 0.1056
0.1684
0.1005 0.1235
0.1964
(0.0820, 0.1300) (0.0943,0.1103)
(0.0840, 0.1389) (0.0981, 0.1164)
0.1052 0.1414
0.2245
(0.0857, 0.1472) (0.1016,0.1221)
0.2513
0.1095 0.1584
(0.0875,0.1556) (0.1050,0.1277)
0.1138 0.1755
0.2784
(0.0893, 0.1640) (0.1086,0.1335)
0.1182 0.1925
0.3052
0.1229 0.2096
0.3316
(0.0915,0.1726) (0.1124, 0.1395)
(0.0937,0.1817) (0.1165, 0.1458)
0.3595
0.1278 0.2274
(0.0958, 0.1898) (0.1199,0.1513)
0.1321 0.2437
0.3848
(0.0971, 0.1980) (0.1232,0.1568)
0.1362 0.2608
0.4120
(0.0977, 0.2054) (0.1255,0.1614)
0.1394 0.2779
0.4400
(0.0984, 0.2129) (0.1279,0.1661)
0.1427 0.2951
0.4681
(0.0998, 0.2260) (0.1323, 0.1743)
0.1485 0.3250
0.5169
(0.1100, 0.2391) (0.1365,0.1825)
0.5660
0.1542 0.3550
(0.1023, 0.2523) (0.1408, 0.1908)
0.3850
0.6150
0.160

Summary

We presented an asset allocation method using possibilistic programming techniques to characterize the imprecise nature of the rate
of return. Unlike the traditional mean-variance method, our asset allocation method takes the portfolio's skewness into consideration. It
provides two control constraints that permit maximal flexibility for decision makers to effectively balance the portfolio's return and the portfolio's risk. The optimal allocation decision is made by solving several
linear programming problems. Software packages are available that can
effiCiently solve linear programming problems.

00
00

No.

(fil' f3u' rl' ru)

1
2
3
4

(0.08,0.17,0.008,0.4)
(0.11,0.17,0.008,0.4)
(0.14,0.17,0.008,0.4)
(0.16,0.17,0.008,0.4)

Table 6
Solutions for Different Values of /3/
Optimal Solution X*
X2

Xl
Xl
Xl

= 0.4977, X3 = 0.2554, Xs = 0.2469
= 0.0788, X 2 = 0.5, Xs = 0.3596, X6 = 0.0616
= 0.4137, X 2 = 0.3113, X3 = 0.275

=0.5, X = 0.5
2

r =(rP,r

m,

rO)

(-0.0946,0.1201,0.4645)
(-0.1214,0.1352,0.5407)
(-0.1609,0.15,0.6387)
(-0.225,0.16,0.775)
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O~timal

No.
1
2
3
4

rm
0.1201
0.1352
0.15
0.16

Portfolio
rm - r P
0.2147
0.2566
0.3009
0.385

Table 7
Return and Portfolio Risk Anal:ysis
m
85%
r° - r
0.3444
(0.0879,0.1718)
(0.0967, 0.196)
0.4055
(0.1049, 0.2233)
0.4887
(0.1023,0.2523)
0.615
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I"l

95%
(0.0879, 0.1373)
(0.1224,0.1555)
(0.135,0.1744)
(0.1408, 0.1908)
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Some problems still remain to be solved. For example, instead of
obtaining the most pessimistic value, the most probable value, and the
most optimistic value for the rate of return from mean and standard
deviation as shown in the examples, we could use simulation to generate
the data directly from the historical resources. We could also use the
possibility programming method to solve multistage asset allocation
problems and assetjliability management problems.
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Nonmedical Limits in Individual Life Insurance
James B. Ross* and Shalini E. Perumpral t

Abstract
This paper shows data that illustrate the substantial variation among nonmedical schedules and the dramatic increase in their amount limits from 1972
through 1992. Coefficients of variation are analyzed for several data subsets.
We find that the variation of schedules in the sample of all firms has increased
throughout the 1972-1992 period for issue ages up to 30, but has declined for
issue ages beyond 30 during the 1982-1992 period. For the non-New York and
stock companies our statistical tests indicate an increase in the variability of
schedules over the full period 1972 to 1992.
Key words and phrases: mortality, underwriting, medical examinations, schedules, coefficient of variation

Introduction
The practice of granting life insurance without a medical examination began in England when underwriting evidence consisted of personal interviews, opinions of associates and friends, and/or attending
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physicians' statements. Medical evidence began to be required in 1850,
and a medical examination was considered essential until 1885. In 1886
cautious experiments to remove the medical examination on smaller
policies began, albeit with substantial restrictions that were gradually
lifted in view of favorable results.
The rationale for nonmedicallimits 1 for insurance policies had been
that the savings in medical exam expenses were sufficient to offset the
additional mortality experienced in the absence of underwriting information from medical exams. A shortage of medical examiners in rural
areas following World War I led a group of Canadian companies to begin nonmedical programs with restrictions on issue ages and amounts.
The practice was well received in the field, the early experience was
favorable, and the Canadian program was liberalized and expanded.
Beginning in 1925 nonmedical underwriting spread rapidly through
the American life insurance industry, and by 1935 86 percent of the
129 members of the American Life Convention had adopted nonmedical programs. Today nearly every life insurer in the United States and
Canada accepts some nonmedically underwritten business, and it is estimated that 67 percent of new ordinary policies and 33 percent of new
ordinary amounts are written nonmedically (Black and Skipper, 1994,
Chapter 24, p. 671).
Because the insurer pays for medical evidence it uses in underwriting the application, there are initial expense savings when no medical
examination is required. The actuarial mechanics of the construction of
such schedules are well established: the present value over the policy
life of the excess mortality experienced under nonmedical underwriting
is equated to the expense savings at issue, and the equation is solved
for the face amount that balances it.
Nonmedical limit schedules theoretically should depend on the cost
of medical exams and the additional mortality experienced in their absence, suggesting that the schedules for different companies should
not vary much. In practice, however, variation among companies enters via differing attitudes in areas such as mortality selection standards, persistency rates, returns on investments, target markets, degrees of accommodation to the writing agent, safety/profit margins in
the premium structure, and stock versus mutual forms of insurer organization. This paper addresses questions raised by the existence of
a large number of nonmedical limit schedules that exhibit substantial
variation.
1 A nonmedical limit for a new life insurance policy is the maximum amount of insurance that can be issued without the benefit of a medical or paramedical examination.
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Changes in nonmedical limits over the last two decades have been
characterized in Black and Skipper (1994, Chapter 24, p. 672) as "nonmedical limits exploded." Great increases in nonmedical limits represent the responses by companies to large increases in the cost of medical examinations over the period of this study. Companies have dealt
with the cost increases in medical examinations by using less expensive
paramedical exams and by making cost-effective use of blood and urine
testing.
The extent to which nonmedical limit schedules vary is an empirical
question. This paper seeks to determine both the degree of the current
variation and the trend in variation over time: Is competition driving the
schedules together, or are individual company differences forcing them
apart? We show how nonmedical limits have developed, summarize the
current situation, and explore the variations of schedules of different
insurers.

2

Factors Impacting Nonmedical Limits

While this paper focuses on nonmedical limits, there is a continuum
of underwriting approaches of which medically examined business and
nonmedical business are the extremes. All variations are driven by the
trade-off between expense savings and differential mortality costs. This
dynamic trade-off is a function of the increase in the cost-effectiveness
of underwriting tools, increases in medical exam costs, and continuing improvements in insured mortality. Paramedical underwriting provides the best example (Woodman, 1992). Paramedical underwriting
has advanced to the point where separate mortality experiences are
maintained for this approach. Blood and urine testing also offer protective values that are cost-effective at levels less than full nonmedical
limits. Additionally, companies review periodically their use of other
underwriting tools such as inspection reports, attending physicians'
statements (APSs), personal health interviews (PHIs), and motor vehicle
records (MVRs). These reviews may cause companies to revise the issue
amounts at which they order such tools.
Inflation is one of the major forces that drew attention to the nonmedical area. The chairman of an extended discussion in 1970 on the
impact of inflation on underwriting remarked: "There is evidence that
the cost of medical underwriting has increased more rapidly than the
health care index, so we can conclude that the major components of
underwriting costs have increased more rapidly than the Consumer
Price Index" (Taylor 1970). The Statistical Abstracts of the United States
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Price Index
Consumer Prices
Medical Care
Physicians' Services
Average Policy Size Issued

1972-1982
131%
148%
145%
168%

1982-1992
45%
106%
94%
154%

1972-1992
236%
410%
375%
580%

provides the data for the percentage increases in related price indices
shown below for the periods 1972-1982, 1982-1992, and 1972-1992.
Data from the Life Insurance Fact Book show that the percentage increases in the average size policy issued have more than kept pace with
these inflationary increases in the several price indices.
The onset of AIDS as a significant factor in underwriting occurred
during the period 1982-1992. During this period AIDS dominated discussions of underwriting in the actuarialliterature. 2 Company responses have included blood testing at much lower face amount levels in
applicant cohorts where AIDS is a concern. Prior to 1985 blood testing
generally was not requested until face amounts applied for exceeded
$1 million. HIV/ AIDS changed that dramatically. Blood/urine/saliva
testing for HIV now begins at $25,000 to $100,000. Additionally, some
observers feel that companies may have slowed increases in nonmedical
limits and conformed their nonmedical schedules by issue ages to those
of competitors to avoid being selected against by the HIV-infected.

3 Literature Review
This literature review concentrates on papers and discussions dealing with the factors impacting nonmedical limits. Outside the actuarial
literature there is substantial additional underwriting material relevant
to this subject, particularly in the publications of the Home Office Life
Underwriters Association and the Institute of Home Office Underwriters.
2For the period up to December 31, 1991, during which information could affect
company decisions on nonmedical limits for 1992, there were several papers and task
force reports on AIDS (though not all focused on underwriting) that were published by
the Society of Actuaries. These include the Guide for Practicing Actuaries (1988), Panjer
(1989), Plumley (1989), Ramsay (1989 and 1990), the Report of the Society of Actuaries
Committee on HW Research (1990), and the Report of the Task Force on the Financial
Implications of AIDS (1990).
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The literature contains three themes. The first theme consists of historical examinations of nonmedical limits in ordinary (and industrial)
life insurance. Parker (1921) reviews the Canadian experiment. Auden
(1938) gives a brief history, an update on the practice of 114 companies,
a review of the reasons for writing nonmedical business, and a report on
the generally favorable mortality. Morton (1977) discusses nonmedical
and paramedical underwriting in his review of underwriting principles
and practices. Sankey (1990) and Black and Skipper (1994, Chapter 24,
pp. 671-672) provide historic treatments for more recent periods.
The second theme, review and liberalization, consists of a long series
of discussions in the actuarial and underwriting journals responding to
questions by editors. Smith (1924) emphasizes the early success of the
Canadian nonmedical program. Larus (1925) cautions against competition on nonmedical limits, while Parker (1925) feels that companies
doing a nonmedical business contribute meaningfully to the information maintained by the Medical Impairment Bureau.
As liberalizations develop, the discussions focus on nonmedical mortality experience relative to that of medically examined business. Smith
(1930) uses Canadian male select mortality as a benchmark; Shepherd
(1930) benchmarks against American male select mortality. Both find
the ratios of actual-to-expected mortality (AlE ratios) for nonmedical
issues higher than the ratios for medically examined business; both
find the AlE ratios for nonmedical issues in age groups beyond age 45
substantially higher than their medically examined counterparts. Smith
and Cross (1930) indicate higher lapse rates on the nonmedical issues.
Marshall (1932) provides data showing the favorable mortality experience of Connecticut Mutual. Discussions in Record of the American
Institute ofActuaries (1934) identify issue age 40 as the supportable upper age for nonmedical schedules, providing several examples at older
issue ages of substantially higher AlE ratios (relative to American male
select mortality) for nonmedical issues than for those medically examined.
Auden (1938) cites reductions from upper age 45 to age 40 as the
trend of the day, with nonmedical persistency still poor but nonmedical
mortality satisfactory. He discusses the value of the forgone expense of
the medical exam in offsetting additional mortality. Hunter (1940) inventories mortality studies (up to 1931 for three Canadian companies
and five American companies) and adds New York Ufe data through
1939 to show generally favorable nonmedical experience. Discussions
in Record of'the American Institute ofActuaries (1942) center around the
problems of obtaining medical examiners during World War II and the
nonmedical liberalizations that would help reduce the load on examin-

96

Journal of Actuarial Practice, Vol. 4, No.1, 1 996

ers (the consensus was "yes" to amounts, "no" to age extensions). The
increase in the percentage of applications on a nonmedical basis that accompanied nonmedical schedule liberalizations is discussed, with one
large company's percentage in 1942 going from 9 percent in July to 30
percent in October!
The central issue in Record of the American Institute of Actuaries
(1946) is wartime mortality; all commentators on nonmedical limits
come to the same general conclusion, viz. that nonmedical business
still could be written satisfactorily at issue ages under 40 for amounts
up to $5,000. The discussions in the Transactions of the Society of Actuaries (1950) indicate that the triggering incident for the announcement
of nonmedical limit increases is a specific increase in medical examiner
fees.
Merriam (1951) describes an increase in medical examiner fees of
about one-third, with resulting extensions of nonmedical limits in the
Metropolitan Life to the age groups 41-45 and 46-50. Mathews (1953)
provides survey evidence from 108 companies that such extensions
are not common-only 5 percent of the companies issue nonmedically
above age 40. Morton (1954) reports that most Canadian companies
continu'e some nonmedical issue amount to age 45, but provides discounted extra mortality costs that suggest only nominal amounts are
feasible. Van Keuren (1956) indicates that Metropolitan Life, which introduced nonmedical issues above age 40 in 1951, has discontinued
them because of unsatisfactory mortality experience and the necessity
to obtain medical exams on 25 percent of nonmedical applicants.
Jacoby and Tookey (1959) both indicate pressure from physicians to
increase the medical examination fees. They attribute this to doctors'
aversion to paper work, the lagging of fees behind price levels, and
resentment that insurers would attempt to fix doctors' fees. All discussants (Transactions of the Society of Actuaries, 1960) note increases of
$25,000 to $30,000 up to age 30, but few increases thereafter.
Lew (1966) predicts increased use of bodily fluids testing to extend
the use of nonmedical limits to older age groups. Gauer and van Keuren
(1967) explore the use of technicians and early paramedical techniques.
The difficulty of finding physicians willing to serve as medical examiners is noted. Many discussants note the use of medical information
phoned-in and recorded. Keltie (1969) attributes the slowdown in mortality improvement on medically examined business to the spread of
paramedical exams and alludes to reductions in the use of inspection
reports and attending physicians' reports.
The third theme consists of the readings gathered by the Society of
Actuaries under the rubric of cost implications in the Professional Actu-
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arial Specialty Guide to Individual Underwriting (1993). Ormsby (1963)
first examines the economics of underwriting in a paper that addresses
the considerations involved in ordering inspection reports. He provides
formulas for" ... converting changes in underwriting action attributable
to information in the APS (attending physician's statement) into equivalent 'net' single premiums at issue so that a comparison can be made
of these 'net' single premiums with the total cost of obtaining and processing the statement itself ... " The techniques outlined are applicable
to the construction of nonmedical limit schedules.
Mast (1978) discusses each element of the nonmedical limit question. His paper determines the break-even amount as "... the policy size at which the increased mortality costs resulting from the lack
of a medical examination are approximately counterbalanced by the
consequent savings in underwriting expenses." He mentions an asset
share approach, and discusses the net single premium technique used
by Ormsby: " ... the relationship between the expenses associated with
obtaining a medical examination and the present value of the increased
mortality cost per $1,000 is used to determine the break-even amount."
Reitano (1979) provides a consistent theory for evaluating the interplay between the cost of underwriting tools and the resulting mortality.
He discusses two cases:

• The actuarial approach typically used in setting nonmedical limits,
using the present value of the difference between medical and
nonmedical mortality experience (the two table technique); and
• The underwriting approach for valuing underwriting tools (as in
Ormsby), under which the value of the tool is the present value of
the extra mortality costs that are saved by remOving certain lives
from the standard issue class (the single table method).
Bergstrom (1989,1991) discusses the assumptions and calculations
that provide estimates for the protective values of blood chemistry profile and urinalysis testing. The earlier study gives protective values
for life insurance, the latter for major medical insurance. The reports
show the techniques for expressing the results in terms of amount levels above which the testing is cost-justified and in terms of return on
the investment (ROI) in the testing.
Mills (1991) provides a general model for such protective value studies, utilizing the axiom that" ... a particular underwriting procedure has
positive economic value if its cost is less than the savings in mortality
(or morbidity) made possible by its use." Mills provides an example for
valuing the attending physician's statement in connection with disability income.
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Woodman (1992) assesses the value of the paramedical examination using the tools and approach specified by Bergstrom. He provides
comparisons between medical, paramedical, and nonmedical mortality
experience; his further analysis indicates the age-at-issue groups and
amount ievels for which the several underwriting approaches are most
appropriate.

4

Data Sources

The data used in the statistical analyses are the nonmedical limit
amounts published in Best's Flitcraft Compend (Life-Health) for the editions dated 1973, 1983, and 1993. The data collection procedures used
by A.M. Best Co. are such that the data relate to the years 1972, 1982,
and 1992. It is these latter years that are used in the table headings and
the text.
The nonmedical limit information, when available, is given in the
policy analysis section (preceding the statistical sections) of the Flitcraft
Compend. The availability of nonmedical schedules is shown in Table 1,
which gives in the panel headings the number of companies contributing nonmedical limit schedules to each year of the study. The material
available for analysis grew substantially from 1972 to 1982, then shrank
in 1992 because the A.M. Best Company split the Flitcraft Compendinto
two sections, only one of which preserved the nonmedical data. As a
result there are data on 113 companies for 1972, 164 companies for
1982, and 119 companies for 1992. Forty-eight companies provided
data for all three years.
The basic data (not shown) consist of values for the nonmedical
limits across each of the 15 issue age groups for each company plus
additional values for independent variables representing specific characteristics of individual companies. The issue age groups used by different life insurers in practice are so similar that less than 20 forcings
were needed to put the nonmedical schedules into the common format
of 15 groups by age at issue.

Table 1
Characteristics of the Sample of All Firms Nonmedical Limits (OOOs)

Panel A: 1992 Sample (N = 119)
Age at Issue
0-4 5-14 15 16-1718-2021-2526-30 31-3536-4041-4546-50 51-5556-60 61-6566-70
Number of Companies*
115 115 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 115 107 52 36 18 10
Mean
222 225 224 220 208 209 209 180 140 86.6 66.3 25.4 17.5 5.50 1.63
Standard Deviation
153 155 137 138 134 134 134 99.8 89.2 65.1 65.3 53.6 50.1 18.3 7.42
Median
0
0
0
0
200 200 200 200 200 200 200 150 100 75 50
Mode
250 250 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 50
0
0
0
0
Maximum
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 500 500 350 350 350 350 100 50
Minimum
000000000000000
Panel B: 1982 Sample (N = 164)
Age at Issue
0-4 5-14 15 16-1718-2021-2526-30 31-35 36-4041-4546-50 51-5556-60 61-6566-70
Number of Companies*
162 162 163 164 164 164 164 162 162 150 82 37 22 16 10
Mean
134 139 139 141 141 145 144 108 70.6 40.1 25.2 15.8 14.4 8.50 5.57
Standard Deviation
84.5 82.5 81.3 81.0 80.9 86.4 86.9 85.2 82.5 75.4 75.9 72.2 72.3 47.5 42.4
Median
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 75 50 20
2
0
0
0
0
Mode
0
0
0
0
0
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 50 25
Maximum
500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500
Minimum
o 0 o 15 15 25 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Panel C: 1972 Sample (N = 113)
Age at Issue
0-4 5-14 15 16-1718-2021-2526-30 31-35 36-40 41-4546-50 51-55 56-60 61-6566-70
Number of Companies*
113 113 113 113 113 113 112 111 111 71
18
9
5
2
0
Mean
30.2 31.9 32.7 33.0 33.1 32.9 32.0 20.9 11.0 3.31 0.50 0.15 0.07 0.02 0
Standard Deviation
9.18 7.83 6.61 6.46 6.39 6.19 6.77 6.04 5.22 3.62 1.49 0.58 0.34 0.17 0
Median
30 30 30 35 35 30 30 20 10
3
0
0
0
0
0
Mode
30 30 30 30 30 30 30 20 10
5
0
0
0
0
0
Maximum
50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 25 10
4 2.5 1.5 0
10 10 10 10 10
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Minimum
5
* Number of companies with nonzero nonmedical limits
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Methodology

For each age group for each of the years 1972, 1982, and 1992 these
univariate statistics for the nonmedical limits are calculated: mean,
median, mode, maximum, minimum, and standard deviation. We also
count and display the number of companies that provide nonzero nonmedical limits to a particular age group. These characteristics are displayed in Table 1. The same statistics are provided in Table 2 for the
48 companies with data for all three years.
Because our interest is to determine the extent of current variation
among issuers and the trend in variation over time, a test for stationarity of variance seems logical. Given the tremendous increase in nonmedical limits in the decade from 1972 to 1982, however, stationarity
tests of the variance do not provide any insight as to the real divergences in behavior within the industry. Therefore, coefficients of variation are calculated for each age group for the years 1972, 1982, and
1992, and a series of nonparametric tests is performed on this statistic.
Statistical tests are used to determine: (i) whether variation within
the industry has remained consistent for the two decades-this test
was suggested in 1937 by Friedman (1991); and (ii) whether the variation has consistently increased or decreased over the two decades-this
test was suggested in 1963 by Page (1991). Appendix A describes these
tests for the entire sample, giving the null and alternative hypotheses,
the calculated coefficients of variation, formulas for the test statistics,
and the cut-off points for rejection at selected confidence levels. The
Friedman and Page tests are performed on the entire sample and repeated again for those 48 companies for which data are available for
both decades. This approach allows us to isolate any bias that may have
been introduced by outliers or new entrants into the full sample.
The 48 firms for which data are available for 1972, 1982 and 1992
are also split into stock (22) and mutual (26) companies and New York
(22) and non-New York (26) insurers. Similar tests are performed on
these samples to determine whether there are any identifiable differences in behavior among these subgroups. The stock/mutual split is
chosen to explore whether the philosophy or practices inherent in the
form of company organization may influence the nonmedical limits.
The non-New York/New York split is chosen to test whether the New
York expense and commission limitations (and perhaps the extraterritoriality) would impact the nonmedical limits.

;;0

Table 2
Characteristics of the Sample of 48 Firms Nonmedical Limits (OOOs)

Panel A: 1992 Sample (N = 48)
Age at Issue
0-4 5-14 15 16-1718-2021-2526-3031-3536-4041-4546-5051-5556-60 61-6566-70
Number of Companies*
47 47 47 48 48 48 48 47 47 47 47 21
11
6
3
Mean
253 259 261 264 252 252 252 204 149 83.5 66.4 29.1 21.5 7.04 1.63
Standard Deviation
163 167 166 163 162 162 162 105 93.4 73.9 72.9 71.9 71.8 22.3 8.00
Median
250 250 250 250 250 250 250 200 100 50 50
0
0
0
0
Mode
250 250 250 250 250 250 250 100 100 50 50
0
0
0
0
Maximum
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 500 500 350 350 350 350 100 50
Minimum
o 0 0 30 30 30 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Panel B: 1982 Sample (N =48)
Age at Issue
0-4 5-14 15 16-1718-2021-2526-3031-3536-4041-4546-5051-5556-60 61-6566-70
Number of Companies*
6
2
2
2
48 48 48 48 48 48 48 47 47 42 16
Mean
137 136 135 135 136 135 134 94.0 50.7 23.1 7.42 1.28 0.11 0.11 0.11
Standard Deviation
70.0 68.3 65.1 65.1 64.9 64.3 65.0 60.3 40.0 24.2 18.0 4.43 0.72 0.72 0.72
Median
0
0
0
0
0
100 100 100 100 125 125 120 75 50 15
Mode
0
0
0
0
0
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 50 10
Maximum
5
5
5
300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 200 100 100 25
Minimum
30 30 30 30 30 30 30
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Panel C: 1972 Sample (N = 48)
Age at Issue
0-4 5-14 15 16-1718-2021-2526-3031-3536-4041-4546-5051-5556-60 61-6566-70
Number of Companies*
48 48 48 48 48 48 48 47 47 27
3
2
1
1
0
Mean
29.7 31.6 32.8 33.2 33.2 33.1 32.1 19.8 9.96 2.96 0.21 0.16 0.03 0.03 0
Standard Deviation
9.31 7.52 5.92 5.60 5.60 5.61 6.09 5.62 3.43 3.20 0.92 0.69 0.22 0.22 0
Median
30 30 30 35 35 30 30 20 10
3
0
0
0
0
0
Mode
30 30 30 30 30 30 30 20 10
0
0
0
0
0
0
Maximum
50 50 50 50 50 50 50 40 25 12
5
4 1.5 1.5 0
10 10 15 20 20 20
15
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Minimum
* Number of companies with nonzero nonmedical limits
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6 Analysis and Findings
Panels A, B, and C of Table 1 show the descriptive statistics for all
firms for the set of 15 age groups over 1972-1992. The data show the
stunning increases in nonmedical limits, particularly over 1972-1982.
The mean is consistently higher than the median and the mode, with few
exceptions, suggesting that some companies offer significantly larger
nonmedical limits than their competitors.
Panels A, B, and C of Table 2 show the descriptive statistics for the 48
companies. The same patterns of skewness, with the mean being higher
than the median and the mode, emerge for 1992 and 1982, while the
1972 figures emulate a normal distribution.
Table 3 shows the percentage increase in the mean nonmedical limits for the periods 1972-1982, 1982-1992, and from 1972-1992. Percentage increases for 1972-1982 are substantial in every age category,
especially beyond issue age 40. There are further increases in the mean
nonmedical limits for every issue age category in the second decade.
These increases are much smaller than those in the earlier decade but
more evenly distributed along the age range.
Table 4 shows that the percentage of companies offering nonzero
nonmedical limits at issue ages beyond age 40 has risen dramatically
since 1972. This may reflect the lower mortality rates due to improved
health care and the reduction of death rates from diseases significant to
the elderly. The percentage of companies offering nonzero nonmedical
insurance to groups below the age of 15 dropped slightly.
A comparison of the various coefficients of variation3 suggests that
the differences among companies increased over both decades for the
first seven age groups (0-30) in the total sample, particularly in the
decade from 1972 to 1982 (Table 5). For the next five age groups (3155) the variation increased from 1972 to 1982, but the differences in
nonmedical limits among companies decline markedly. For the last
three age groups the variation among companies from 1972 to 1992
consistently declined. Much of the reduction in variation at the older
ages can be attributed to those companies which went from zero to positive nonmedical limits in that age range. The data further suggest that
positive socioeconomic factors for the older age groups in the decade
from 1982 to 1992 may have overridden any differences in individual
company underwriting costs. The greater variability in practice for the
lower age groups, however, suggests that company poliCies differ more
in targeting this age group.
3The coefficient of variation is the ratio of the standard deviation to the (nonzero)
mean.
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Table 3
Percentage Increases in Mean
Non-Medical Limits: All Firms (in %)
Age Range 1972-82 1982-92 1972-92
0-4
5-14
15-15
16-17
18-20
21-25
26-30
31-35
36-40
41-45
46-50
51-55
56-60
61-65
66-70

347
336
325
327
326
344
353
417
545
1,118
4,980
10,500
21,186
42,900
00

66
62
61
56
48
43
44
67
97
115
161
60
17
(36)
(71)

640
605
585
567
528
535
553
761
1,173
2,516
13,160
16,833
24,900
27,400
00

For the entire sample the null hypothesis that variation among firms
did not change from decade to decade is rejected at the 5 percent level
using Friedman's nonparametric test (Table 6). The alternate hypothesis that the variation increased over time could neither be accepted nor
rejected using Page's ordered test, while a second alternate hypothesis
that the variation decreased over time failed to be accepted (Table 7).
The analysis suggests that the divergent pattern in nonmedical limits
for the younger age groups more than offsets the convergent patterns
for the older age groups, but only to a small extent. There is no ordered pattern to this variation, however; neither the highest nor the
lowest nonmedical limits fall in the same issue age category for the
years 1972, 1982, and 1992.
The results are similar when the tests are performed only on the 48
firms for which data are available for both decades. The null hypothesis
that variations among firms did not change from decade to decade fails
to be rejected (Table 6 and Table 7). This is true even though the pattern
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Age
Range
0-4
5-14
15-15
16-17
18-20
21-25
26-30
31-35
36-40
41-45
46-50
51-55
56-60
61-65
66-70

Table 4
Percentage of Companies Offering
Nonzero Nonmedical Privileges
Percent Increase (in %)
1972
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
99.1
98.2
98.2
62.8
15.9
8.0
4.4
1.7
0

1982
98.8
98.8
99.4
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
98.8
98.8
91.5
50.0
22.6
13.4
9.8
6.1

1992
96.6
96.6
99.2
99.2
99.2
99.2
99.2
99.2
99.2
96.6
89.9
43.7
30.3
15.1
8.4

1972-82
(1.2)
(1.2)
(0.6)
0
0
0
0.9
0.6
0.6
45.7
214.5
182.5
204.5
444.4
00

1982-92
(2.2)
(2.2)
(0.2)
(0.8)
(0.8)
(0.8)
(0.8)
0.4
0.4
5.6
79.8
93.4
126.1
54.1
37.7

1972-92
(3.4)
(3.4)
(0.8)
(0.8)
(0.8)
(0.8)
0.1
1.0
1.0
53.8
465.4
446.3
588.6
738.9
00

in the coefficient of variation for the first seven age groups shows an
increasing variation over time.
The null hypothesis fails to be rejected because there is a strong
pattern of convergence in company practices in the age groups extending from 41 to 70. The increasing similarity in the behavior of these
companies may have allowed other more independent firms to carve
niches in these target markets, which would explain the ambivalence in
the results for the entire sample.

Table 5
Coefficients of Variation for All Age Groups

Sample: All Firms
Age
0-4
5-14
15 16-17 18-20 21-25
1992
69.02 69.17 61.34 62.82 64.32 64.19
1982
63.00 59.59 58.35 57.51 57.35 59.38
1972
30.43 24.54 20.20 19.58 19.33 18.38
Sample: 48 FIrms
Age
0-4
5-14
15 16-17 18-20 21-25
1992
64.55 64.40 63.59 61.83 64.23 64.23
1982
51.29 50.33 48.15 48.15 47.65 47.54
1972
31.35 23.83 18.03 16.86 16.86 16.95
Sample: Mutual Companies - 26 Frrms
Age 0-4 5-14
15
16-17 18-20 21-25
1992
63.28 64.94 62.95 58.90 66.06 66.06
1982
44.72 45.03 45.03 45.03 45.03 74.42
1972
25.44 15.61 15.61 15.10 15.10 15.29
Sample: Stock Companies - 22 FIrms
Age 0-4 5-14
15
16-17 18-20 21-25
1992
56.21 56.21 53.23 54.73 53.23 53.23
1982
60.07 56.91 52.80 52.80 51.54 51.54
1972
36.78 32.49 21.29 19.39 19.39 19.39
Sample: New York Companies - 22 Frrms
Age
0-4
5-14
15 16-17 18-20 21-25
1992
65.02 63.02 63.02 56.59 62.48 62.48
1982
54.97 56.56 52.83 52.83 52.83 52.94
1972
23.14 17.01 17.01 17.01 17.01 17.27
Sample: Non-New York Companies - 26 Firms
Age 0-4 5-14
15
16-17 18-20 21-25
1992
49.92 49.92 48.78 51.20 52.47 52.47
1982
46.45 43.44 43.44 43.44 42.71 42.71
1972
36.00 28.82 19.14 17.09 17.09 17.09

;;0

o

VI
VI
~

26-30
64.19
60.10
21.15

31-35
55.31
78.89
28.95

36-40
63.51
116.88
47.30

41-45 46-50 51-55
75.13 98.50211.04
188.10 300.59457.71
109.30 297.31 386.89
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500.98
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26-30
64.23
48.60
18.97

31-35
51.23
64.20
28.40

36-40
62.82
78.86
34.47

41-45 46-50 51-55
88.49 109.89247.35
104.66 242.14345.96
108.35 442.35428.64

56-60 61-65 66-70
334.40 316.56492.25
631.64 631.64 631.64
692.82692.82 0

26-30
66.06
45.98
17.23

31-35
18.19
65.86
19.22

36-40
46.72
57.50
23.83

41-45 46-50 51-55
45.81 53.78 129.79
90.57261.28269.03
97.30355.62363.32

56-60 61-65 66-70
216.15 429.98509.90
509.90509.90 509.90
509.90509.90 0

26-30
53.23
52.15
21.29

31-35
54.95
65.28
38.60

36-40
77.74
97.72
44.97

41-45 46-50 51-55 56-60 61-65 66-70
102.65 133.59216.90267.07235.59409.65
119.65210.28431.80458.26458.26458.26
128.08 458.26458.26 0
0
0

26-30
62.48
54.77
19.73

31-35
51.75
75.99
19.35

36-40
67.61
79.04
36.54

41-45 46-50 51-55
73.49 88.90 150.74
104.48 218.55231.40
120.77325.86333.01

26-30
52.47
42.97
18.96

31-35
49.53
48.82
34.13

36-40
60.06
80.75
33.35

41-45 46-50 51-55 56-60 61-65 66-70
93.39 124.77 236.58 331.10 340.63 500.00
97.89233.97500.00 500.00500.00 500.00
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Table 6
The Friedman Test
Friedman Test
Statistic
Sample
6.93
All Firms
48 Firms
2.53
Mutual Companies (26)
3.63
Stock Companies (22)
19.07
New York Companies (22)
3.73
Non-New York Companies (26)
11.03
Note: Ho: tl = t2 = t3;
HI: At least one of the

Test Indication on
Null at 5% Level
Reject
Fail to reject
Fail to reject
Reject
Fail to reject
Reject

tis is different.

The 5% critical value is for this test is 5.99.

Sample
All Firms

Table 7
The Page Test
Page Test
Statistic
HI: 190
H2: 170

48 Firms

HI: 187
H2: 173

Mutual Companies (26)

HI: 188.5
H 2: 171.5

Stock Companies (22)

HI: 195

New York Companies (22)

HI: 188

H 2 : 170
H 2 : 170

Non-New York Companies (26)

HI: 196
H 2 : 164

Note: Ho: tl = t2 = t3;
HI: tl < t2 < t3;

H2: tl > t2 > t3.

The 5% critical value is for this test is 190.

Test Indication on
Null at 5% Level
Unclear
Fail to reject
Fail to reject
Fail to reject
Fail to reject
Fail to reject
Reject
Fail to reject
Fail to reject
Fail to reject
Reject
Fail to reject
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When the 48 firms are divided into New York carriers and non-New
York insurers, the statistical tests provide interesting results. The tests
indicate that the variation among New York carriers did not change
over the two decades, while the null (no change) is strongly rejected
for non-New York insurers (Table 6). Furthermore, Page's ordered test
rejects the null in favor of the alternate that the variation among firms
is increasing over time for the non-New York carriers (Table 7). The
pattern in the coefficient of variation for the New York insurers remains
similar to that for the sample of 48 firms.
When the sample of 48 firms is split on the basis of organization
into stock and mutual firms, we again find interesting differences. For
the stock companies, the null hypothesis that the variation in company
practices did not change over time is strongly rejected in favor of the
alternate (Table 6). Furthermore, Page's test rejects the null in favor
of the alternate that the variation in company practices is increasing
over time (Table 7). These variations are preponderant in the issue age
groups from 0 to 30. Although the pattern of increasingly divergent
practices exists at the lower age groups for the mutual companies, there
seems to be convergence at the higher age groups. As a result, Friedman's test fails to reject the null of no changes. This result is further
confirmed by Page's test-the null fails to be rejected in favor of either
increasing or decreasing divergence in mutual company practices over
time.

7

Conclusions

This study examines nonmedical limits for a sample of life insurance
companies over a 20 year period to determine the extent of variability in
company practices at several points in time and the change in variability
over time. The study shows a greater variability in company practices
for the lower age groups than for higher age groups. Part of this variability could be attributed to the fact that almost all companies offer
nonmedical insurance in the lower age brackets. The number of companies offering nonmedical insurance at higher age brackets decreases
sharply, particularly after age 50.
Analysis of data over time shows that the percentage of companies
offering insurance at the higher age brackets has risen while the percentage at lower age brackets has dropped slightly. The number of
companies offering nonmedical insurance to those below age 45 increased substantially in the first decade of our study, but decreased
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slightly in the second decade. There is a continuous increase, however,
in the number of firms offering nonmedical insurance at the higher age
brackets. This fact could be attributed to improved mortality rates for
the older population and to companies' increased interest in the senior
citizen market.
When the entire sample is examined, statistical tests suggest an increase in variability of company nonmedical limit schedules. When the
subs ample of 48 firms for which data are available over both decades
is examined, however, there appears to be no substantive change in the
variability of nonmedical limits. One possible explanation for these results is that new firms entering or leaving the market attempt to carve
special niches that contribute to the greater variability in nonmedical
limits.
Interesting questions about nonmedical limits in practice abound.
Do companies construct new nonmedical limit schedules analytically
along the lines suggested earlier in this paper? Or do they forego such
calculations and base their decisions in part on the schedules of other
companies-particularly competitors? How do companies manage their
agency operations with nonmedical limits less liberal than competitors?
And where is the industry headed with respect to limits for nonmedical
and paramedical acceptances and for blood/urine testing? Qualitative
data are required to provide useful answers to these questions. Perhaps
these data are best secured through a survey instrument addressed to
the companies. The survey approach would have the additional benefit of providing a larger sample by avoiding the data limitations that
a source such as the Best's Flitcraft Compend (Life-Health) necessarily
imposes.
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Appendix
The Friedman and Page statistics are explained below for the sample of all firms; for more details on these statistics see Hettmansperger
(1991). They are nonparametric tests and are performed on the coefficient of variation for the sample of all firms and for all the subsamples.
The first column of Table Al recognizes that there are 15 issue age
groups in the sample. In the remaining three columns the values of
the coefficient of variation (CV) and the respective ranking of each year
based on the CVs are provided. A value of three is given to the year
with the highest value of the CV, and the other years are rank-ordered
accordingly for each age group. The years 1972, 1982, and 1992 are
represented by tl. t2, and t3, respectively, in the tests below.
For the Friedman test, the null hypothesis and the alternative hypothesis are:
tl = t2 = t3;
At least one of the

Ho :
HI :

tiS

is different.

The test statistic is:
K*

12

k

= nk(k + 1) j~ (R.j)2
15

xl~ x 4

6.93

- 3n(k

+ 1)

x [(22)2 + (36)2 + (32)2] - 3 x 15 x 4
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Age
Group

Table Al
Coefficient of Variation
And Rank (in parentheses)
Year
1972
30.4 (1)
24.5 (1)
20.2 (1)
19.6 (1)
19.3 (1)
18.8 (1)
21.1 (1)
28.9 (1)
47.3 (1)
109.3 (2)
297.3 (2)
386.9 (2)
518.3 (3)
767.4 (3)
0.0 (1)
22

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

14
15
R·
.J

1982
63.0 (2)
59.6 (2)
58.3 (2)
57.5 (2)
57.3 (2)
59.4 (2)
60.1 (2)
78.9 (3)
116.9 (3)
188.1 (3)
300.6 (3)
457.7 (3)
501.0 (2)
558.5 (2)
762.5 (3)
36

1992
69.0 (3)
69.2 (3)
61.3 (3)
62.8 (3)
64.3 (3)
64.2 (3)
64.2 (3)
55.3 (2)
63.5 (2)
75.1 (1)
98.5 (1)
211.0 (1)
286.2 (1)
332.9 (1)
453.9 (2)
32

where k is the total number of years (k = 3); n is the number of issue
age groups (n = 15); Rij is the rank of the i-th observation in year j
relative to the other k - 1 years; and
n

R.j

=

L Rij

j

=

1,2, ... , k.

j;l

The calculated value of K* has a chi-square distribution with two
degrees of freedom. The critical values at the 5 percent and 10 percent
levels are 5.99 and 4.61, respectively. Thus, the hypothesis is rejected in
favor of the alternative that the variations in the years 1972, 1982, and
1992 are not the same. (The hypothesis, however, fails to be rejected
at the 1 percent level.)
Page's test for ordered alternatives asks whether the variable (in this
case the coefficient of variation) is increasing over time or is decreasing
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over time. The null hypothesis and the alternatives are:

tl = t2 = t3;
tl < t2 < t3;
tI>t2>t3.

Ho :
HI :

H2:
The test statistic for HI is:
k

L

Lj

x R.j

j=I

1 x 22 + 2 x 36 + 3 x 32
190.

The value of the test statistic is equal to the critical value of 190 at
the 5 percent confidence level. Therefore the hypothesis is neither accepted nor rejected in favor of the alternative HI that the coefficient of
variation is increasing over time.
The test statistic for H2 is:
k

L

L (k -

j + 1) x R.j

j=I

3 x 22 + 2 x 36 + 1 x 32
170.

Because the calculated value of 170 is less than the critical value of 190,
the hypothesis that the coefficient of variation remains constant over
time fails to be rejected.
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A Proposal for Improving the System of Financing
Health Care in Singapore
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Abstract*
Like many other countries, including the United States, Singapore faces the
dual problems of rising health care costs and an aging population. To cope with
these problems, the Singapore government introduced the Medishield scheme
in 1989 that provides low cost catastrophic medical insurance coverage. The
scheme suffers from a serious deficiency, however: coverage ceases at age
70. This deficiency is exacerbated by Medishield's premium payment structure
which is akin to the premium structure of a one year renewable term policy
so no reserves are developed. As a result, coverage beyond age 70 requires
exorbitant premiums that are beyond the reach of the average Singaporean.
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We propose a premium payment structure under which the annual premium payable remains level in real terms throughout the lifetime of the insured. This makes the premium structure similar to one that is a level percentage of salary. The model uses such key variables as the rate of return, the rates
of inflation of general costs and of medical costs, and the rate of increase in
the morbidity rate.
Key words and phrases: premiums, inflation, reserves, gains and losses, surplus

Introduction
Singapore soon will face the problem of rising health care costs as
its population ages. To cope with this anticipated problem, the Singapore government introduced the Medisave scheme in 1984 under which
every working person must contribute a certain percent of his or her
income to meet personal or immediate family hospitalization expenses,
particularly medical expenses incurred during old age. l
1.1

The Medisave Scheme

Medisave is compulsory and is administered by the Central Provident
Funds (CPF) Board, a statutory board of the Singapore government. All
employed persons are required to be members of the CPF and must contribute 40 percent of their income 2 to meet their retirement, housing,
education, investment, and health care needs. This 40 percent contribution is jointly and equally shared by the employer and the employee
and is allocated as follows:
• 6 to 8 percent of the total contribution goes to the Medisave account;
• 4 percent of the total contribution goes to the special account;
• The balance (28 to 30 percent) of the total contribution remains
in the ordinary account.
The operation of the Medisave special account and ordinary account
are described below.
The Medisave Account: Funds in the Medisave accounts may be used
to meet personal or immediate family's hospitalization expenses,
I Medisave coverage ceases at age 70.
2Income is subject to a maximum monthly contribution of $2,400.
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especially after retirement. For example, these funds can be used
to pay for the hospital bills of the member's spouse, children,
parents, or grandparents up to:
• $300 per day for daily hospital charges; and
• A fixed limit per table of surgical operation according to the
complexity of the operation.
If the hospital bill exceeds Medisave limits, the member is obligated to pay the part of the hospital bill not covered by Medisave.
In addition, Medisave can be used to pay for the hospital stay for
the delivery of the first three children.

Employee contribution rates progressively increase with age as
shown in Table 1: For self-employed workers, contribution rates
are lower. Medisave contributions and savings earn interest at
Table 1
Singapore Medisave
Contribution Rates
Age
Rate
6%
Below 35
35t044
7%
45 and above
8%
prevailing market rates and are tax-deductible. The Medisave balance can be accumulated up to $17,000; any amount in excess of
this limit is automatically transferred into the ordinary account.
The Special Account: Funds in the special account can be used to finance the Minimum Sum scheme, which is a compulsory national
retirement scheme to help members support a modest standard
living during retirement. Starting from $40,000 in 1995, the minimum sum will be raised by $ 5,000 a year until it reaches $80,000
in 2003. At least half the minimum sum must be in cash, the
other half may consist of tangible assets such as property. The
cash portion ensures members of a monthly income in retirement.
Prior to retirement, members have three options to invest their
minimum sum: (i) buy a life annuity from an approved insurance
company, (ii) keep it with an approved bank, or (iii) leave it with
the CPF Board. If the income in the special account is less than
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the minimum sum, the balance of the minimum sum is covered
by the income in the ordinary account.
The Ordinary Account: Funds in the ordinary accounts can be used for
several different purposes including: (i) retirement (together with
the special account to meet the minimum sum requirement); (ii)
housing (can be government or private houses, for the purpose
of owner occupation or for investment in one or more houses);
(iii) education (restricted to local tertiary education), and (iv) investment (in common stocks and bonds, government bonds, fixed
deposit, unit trust, gold, as well as endowment insurance policy).

1.2

The Medishield Scheme

CPF members' Medisave accounts, however, may be strained in the
event of a prolonged illness that requires long-term medical treatment.
To protect the Medisave account, the Singapore government introduced
the Medishield scheme in 1990, a low cost medical insurance that adds
more value to Medisave. Medishield is major medical insurance with
participation built in by way of deductible and co-insurance as measures to contain cost. All CPF members automatically are covered under
Medishield unless they elect to opt out. The Medishield premium and
any costs not covered by Medishield, such as deductibles, co-insurances,
and amounts in excess of the maximum claimable amount, can be paid
from the Medisave account. Table 2 shows the benefits and claim limits
under Medishield. Those limits are per policy. Each of the family member will have his/her own policy. Therefore, for example the deductible
$4,000 is for the particular family member and not the entire family.
Likewise for all of the rest.
Let AP(x, z) be the actual annual premium charged for one year
health insurance coverage in calendar year z payable under Medishield. 3
The actual premium charged is determined from expected claims by
applying the percentage loading according to the formula:
AP(x, z) = (1 + e)EC(x, z)

(1)

where EC(x, z) is the expected claim cost in the calendar year z for
insured age x last birthday on l/l/z, and e is the expense and other
loading applied to the net premium to get the actual annual premium
charged.
Table 3 shows how these premiums increase with age.
3 As these premiums are only for coverage for one year, they are similar to the premiums for yearly renewable term policy in life insurance.
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Table 2
Medishield Benefits and Claim Limits (in Singapore $s)
Benefits
Limits
$4,000 per policy year
Deductible
Claim Limits
$70,000 per policy year; $200,000 lifetime
$500 per day
Hospital Stay*
$800 per day
Intensive Care Unit*
Surgical Operations
$400 to $5,500 per policy year
$3,500 per policy year
Implants
Outpatient Treatment Limits vary according to treatment.
*Includes meals, prescriptions, investigations, and other miscellaneous charges.

The annual premiums shown in Table 1 are the 1995 published rates
charged by the CPF's Medishield program on an annual basis for an insured of age x last birthday. Because we do not have access to original data such as the morbidity rate and other assumptions used by
Medishield in determining AP (x, z), it is difficult to estimate the annual
premiums for ages beyond age 70. A quick estimate of the projected
premiums beyond age 70 can be obtained by assuming that health care
costs continue to increase exponentially at advanced ages. The formula
AP(x, 1995)

='

13.17(l.06)X

(2)

for x=' 25,35,45,55,62.5, and 67.5 gives a good least squares fit to the
data in Table l. Equation (1) is used to provide estimates for AP(x, z)
for higher ages as tabulated in Table 4. Table 4 shows that if coverage
is extended beyond age 70, the annual premium for ages over 70 will
be more than most Singaporeans can afford.

1 .3

Objectives

The objective of this paper is to develop a model of the Medishield
program without the restriction that coverage ceases after age 70, where
it is needed most. To pay for this extended benefit, we develop a premium structure that remains level in real terms and is approximately
a constant percentage of a worker's salary. A method for performing
a detailed analysis of the annual gains and losses and the sources of
surplus of the Medishield program is provided.
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Table 3
Medishield
1995 Annual Premiums*
Age (x)
AP(x, 1995)
o - 30
$ 60
31 - 40
$ 90
41 - 50
$180
51 - 60
$360
61 - 65
$480
66 - 70
$660
*In Singapore dollars.

2 Notation
The analysis presented in this paper is based on population information that may be most readily available at the start of each calendar
year. If, however, information is gathered on a different basis, such as
is the case for fiscal years, then our results can easily be modified. This
requires changing 1/1/ z to the date at the start of the fiscal year. All
events are then defined over the fiscal year in an obvious manner.
The following notation is used throughout this paper:
lbd
b
9
m
i

v
Zo
Xo
z

x
kP~T)
q~d)

Last birthday;
Annual morbidity rate of increase due to age;
Annual rate of inflation (general cost of living);
Annual rate of medical inflation;
Annual valuation rate of interest;
(1

+ i)-I;

Calendar year of issue on the policy;
Age lbd on l/l/zo;
Current calendar year;
Current age last birthday on 1/1/ z;
Probability that a Medshield insured age x
lbd survives to age x + k lbd;
Probability that a Medshield insured age x
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Table 4
Medishield Extrapolated
AurnnualPrenrlum*
Age
Premium
70
$ 778
75
$1,041
80
$1,393
85
$1,865
90
$2,495
95
$3,339
*In Singapore dollars.

q~W)

lbd dies before age x + 1 lbd;
Probability that a Medshield insured age x
lbd withdraws before age x + 1 lbd;
q x(d)

ECS(x, z)

ECD(x,z)

ECW(x,z)

1 + is

1 +!d
1 +iw
LP(xo, zo)

+ q(w).
x'

Morbidity rate in calendar year Z for insured
age x lbd on l/l/z;
Expected Medshield claim cost in calendar year z
for an insured age x lbd on 1/1/ z who survives
to l/l/z + 1;
Expected Medshield claim cost in calendar year z
for an insured age x lbd on 1/1/ z who dies
before l/l/z + 1;
Expected Medshield claim cost in calendar year z
for an insured age x lbd on 1/1/ z who withdraws
before l/l/z + 1;
Annual extra claim inflation factor for survivors;
Annual extra claim inflation factor for deaths;
Annual extra claim inflation factor for withdrawals;
Level (in real terms) annual premium payable upto
age 65 for Medshield coverage sold in calendar
year Zo to a person age Xo lbd on 1/1/ zoo
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Note that for all calculations we will use the Singapore male mortality table for the minimum reserve calculation for annuity (MAS 309)4
with qgg = 1. This table is deemed suitable, as it is based on the a(90)
table with improvement in mortality over time. There is no service table, with decrements for disability and withdrawals, available for use
in Singapore's Medishield program as of May 1996.

3 The Individual Model
We develop a model in which the charged premium remains level in
real terms throughout the working life of the member (Black & Skipper,
1994, Chapter 22). Level premium in real terms means that the premiums in subsequent years are adjusted by the rate of inflation of the
general cost of living. Such level premiums also decrease the rate of
growth of premiums at the older ages and tend to make lifetime coverage more affordable. Another advantage of this approach is that it
makes financial planning easier in an environment where wages and
salaries keep pace with the general cost of living increases; these premiums are approximately a constant percentage of wages and salaries.
A key feature of our model is that it removes the restriction that
coverage ceases after age 70, as is the case with the Medishield program.
Thus, coverage is available in the advanced ages where people may need
it most.

3.1

Benefits

For increased flexibility, we develop three separate expected claim
costs in any calendar year: (i) for those who continue their Medishield
policy during the next calendar year (ECS(x, z)), (ii) for those who die
within the calendar year (ECD(x, z)), and (iii) for those who withdraw
from the Medshield program during the calendar year (ECW(x, z)). Using anti-selection arguments, one may expect those who withdraw to be
healthier than those who remain, while those who die may tend to have
larger than average costs. Thus anti-selection arguments suggest that
we adjust the expected claim costs by the appropriate extra claim inflation factor (1 + f) to reflect the different expected experiences among
those who die, withdraw, or continue with the policy.
4The MAS 309 is the notice No. 309 issued by the Monetary Authority of Singapore
(equivalent to the Federal Reserve Board in the United States) to life insurers. In MAS
309, the mortality tables for calculating the minimum reserves for annuities are given.
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We will assume that expected claim costs are paid at the end of the
calendar year. As a result, we include the expected interest accrued to
the end of the calendar year in our definition of the expected claims.
Our model assumes that the expected claim cost for an insured increases for two reasons: (i) increases in the underlying rate morbidity
rate, and (ii) increases due to medical inflation. Motivated by equation
(1), we model the morbidity rate due to age (within the a calendar year)
as:
r;+l

= (1 + b)r;,

which gives
ECS(x

+ 1, z)

= (1

+ b)ECS(x, z).

On the other hand, the impact of annual medical inflation on expected
claim costs is assumed to affect only the size of claims not the morbidity rate. So, r;+l = r;, and
ECS(x,z

+ 1)

= (1

+ m)(1 + is)ECS(x,z).

The final factor to be applied is the extra claim inflation factor. The
combined effect on expected claim costs is as follows:

+ b)(1 + m)(1 + is)]kECS(x, z)
(3)
+ b)(1 + m)(1 + !d)]kECD(x,z) (4)
[(1 + b)(1 + m)(1 + iw)]kECW(x,z). (5)

ECS(x+k,z+k)

[(1

+ k,z + k)
ECW(x + k,z + k)

[(1

ECD(x

Note that we expect iw ::; is ::; !d.
The actuarial present value of the future health claims on 1/1/ z for
individual age x on 1/1/ z is denoted by AH C (x, z) where
00

AHC(x,z)

I

v(k+l)k+1P~T)ECS(x

+ k,z + k)

k=O
00

+ L'" v(k+l) k p(T)q(d)
ECD(x + k z + k)
x
x+k
'
k=O
00

+

I

v(k+l\p~T)q~-::ECW(x

+ k,z + k).

(6)

k=O

Notice that equation (6) includes costs incurred after age 70. s Using
equations (3), (4), and (5) the expression for AHC(x, z) can be rewritten
5Recall that the Medishield program ceases coverage at age 70 while the proposed
Medishield program provides coverage beyond age 70.
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as follows:
00

ECS(x, z)

AHC(x,z)

L (1 + id-(k+l\+! p!T)
k=O
00

L (1 + iz)-(k+l\p!T)q~~~

+ ECD(x,z)

k=O
00

L (1 + i3)-(k+l\p~T)q~,:j

+ ECW(x,z)

k=O
ECS(x, z)a x

+ ECD(x, z)A~d)

+ ECW(x, z)A~w)

(7)

where
00

ax

L (1 + i 1)-(k+l) k+! p(T)
x

(8)

k=O
00

A(d)
x

L (1 + i z)-(k+l)

p(T)q(d)
x
x+k

(9)

)-(k+l) p(T)q(W)
k
x
x+k

(10)

k

k=O
00

A(w)
x

L (1 + i

3

k=O

1 + i1
1 + iz
1 + i3

3.2

l+i

(1 + b)( 1 + m)( 1 + is)
l+i

(1 + b)(1 + m)(1 + id)
l+i

(1 + b)(1 + m)(1 + iw)

(11)

(12)
(13)

Level Premiums in Real Terms

By assuming a constant rate of inflation, g, we can determine the individual net premium (payable to age 65) that is level in real terms. That
is, if LP(x, z) is the net level (in real terms) annual premium payable
up to age 65 for health insurance coverage for a newly insured age x
last birthday on 1/1/ z, then the premiums increase annually by a factor of (1 + g). This implies that the premium for policy year (k + 1) is
(1

+ g)kLP(x, z).
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The actuarial present value of the future premiums on 1/1/ Zo for
individual age Xo on 1/I/zo is denoted by AFP(xo, zo) where
6S-Xo-l

L

AFP(xo,zo)

v\p~~)O + g)kLP(xo, zo)

k=O

(14)
where
6S-x-l

L

5 ..

a x :6s - x l

(1

+ g)kV\p~T)

(1

+ i4)-\p~T)

k=O
6S-x-l

L

k=O
iix:6S-xl

at i4,

(15)

and
i4

=

(i - g)/O + g).

(16)

The net premium is then given by
LP(xo, zo)

=

[ECS(xo, zo)a xo

+ ECD(xo, zo)A1~)

+ ECW(xo, zo)A1~)] /5 iixo:6S-xn I.

4

(17)

Analysis of Gains and Losses

Once expected claim costs have been determined and the premiums
have been set, the actual experience of the fund must be evaluated annually to see how it compares with what was expected. Large surpluses
or large deficits may signal problems inherent in the pricing or benefit structure. To get a clear picture of the year's experience, we need
to develop a formal system for determining reserves, surpluses, and
gains.
Let VeX, zlxo, zo) be the actuarial reserve on 1/I/z for an insured
active worker who is age x last birthday on 1/1/ z but was age Xo last
birthday on 1/1/ Zo at which time the policy was issued.
Vex, zlxo, zo)

ECS(x, z)ax

+ ECD(x, z)A1d ) + ECW(x, z)A1w )
- LP(xo, zo)(1

+ g)(z-zo) 5iix :6s =x1

(18)
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for x

2::

xo. But as

(T)

s ..

a x :65 - x l

Px

s ..

1 + -1--' ax+l'64-xl
+ 1-4
.

it follows that
vECS(x, Z)p~T) + vECD(x, z)q1d )

Vex, zlxo, zo)

+ vECW(x, z)q1W »)
+ Vp~T)V(X + 1, z + Ilxo, zo)
- LP(xo, zo)(1 + g)Z-zo.

(19)

Equation (19) can be rearranged to give
(1 + i)(V(x, zlxo, zo)
+ (1 + i)LP(xo, zo)(1 + g)Z-ZO)

Vex + I,z + Ilxo,zo)

- ECS(x, Z)p~T)
- ECD(x, z)q1d )
- ECW(x, z)q1W

)

+ q~T)V(X + 1, z + Ilxo, zo).

(20)

Given this recursive relationship between successive years' reserves,
we can develop an analysis of gains and losses in a manner similar to
Anderson (1990, Chapter 2). To this end we introduce the following
notation:
Ylz

Wz
'Dz
Nz

Set of the Medishield insureds alive on 1/1/ z
Set of withdrawals from Ylz during calendar year z;
Set of deaths from Ylz during calendar year z;
Set of new Medishield insureds who joined the
program during calendar year z.

In addition, let j denote a member of the set Ylz, and we append the
subscript j to our previous notation to refer to values that depend on
the insured j's policy experience.
We define TVz to be the total actual Medishield reserve as of I/1/z,
i.e.,
TVz =

L
je.Jt z

Vj(x, zlxo, zo)

(21)
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where Vj(x, zlxo, zo) is the reserve for insured j. Following Anderson,
we decompose TVz+l to give
TVZ+l

=

JEDz

- L

Vj(x+1,z+1I x o,zo)

jE'Wz

+

L

Vj(x+1,z+1I x o,zo).

(22)

jENz

In order to simplify our mathematical expressions and reduce clutter,
we use the following abbreviation:
Vj(Z + 1) = Vj(x + l,z + 1Ixo,zo).

(23)

Substituting equation (20) into equation (22) yields
TVZ+l

=

+ i)TVz
+ (1 + i) L LP(xo, zo)(l + g)Z-ZIl

(1

+

L

Vj(z + 1).

(24)

jENz

To develop an expression for the surplus, we must now consider
the fund balance at the start of each calendar year. Let Fz be the actual
fund balance on 1/1/ z.
(25)
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where 1z is the actual interest earned during calendar year z; T Pz is the
total premiums actually received during calendar year z; and T Cz is the
total claim costs actually paid during calendar year z. The surplus in
hand on I/I/z, SUR z is defined to be
SUR z = Fz - TVz .

(26)

Using equations (24) and (26) yields
SURZ+l

=

(1

+ i)SUR z +

+ [Iz - iFz - 1TPz + 1TCz ]
+ [(TPz + 1TPz ) - (1 + i) L LPj(xo,zo)(I + g)Z-ZO]

+[

L

Vj(z + 1) -

jE'Wz

L

q~W)Vj(z + 1)]

jE..7t z

(27)

where 1TPz is the expected interest earned on TPz ; Td S ) is the total
claims costs generated by those who survive to the end of calendar
year z; 1Tds ) is the expected interest earned on Td s ); Tdd) is the
total claims costs generated by those who died during calendar year
z; 1Tdd) is the expected interest earned on Tdd); TdW) is the total
claims costs generated by those who withdrew during calendar year z;
1Tdw ) is the expected interest earned on Td w );
TCz
1TCz

=

TC~s)

=

1TC(s)
z + 1TC(d)
z + 1TC(w)
z .

+ TC~d) + TC~w)

The actuarial gain for calendar year z is defined to be
GA1Nz = SURz+l - (1 + i)SUR z .

(28)

The various components of the gain can be identified from equation
(27).
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5 Closing Comments
The model we have developed is simply a first step in the process
of developing a more comprehensive model of the Medishield program.
We need actual Singapore data on mortality and morbidity to test the
model.
There are several known limitations, however, inherent in our current model:
• We failed to separate morbidity by sex. Females, in general, have
different morbidity patterns than males. They tend to have higher
morbidity during their child-bearing years.
• We have simplified the morbidity pattern over calendar year as
well as over age. A more appropriate model would use very general rates: r~~) for males and rXl for females. These rates must
be developed from population data.
• Insureds who die during a calendar year are likely to have very
high medical expenses during the preceding five years of life. This
should be explicitly included in the model. The current model
accounts for these high end-of-life expenses through experience
losses attributable to deaths.
• Persons who withdraw are likely to reenter if they expect to be ill
or are ill. This poses severe anti-selection problems.
Our proposed model is only a first attempt at extending the current
Medishield program. Much more work needs to be done before this
proposal can be implemented in practice.
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Concentration in American Property-Casualty
Companies
Edward Nissan*

Abstract t
A Theil's entropy index utilizing premiums written as units is employed to
measure trends in concentration of the largest 200 property-casualty companies in the United States between 1985 and 1993 based on Best's Insurance
Report data. Each of the indexes confirms that concentration trends experienced no increase for the whole period for all 200 firms, the top 20, and subsets of lower ranked companies. Significant differences are observed, however,
between groups of companies for the same period.
Key words and phrases: mergers and acquisitions, Theil's entropy, insurance

1

Introduction

Throughout its history the United States economy has experienced
cycles of mergers and acquisitions. The most recent cycle, according
to Shleifer and Vishny (1991) and Sikora (1995), occurred during the
1980s. Significant factors contributing to mergers and acquisitions
in the 1980s included laxity in antitrust enforcement policies and improvements in takeover technology (such as leveraged buyouts and junk
bonds).
The property and casualty insurance industry was not exempt from
this merger wave. Farinella (1996) reports that between 1985 and 1995
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some 660 corporate retirements, acquisitions, and mergers occurred in
response to what Gart (1994) describes as tremendous changes within
the insurance industry. Increasing competition drives the change and
forces more company mergers, creating conglomerates of multiple function companies. Multiple functions allow a company to take advantage
of the opportunities in the emerging financial services field. Such activities may lead insurance companies to engage in anticompetitive practices, resulting in allegations of collusion, restriction of output, and
favorable terms from consumers. Anticompetitive practice may cause
the repeal of the McCarran-Ferguson Act which exempts insurance companies from federal antitrust enforcements.
Roughly 3,000 companies constitute the property-liability insurance
industry. Due to numerous affiliations, however, there are really only
800 independent decision-making units or groups. In 1993, according to Huebner, Black, and Webb (1996), the net premiums written, the
combined admitted assets, and policyholders' surplus totaled $253.8
billion, $571.5 billion, and $182.3 billion, respectively. Policyholders'
surplus serves as a cushion so that larger-than-expected losses can be
paid. The abundance of cash, access to cheap capital, and low interest rates helped boost the recent trend in mergers and acquisitions
(Farinella 1996).
There are two major conflicting arguments regarding mergers. One,
according to Gilbert (1989), is that mergers enhance efficiency by promoting consumer welfare through a superior allocation of productive,
financial, and managerial resources. Potential competition serves as a
control on monopoly power. Salop (1987) and Adams and Brock (1996)
note that the rationale for this argument is provided by economists at
the University of Chicago. Simply stated, this theory focuses on consumer welfare as the sole concern. The other argument, supported by
economists at Harvard University, is that mergers damage the overall
working of the economy, lessen competition, and increase concentration of sales and thereby create monopoly power in a given industry.
The process of concentration is defined as the increase in the extent
economic activity is controlled by large firms.
Clarke (1985) distinguishes market and aggregate concentration and
absolute and relative concentration. Market concentration concerns a
specific industry under the control of a few large firms which may lead
to the exercise of monopoly power. Aggregate concentration occurs
when a few large firms control broad segments of the economy (such as
manufacturing, financial, and insurance sectors) or when the power of
conglomerates extend beyond a particular industry. Changes in aggregate concentration may signal a change in the distribution of economic,
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political, or social power. Another distinction is between relative and
absolute concentration. If all firms grow the same proportion, concentration increases absolutely but relatively remains the same. Relative
concentration is concerned with the share of output held by large firms
among a fixed number of firms. Accordingly, various indexes are proposed to measure such concentrations.
The most widely used indexes are the k-firms concentration ratio,
whereby the share of sales of the k largest firms (out of a total of n
firms) are combined; the Herfindahl, defined as the sum of the shares
of all n firms with the share of each firm weighted by itself; the Gini,
which measures the extent to which firms in the industry are unequal
in size; the coefficient of variation, which is the ratio of the standard
deviation to the mean; and the Theil's entropy, l which is used in physics
as a measure of disorder. Hannah and Kay (1977) find Theil's entropy
to be one of the most satisfactory indexes. As a result, Theil's entropy
is used throughout this paper as the measure of concentration.

2

Past Studies

In the two decades spanning 1973 to 1991 three studies provide excellent information on the structure of the property insurance industry.
The common denominator of these articles is an assessment of market concentration by product line category or by ownership category.
Joskow (1973) informs us that the 1206 property-liability insurance
firms as a whole in 1971 held assets of $ 68 billion and premiums of $ 35
billion. Over half of the latter was written by the top 20 firms, resulting
in a slight increase in concentration since 1961. Joskow also examines
concentration within two individual lines, automobile and fire. Again,
the top 20 firms accounted for concentration levels of approximately
56 percent in each line, increasing from 45 percent for automobile and
from 49 percent for fire in 1954. Joskow believes that as a result of
effective competition, consumers moved their business from high cost
firms to low cost firms and thereby caused concentration to increase.
1 Entropy in used in information theory a measure of disorder. In the field of economics, entropy is conveniently translated as a measure of the concentration of firms
in an industry. Sawyer (1981, pp. 29) explains that this use of entropy in economics
is justified along the lines that an industry will be more competitive the greater the
uncertainty as to which of a given number of firms will secure the business of a buyer
chosen at random, and entropy is a measure of this uncertainty. Note that a rise in entropy indicates an increase in competitiveness and hence a decrease in concentration.
Brockett (1991), Brockett and Song (1995), and references therein provide examples of
other applications of information theory to actuarial science.
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Mayers and Smith (1988) use geographical concentration, line-ofbusiness concentration, and specialization as indicators of success for
the ownership type structure (Uoyds, common stock, mutual, reciprocal) of the insurance companies. Mayers and Smith find stock companies are less concentrated geographically than the other three forms
of ownership. When not controlling for size, mutual companies were
the least concentrated by line of business. When controlling for size,
however, reciprocals were the most concentrated.
The third significant paper, by Cummins and Weiss (1991), assesses
concentration for the personal and commercial categories for four, ten,
and 50 largest firms. They discover that for the personal lines in 1989
the top four firms controlled 43.2 percent and 41.8 percent of private
passenger auto liability and private passenger auto physical damage,
respectively. For homeowners, 39.5 percent was controlled by the top
four firms. On the commercial side, 26.7 percent of workers' compensation was controlled by the top four firms. Cummins and Weiss echo
the assessment of Joskow that concentration in some insurance lines
results from the efficiency advantage some companies have in dealing with clients and from gains in market share that accompany lower
prices for insureds.

3 Aim and Purpose
Most studies on concentration of property insurance have been based
on a product line category or on ownership category, the two important classifications according to Gart (1984). Due to the two interrelated categories, the noticeable reorganization of the insurance industry where there is increased interest in financial services, and general
corporate mergers, many insurance companies operate on many lines
and thus have become conglomerates. Specifically, mergers among
competing firms, who already occupy substantial positions as pointed
out by Manne (1965), are viewed with suspicion.
Utton (1970) explains that where overall (aggregate) concentration
exists, it is most likely that some individual markets will be highly concentrated. There are also arguments that stress the significance of aggregate concentration. Among these arguments is the notion that when
a large proportion of economic activity is held by a relatively few firms,
it constitutes a threat to democratic government directly through pressure groups and indirectly through advertising. A follow-up to this
notion is the concern that basic policy decisions such as future investment, price, and product poliCies (which are functions associated with
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entrepreneurship) are made by a small number of individuals, perhaps
one or two members of the board of directors. Furthermore, large diversified firms can affect the market conduct even though their relative
shares do not constitute a monopoly. If one large firm has a stronger
position in a specific product line and another firm has a stronger position in another line, it is unlikely that any of the firms compete in the
market where it has the advantage for fear of retaliation in the market
where its position is not strongly established. The focus of attention,
therefore, is the overall concentration of economic power controlled by
a small number of large firms, typically the largest 100 or 200 enterprises.
The purpose of this paper is to quantify the effects of reorganization and mergers of recent years on aggregate concentration. Such an
assessment will add further insight into the structure of the propertycasualty insurance industry with data from Best's Insurance Reports on
the largest 200 American property casualty companies. Similar studies concerned with aggregate concentration in the industrial sector have
been conducted using the Fortune 500, a popular source of data for such
studies. Notable among these are the works by Hexter and Snow (1970),
Nissan and Caveny (1985, 1988), Attaran and Saghafi (1988), Saghafi
and Attaran (1990), and Deutsch and Silber (1995). The data supplied by
Best's Insurance Reports since 1985, whereby the 200 largest American
property-casualty companies are ranked, provide a similar opportunity
for measuring aggregate concentration for the insurance industry.

4

Measurement

Using the data on shares of premiums reported in Best's Insurance
Reports for the largest 200 firms or groups in 1985, 1989, and 1993,
Theil's entropy is used to quantify the degree of concentration. The
three periods 1985, 1989, and 1993 are spaced in time to show if any
significant changes occurred. Between 1985 and 1989 approximately
250 mergers and acquisitions occurred. Between 1990 and 1993 approximately 300 occurred. The question is whether these mergers have
resulted in an increase in concentration.
Theil's (1967) entropy, E, is defined as
n

E=-LPilogpi,O:::;E:::;logn

(1)

i=l

where Pi 2': 0 is the i-th firm's proportional share of premiums; n is the
number of firms, and :L. Pi = 1.
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If all n firms have an equal share, then E = log n, and concentration
is at a minimum, in contrast to E = 0 when one firm controls all shares.
Therefore, a decline in E corresponds to an increase in concentration.
For a given level of entropy E*, the numbers eqUivalent, (n *), is the
number of equally sized firms it would take to produce the same level
of entropy E*, i.e.,
n* = eE *.
(2)

5 Empirical Results
The largest 200 property-casualty insurance companies or groups of
companies accounted in 1993 for 73 percent of net premiums written
($189 billion of $259 billion), 78 percent of admitted assets ($ 527 billion
of $672 billion), and 84 percent of holders' surplus ($153 billion of $182
billion). These huge sums indicate that this comparably small number
of firms held a significant control of the market.
The three panels of Table 1 report for 1985, 1989, and 1993 the total net premiums, the mean, the standard deviation, the minimum, the
maximum, and the coefficient of variation. The information in Table 1
is supplied for the largest 200 companies as well as by smaller sets of
four groups of companies 001-020; 021-050; 051-100; 101-200. Total
net premiums written by the 200 companies increased from approximately $117 billion in 1985 to $189 billion in 1993, an increase of 62
percent. The largest 20 companies accounted on average for 50 percent
of total premiums written throughout the period, followed by the next
30 companies of lesser rank accounting for approximately 20 percent.
The lesser ranked sets of 50 companies and 100 companies, ranked 51
to 100 and 101 to 200, accounted for approximately 16 percent and 15
percent, respectively.
In 1993 the average net premiums written for all the 200 companies
reached almost $1 billion, with the largest 20 companies writing on
average $4.7 billion. The smallest company among the 200 in 1993
wrote $200 million worth of premiums, while the largest wrote well over
$22 billion. For all 200 companies the coefficient of variation shows an
increase from 1.81 in 1985 to 2.01 in 1989 to 2.18 in 1993. For the
respective three periods the most noticeable increase in the coefficient
of variation occurred for the top 20 companies, moving from 0.80 to
0.94 to 1.12. The coefficient of variation for the other groups remained
virtually the same throughout the three periods.
Table 2 shows the results for the computation of the concentration
index, the Theil's entropy E of equation (1). There are slight changes
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Table 1
Summary Information of Net Premiums Written
of Largest Property.Casualty Companies

Com~anies

Total
Panel A: 1985
All 200
117,103
001-020
56,840
021-050
23,460
051-100
19,005
101-200
17,798
Panel B: 1989
All 200
166,645
001-020
83,380
021-050
32,706
051-100
27,010
101-200
23,549

Coefficient
Standard
of
Percent Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum Variation
100
49
20
16
15

586
2,842
782
380
178

1,058
2,281
183
79
46

114
1,228
547
265
114

10,331
10,331
1,201
540
264

1.81
0.80
0.23
0.21
0.26

100
50
20
16
14

1,677
833
4,169 3,920
1,090 272
540
118
236
54

148
1,664
770
350
148

16,873
16,873
1,657
757
348

2.01
0.94
0.25
0.22
0.23

Panel C: 1993
All 200
189,030 100
945 2,060
200
22,226
2.18
001-020
93,100
49 4,655 5,202
1,982
22,226
1.12
021-050
36,735
20 1,225 264
879
1,882
0.22
16
425
051-100
30,730
615
853
0.23
139
101-200
28,465
15
200
285
423
60
0.21
Source: Best's Insurance Reports: Property-Casualty United States (Oldwick,
New Jersey: A.M. Best Company, 1985, 1989, and 1993) and calculations by
the author. Total, mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum are in $
millions.

in the magnitudes of E over time among the 200 companies, as well
as the smaller subsets of 20, 30, 50, and 100 companies. This is also
obvious from the numbers equivalent n * of equation (2). The numbers
equivalent for all the 200 firms was reduced from 99 in 1985 to 92 in
1989 to 91 in 1993. For the top 20 the sequence is 16, 15, 14. Hardly
any change is visible for the lower ranked companies.
Next we need to ascertain whether these apparent differences in
entropy over time are statistically significant. Let Eij denote the entropy
associated with the proportion of premiums (Pij) written for firm i in
time period j, be denoted by
Eij = - Pij

log Pij

(3)

138

Journal of Actuarial Practice, Vol. 4, No.1, 1996
Table 2
Concentration of Premiums Written
of Largest Property·Casualty Companies

Numbers
ComQanies
Panel A: 1985
All 200
001-020
021-050
051-100
101-200
Panel B: 1989
All 200
001-020
021-050
051-100
101-200

Theil's Entr0I2Y (E} Standard Deviation

EQuivalent

1.9976
1.2022
1.4661
1.6901
1.9859

.0112
.0265
.0079
.0052
.0040

99
16
29
49
97

1.9661
1.1720
1.4646
1.6890
1.9887

.0119
.0293
.0084
.0055
.0036

92
15
29
49
97

Panel C: 1993
.0119
All 200
1.9594
91
001-020
.0317
14
1.1333
021-050
1.4678
.0073
29
051-100
1.6881
.0057
49
101-200
.0033
1.9908
98
Source: Best's Insurance Reports: Property-Casualty United States (Oldwick,
New Jersey: A.M. Best Company, 1985, 1989, and 1993) and calculaLions from
equation (1).

for i = 1,2, ... , n, j = 1985,1986, ... ,1993 and
equation (1), it is obvious that

2:r=l Pi}

=

1. From

n

E.j =

L Eij = nE.j.
i=l

To test the hypothesis of equality of a pair of total entropies E.j
and E.k. for j, k = 1985, 1989 and 1993, the appropriate test statistic
(assuming that a large sample approximation is appropriate) is
Z

=

E.j - E.k

~n(sJ + Sf)
where

(4)
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Under the null hypothesis, the statistic Z has a standard normal distribution.
The results indicate that differences in total entropy are not statistically significant at (){ = 0.05, in which case IZI < 1.96. None of
the computed IZI values for the groups of companies 20, 30, 50, and
100 exceeds 1.96. The important conclusion from these results is that
the levels of concentration among these groups remained virtually the
same throughout the period 1985-1993. In other words, no substantial shares of premiums written were transferred from one company to
another.
The picture looks a bit different when the comparisons are made
between the groups at each period. Note in Table 1 that E increases in
magnitude, indicating a decrease in concentration as one moves down
the hierarchy from the top 20 companies to the bottom 100 companies
for every period, thus pointing to the existence of larger concentration
among the top 20 than among the next 30. In turn, there is more concentration among this group of 30 than among the smaller group of 50
companies, which has higher concentration than the next group of the
smaller 100 companies. The patterns, however, remain the same for
every period. Concentration does exist, especially among the largest
firms, yet the level of concentration has remained stable.
The reorganization and mergers of recent years have not resulted in
a perceptible increase in concentration in the property-liability insurance industry, unlike what has happened in other services such as retail
trade, electric and utilities, and the transportation sectors, as shown by
O'Neill (1996). These services experienced large increases in concentration in recent years.

6

Summary

This paper focuses on measuring aggregate concentration using as
units net premiums written of the 200 largest property casualty companies, an important sector in the U.S. economy. Theil's entropy index
is employed for the period 1985 to 1993. The index is not sensitive
to measuring an increase in concentration among the 200 companies
or by groups of 20,30, 50, and 100 companies. Concentration between
these groups of companies remained stable for every period under consideration. During the period under consideration which was marked
by a substantial activity of mergers and takeovers the property-liability
insurance industry cannot be accused of increasing its overall economic
power in spite of the large number of mergers.
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The findings that no perceptible increase is detected in aggregate
concentration in the property-liability insurance industry do not preclude the possibility that some lines of insurance have become concentrated as a result of recent mergers and acquisitions. Tests at the
aggregate level may mask increasing trends in concentration on a byline basis. Past studies were conducted using data prior to 1990. Because mergers and acquisitions have been relatively high in the past five
years, documenting changes in by-line concentration since 1989 would
be useful.
The debate whether industry concentration is due to growth of efficient firms that manage to maintain low cost operations through economies of scale or whether concentration is due to collusion and suppression of competition continues. In the mean time, efforts must be made
to provide empirical evidence as to whether concentration exists and,
if so, whether it is increasing or decreasing over time.
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Bias of Excluding High and Low Data for
Long-Tailed Distributions
Cheng-Sheng Peter Wu*

Abstract
Property and casualty actuaries frequently employ a technique of averaging
(called high-low averages) that excludes the same amount of data at both ends.
For example, (0 in selecting loss development factors, the middle three of the
latest five years or the middle eight of latest 12 quarters sometimes are used,
or (ii) in calculating average expense ratios, the largest expense ratios and the
smallest expense ratios may be removed from the sample. Although highlow averages can reduce the impact of influential data on analyzed results,
the averages will result in downward bias when they are applied to pricing or
reserving data that exhibit a long-tailed property. We derive the bias for two
commonly used distributions: lognormal and Pareto. An example is provided
using chain-ladder reserving where loss development factors are assumed to
be lognormally distributed.
Key words and phrases: lognormal distribution, Pareto distribution, percentile,
influential data, long-tailed distributions, chain-ladder

High-Low Percentile Average
Property and casualty (P&C) actuaries often encounter a wide variety
of large loss risks. These large loss risks sometimes result in pricing
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or reserving data that have disproportional influence on analyzed results. Long-tailed distributions, such as lognormal or Pareto distributions, have been used to describe the insurance data with the large loss
risks.
One remedy to minimize the effect of influential data (Le., large
losses) on analyzed results is to exclude only the influential data. This
requires a great deal of caution, however. According to Neter, Wasserman, and Kutner (1989):
... an outlying influential case should not be automatically
discarded, because it may be entirely correct and simply represents an unlikely event. Discarding such an outlying case
could lead to the undesirable consequences of increased variances of some of the estimated regression coefficients.
P&C actuaries frequently employ a technique of averaging that excludes the same amount of data at both ends. This averaging technique will be called high-low averaging in this paper. High-low averages, such as the averages of the middle three among five years, middle
eight among ten quarters, etc., can be used in many different situations
including the calculation of loss development factors, to select underwriting expense ratios or to determine loss adjustment expense ratios.
This paper, however, focuses on the particular type of high-low averaging called high-low percentile averaging where the data are sampled
from a single distribution and the average excludes data lying outside
a speCified lower and upper pair of percentile points.
Applying high-low percentile averages to data sampled from a longtailed distribution results in a systematic downward bias. The downward bias is the percentage difference between the mean and the conditional mean given that the data lie between a specified lower and upper
pair of percentile points, Le.,
Downward Bias

=

E [X] - E[X]
p E[X]
x 100%

with
E[X]
Ep[X]

Expected value for random variable X;
Expected value of X given that X lies between
its upper and lower p percentile points, Le.,
1

--

1 - 2p

f

X

2(P)

xJ{p)

xdF(x)

(1)
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where F(x) is cumulative probability function (cdf) of X, and X2 (p) and
xICp) are the upper and lower percentile points respectively of F(x),
i.e.,
F(X2(P»

= 1- p

F(xICp»

= p,

xICp) ~ X2(P)·

Once the downward bias is calculated, the sample high-low average
can be modified as follows:
M dT d S
1 H" h L A
o I Ie amp e Ig - ow verage

=

Sample High-Low Average
1 + Downward Bias

(2)

Figure 1 illustrates such downward bias when the upper and the
lower deciles (p = 0.10) of the lognormal distribution are excluded.
The more data excluded or the more skewed the distribution, the higher
the downward bias is. Results in Figure 1 can be extended to highlow averages used by P&C actuaries. For example, a middle 8-of-10
average also excludes the upper and lower 10 percent of the data. The
only difference is that the high-low average is based on the sample or
empirical cumulative distribution function, while Figure 1 is based on
the theoretical cumulative distribution function.
In Section 2, the downward bias is derived using the theoretical cumulative distribution function for two commonly used long-tailed distributions: lognormal and Pareto. The downward bias when the sample (empirical) cumulative distribution function is used is not easily
derived. Section 3 provides a chain-ladder reserving example in which
high-low percentile averages are used to select loss development factors, and the lognormal distribution is assumed for the loss development factors.

2

Downward Bias for the Lognormal and Pareto

In this section two long-tailed distributions, the lognormal and the
Pareto, are used for illustration. Other long-tailed distributions should
follow the general results given for these two distributions. Many of
the results in this section can be found in Hogg and Klugman (1984) or
other statistical texts.

2.1

Lognormal Distribution

If Z is a standard normal distribution, then X has a lognormal distribution if and only if

InX

=

J1 + a"Z,

(J

> O.
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Table 1
Bias for Lognormal
p

u

= 0.2

u

-0.8%
-1.1%
-1.6%

0.05
0.10
0.20

= 1.0

u

-18.2%
-25.1%
-32.6%

= 1. 5

-38.1%
-48.6%
-59.1%

Let <I> be the cumulative distribution of the standard normal distribution, i.e.,
x

<I>(x) =

I

e-y2/2

--dy,

-00

)'[IT

it follows that the theoretical cumulative distribution function of X is
F(x) = <I>(lnx - J.l).

u

In addition, we have
and

F(xrCp»=p

=>

Inx1(P) = J.l+ u<I>-l(p),

F(X2(P» = 1 - P

=>

Inx2(p) = J.l + u<I>-l(1- p).

It can be easily proved that

E[X]
Ep[X]

1 2
eXP{J.l+zu },

and

E[X] [<I>(lnX2(p) - J.l- (
(1 - 2p)
u
E[X] [
(1- 2p) <I>(<I>

-1 (1 -

2

) _ <I>(lnxrCp) - J.l- (
u

p) - u] - <I> (<I>

2

)]

-(p)1
]
- u) .

This gives the downward bias as:

The above result indicates that the degree of bias only depends on p,
the percentage of data being excluded, and u, the shape factor. The bias
does not depend on J.l, the location parameter. Table 1 above shows the
bias for several combinations of u and p.
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Table 2
Bias for Pareto
()(=3
-23.1%
-31.2%
-40.1%

p

0.05
0.10
0.20

2.2

()( = 10
-14.0%
-20.4%
-28.1%

()( = 50
-11.7%
-17.6%
-24.7%

Pareto Distribution

Here the theoretical cumulative distribution function is more tractable:
F(x) =

1- (_A_)
ex
A+x

where A > 0 and ()( > 1 are the location and shape parameters. The
upper and lower percentile points are easily seen to be given by:
F(xICp»=p

=>

xICp)=AX((1-p)-1/ex-1),

F(X2(P» = 1- P

=>

X2(P) = A x (p-l/ex -1).

and

In addition,
A/ «()( - 1)

E[X]
Ep[X]

where (3

=

and

E[X] [ ()((1 - p)f3 - pf3) (1 - 2p)

«()( - 1)(1 -

2p) ] .

«()( - 1) / ()(. Finally, the downward bias is:
Bias

=

()(

(1 - 2p)

[(1 - p)f3 - pf3 - (1 - 2p)] .

(4)

The degree of bias for Pareto distribution depends only on the percentage of excluded data (p) and the shape factor «()(), but not on the
location parameter (A). Table 2 above shows the bias for different combinations of ()( and p.

3

A Case Study: Chain-Ladder Reserving Example

The chain-ladder technique is a loss development technique that assumes that past loss development patterns reflect future loss developments. For more information regarding loss development techniques,
see Wiser (1990, Chapter 2).
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Let Li,} denote the loss for accident year i developed to age j and
D },}+l denote the age-to-age development factor from development age
j to j + 1. The estimate of the ultimate loss for year i developed to age
j, ULi(j), is:
(5)

where UDi(j) is the age-to-ultimate development factor for year i developed to age j and
UDi(j) =

n

D}+k,}+k+l'

(6)

k=O

Table 3 shows an automobile bodily injury loss triangle and the associated age-to-age development factor triangle. These data were introduced by Zehnwirth (1989) and analyzed by Kelly (1992), and others.
Table 3 also shows three types of averages for selecting the age-toage and age-to-ultimate development factors: all year straight averages,
all year averages excluding one high and one low data, and all year
averages excluding two high data and two low data. These averages
are factor averages, not volume-weighted averages. When the number
of data points for older accident years is not enough to calculate one
high-one low (two high-two low) averages, straight averages (one highone low averages) will be used.
Results in Table 3 show that the straight averages result in the highest estimates, while the two high-two low averages result in the lowest
estimates. This suggests that age-to-age loss development factors may
have a long-tailed property.
The possibility that age-to-age development factors may have a long
tail has not gone without notice. Hayne's study (1986) assumes in quantifying variability of loss reserves, that the age-to-age development factors are lognormally distributed:
In(D},}+d ~ N(/-l}, a})

where /-l} and a} are the mean and variance of the normal distribution.
The main advantage of assuming lognormal distributions for ageto-age development factors is that the age-to-ultimate factors and, consequently, the ultimate loss estimates are also lognormally distributed,
Le.,
00

InUDi(j) ~ N(

00

L /-lk. LaD·
k=}

k=}

,....

Table 3

Loss and Loss

Develo~ment

Vl

0

Factor Triangles

Losses:
Development Age
Accident
Year
1
1971
$568,891
1972 $428,753
1973
$458,252
1974 $355,229
1975
$282,419
1976 $267,600
1977 $560,307
1978 $360,171
$445,545
1979

2
$2,148,049
$1,399,393
$1,447,324
$1,304,036
$970,751
$1,312,390
$1,500,309
$1,371,944

3
$3,425,871
$2,355,291
$2,864,930
$2,596,936
$2,129,544
$2,528,827
$2,686,208

4
$4,160,541
$3,451,062
$3,818,152
$3,344,939
$3,032,994
$3,367,532

5
$4,840,910
$3,961,134
$4,699,285
$3,892,227
$3,662,977

7
6
8
9
S5,058,131 $5,205,931 $5,263,030 $5,327,859
$4,452,987 $4,695,982 $4,995,827
$4,978,063 $5,175,219
$4,166,594

0

c
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::J

~

0
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:t>
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C
PJ

"'"

Age-to-Age Factors:

~
'"0

Development Age
Accident
Year
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979

'--

"'"

PJ

("'\

1-2
3.7759
3.2639
3.1584
3.6710
3.4373
4.9043
2.6777
3.8091

2-3
1.5949
1.6831
1.9795
1.9915
2.1937
1.9269
1.7904

3-4
1.2144
1.4652
1.3327
1.2880
1.4242
1.3317

4-5
1.1635
1.1478
1.2308
1.1636
1.2077

5-6
1.0449
1.1242
1.0593
1.0705

6-7
1.0292
1.0546
1.0396

7-8
LOll 0
1.0639

8-9
1.0123

::!.
("'\
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0
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\0
01
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III
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Table 3 (continued)
Loss and Loss Development Factor Triangles

o

::s

lO

.:,

Age-to-Age Development Factors:

All Year Average - Straight Average
All Year Average - 1 High and 1 Low
All Year Average - 2 High and 2 Low

1
2
3.5872 1.8800
3.5192 1.8743
3.5370 1.8989

Development Age
4
6
3
5
1.3427 1.1827 1.0747 1.0411
1.3442 1.1783 1.0649 1.0396
1.3322 1.1636 1.0649 1.0396

~.

(!)

7
1.0374
1.0374
1.0374

8
1.0123
1.0123
1.0123

9

c..
CJ

VI
.....

~.

at:

!:!'.

Age-to-Ultimate Development Factors:
1
2
All Year Average - Straight Average 12.5843 3.5081
All Year Average - 1 High and 1 Low 12.1459 3.4513
All Year Average - 2 High and 2 Low 12.1050 3.4224
Notes:

o

Development Age
4
6
3
5
1.8660 1.3897 1.1751 1.0934
1.8414 1.3699 1.1626 1.0918
1.8023 1.3529 1.1626 1.0918

::s

VI

7
1.0502
1.0502
1.0502

8
1.0123
1.0123
1.0123

9
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000

1. These are automobile bodily injury data that were studied by Kelly (1992).
2. No tail development is assumed.
3. If the number of data points is not enough, straight averages (1 high - 1 low) will be used for 1 high - 1 low (2
high - 2 low).

f-'

Ul
f-'
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Kelly (1992) and McNichols (1992) also conclude that a lognormal assumption is better in describing age-to-age development factors than a
normal assumption because lognormal distributions can take only positive values and their long-tailed property reflects no upper boundary
for the development factors.
Fitting lognormal distributions to the age-to-age development factors in Table 3 produces the parameter estimates in Table 4. First, /1 j
and a} are calculated for each development age. These parameters are
then summed from that age to ultimate to obtain age-to-ultimate development factors for a development age. No tail development is assumed
in Tables 3 or 4.
There are noted differences between the sample variances given in
Table 4 and the sample variances given by Kelly (1992). In Table 4 the
sample variances are equal to the sum of squares divided by a factor of
n - 1 (to yield the traditional unbiased estimate of the sample variance),
while Kelly divides the sum of squares by n (to yield the maximum
likelihood estimate of the sample variance).
Given these lognormal parameter estimates, the high-low averages
in Table 3 can be modified to correct the downward bias for the averages. The modified averages are given in Table 5. For example, the
one high-one low all-year average (middle six of eight) for the one yearto-two year development factor excludes the upper and the lower 12.5
percent of the sample data. According to the results given in Section
2.1, with P = 12.5%, /11 = 1.2636, and O"f = 0.2155, a bias of -0.97
percent is indicated for the lognormal assumption.
Table 5 shows the indicated biases for each development age and the
modified high-low averages. Table 6 compares the estimated ultimate
losses and reserves among the straight averages, the high-low averages,
and the modified high-low averages.
Three issues for dealing with limited volume data should be noted.
First, for limited volume data additional parameter variation is introduced because sample parameters are assumed for true parameters.
Second, this is a bootstrap procedure because excluded data are used
to calculate the sample parameters, which in turn are used to calculate
the degree of bias to modify the high-low averages.
Last, even though the true parameters are known, the indicated bias
when sample size is small will not be the same as the indicated bias
when sample size is large. In the chain-ladder reserving example, the
indicated bias is -0.97 percent for the one high-one low all-year average
(middle six of eight) for the one year- to-two year development factor.

~

s:::

~

III
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Table 4
Lognormal Parameters for Loss Devel0l!ment Factors

r

0

::s

Natural Logarithm Transformation of Age-to-Age Factors in Table 2:

lC

Development Age
4-5
5-6
0.1515
0.0439
0.1378
0.1170
0.2076
0.0576
0.1515
0.0681
0.1887

.:.;

Accident Year
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978

1-2
1.3286
1.1829
1.1501
1.3005
1.2347
1.5901
0.9849
1.3374

2-3
0.4668
0.5206
0.6828
0.6889
0.7856
0.6559
0.5825

3-4
0.1943
0.3820
0.2872
0.2531
0.3536
0.2864

Age-to-Age DeveloQment Factors:
Lognormal Mean - All Year Average
Lognormal Variance - All Year Average

1.2636
0.0308

0.6262
0.0120

0.2928
0.0046

0.1674
0.0009

0.0717
0.0010

0.0403
0.0001

0.0364
0.0013

0.0122
0.0000

Age-to-Ultimate DeveloQment Factors:
Lognormal Mean - All Year Average
Lognormal Variance - All Year Average

2.5106
0.0507

1.2470
0.0199

0.6208
0.0079

0.3280
0.0033

0.1606
0.0025

0.0889
0.0014

0.0486
0.0013

0.0122
0.0000

6-7
0.0288
0.0531
0.0388

7-8
0.0109
0.0619

8-9 .
0.0122
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Table 5
Modified High-Low Averages for Loss
Age-to-Age Factors in Table 2:
Accident Year
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978

1-2
3.7759
3.2639
3.1584
3.6710
3.4373
4.9043
2.6777
3.8091

2-3
1.5949
1.6831
1.9795
1.9915
2.1937
1.9269
1.7904

3-4
1.2144
1.4652
1.3327
1.2880
1.4242
1.3317

Develo~ment

Factors

Development Age
4-5
5-6
6-7
7-8
1.1635 1.0449 1.0292 1.0110
1.1478 1.1242 1.0546 1.0639
1.2308 1.0593 1.0396
1.1636 1.0705
1.2077

8-9
1.0123
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Age-to-Age DeveloQment Factors:
All Year Average - Straight Average
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3.5872

1.8800 1.3427 1.1827 1.0747 1.0411 1.0374

1.0123
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n
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Lognormal Parameters:
Lognormal Mean - All Year Average
Lognormal Variance - All Year Average

1.2636
0.0308

All Year Average - 1 High and 1 Low
% of High and Low Data Excluded
Downward Bias
Modified 1 High and 1 Low

3.5192 1.8743 1.3442 1.1783 1.0649
12.5% 14.3% 16.7% 20.0% 25.0%
-0.97% -0.40% -0.17% -0.03% -0.04%
3.5536 1.8819 1.3464 1.1787 1.0654

n

0.6262 0.2928 0.1674 0.0717 0.0403 0.0364
0.0120 0.0046 0.0009 0.0010 0.0001 0.0013

0.0122
0.0000
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Table 5 (continued)
Modified High.Low Averages fo~ Loss D~v:~lopment Factors
Age-to-Age Development Factors:
Development Age
5-6
6-7
7-8
1-2
2-3
4-5
3-4
3.5370 1.8989 1.3322 1.1636 1.0649 1.0396 1.0374
All Year Average - 2 High and 2 Low
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
p% of Data Excluded
25.0% 28.6% 33.3% 40.0%
-1.31% -0.54% -0.22% -0.04%
Downward Bias
3.5840 1.9092 1.3351 1.1641 1.0654 1.0397 1.0374
Modified 2 High and 2 Low
Age-to-Ultimate DeveloQment Factors:
Straight Average
Modified 1 High and 1 Low
Modified 2 High and 2 Low

12.5843 3.5081 1.8660 1.3897 1.1751 1.0934 1.0502
12.3453 3.4740 1.8460 1.3711 1.1632 1.0919 1.0502
12.3702 3.4515 1.8079 1.3541 1.1632 1.0919 1.0502
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Table 6
Com~arison of Ultimate Losses and Reserves Between Different Averaging Technigues
Age-to-Ultimate Loss Development Factors:
Undeveloped
Straight
2 High &
Modified 1 High Modified 2 High
1 High &
Accident Year
Avel'al!e
&2Low
Losses
& 1 Low
1 Low
2 Low
1971
$5,327,859
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1972
$4,995,827
1.0123
1.0123
1.0123
1.0123
1.0123
1973
$5,175,219
1.0502
1.0502
1.0502
1.0502
1.0502
1974
$4,166,594
1.0934
1.0918
1.0919
1.0919
1.0918
1975
$3,662,977
1.1632
1.1751
1.1626
1.1626
1.1632
1976
$3,367,532
1.3897
1.3529
1.3711
1.3541
1.3699
1977
$2,686,208
1.8660
1.8023
1.8460
1.8079
1.8414
1978
$1,371,944
3.5081
3.4224
3.4740
3.4515
3.4513
1979
12.3453
12.3702
$445,545
12.5843
12.1050
12.1459
Total:
$31,199,705
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Ultimate Losses:
Accident Year
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
Total:

Straight
Average
$5,327,859
$5,057,365
$5,434,955
$4,555,688
$4,304,274
$4,680,012
$5,012,583
$4,812,972
$5,606,883
$44,792,590

1 High &
1 Low
$5,327,859
55,057,365
$5,434,955
$4,549,008
$4,258,744
$4,613,276
$4,946,406
$4,734,976
$5,411,560
$44,334,149

2 Higb &
2 Low
S5,327,859
S5,057,365
S5,434,955
$4,549,008
$4,258,744
$4,555,846
$4,841,310
$4,695,357
55,393,340
544.113,782

Modified 1 High Modified 2 Higb
& 1 Low
&2Low
55,327,859
$5,327,859
$5,057,365
55,057,365
55,434,955
$5,434,955
$4,549,326
$4,549,326
$4,260,887
$4,260,887
$4,617,162
$4,560,077
$4,958,844
$4,856,293
$4,766,110
$4,735,286
S5,5OO,387
$5,511,474
$44,293~20
$44.47~,89~_ .
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Table 6 (continued)
Comparison of Ultimate Losses and Reserves Between Different Averaging Techniques

(!)

0.

Reserves:
Straight

Accident Year
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
Total:

~

!:!.

Average

o

$61,538
$259,736
$389,094
$641,297
$1,312,480
$2,326,375
$3,441,028
$5,161,338
$13,592,885

1 High &
1 Low

o

$61,538
$259,736
$382,414
$595,767
$1,245,744
$2,260,198
$3,363,032
$4,966,015
$13,134,444

2 High &
2 Low

o

$61,538
$259,736
$382,414
$595,767
$1,188,314
$2,155,102
$3,323,413
$4,947,795
$12.914,077

Modified 1 High Modified 2 High
& 1 Low
&2Low

o

$61,538
$259,736
$382,732
$597,910
$1,249,630
$2,272,636
53,394,166
55,054,842
$13.273,189

0
$61,538
$259,736
$382,732
$597,910
$1,192,545
$2,170,085
$3,363,342
55,065,929
$13,093,815
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This is the indicated bias when the sample size is large with p = 12.5%,
III = 1.2636, and a"l = 0.2155. On the other hand, a further simulation
test based on 5,000 replicates indicates that the bias is -0.80 percent
when middle six of eight are used for the average. This simulated bias
is smaller than the theoretical bias when sample size is large.

4

Summary and Conclusions

For many insurance applications, high-low averages result in lower
estimates than straight averages because insurance data exhibit a longtailed property. This downward bias is shown in a simple reserving
example in which high-low averages are used to select loss development
factors. These averages, however, can be modified using equation (2).
The analysis and data given in this paper are far from complete. The
levels of the downward bias that would most likely exist in practice have
not been reviewed. Also, the level of the downward bias for a limited
volume of data has not been fully explored. There needs to be more
in-depth research in this area.
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Disclosure and Confidentiality Requirements of
Corporate Pension Plan Actuaries
Theodore Konshak*

Abstract
Corporate pension plan actuaries are subject to the standards of the Joint
Board for the Enrollment of Actuaries. The Joint Board is empowered to establish such standards under the provisions of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974, a federal law. In consideration of these statutory standards, this article will discuss whether standards published by professional
actuarial organizations have any applicability. The contrast between the disclosure requirements of federal law and the confidentiality standards of the
Society of Actuaries will be highlighted.
Key words and phrases: ERISA, actuarial standards, fiduciaries, enrolled actuary, plan auditor

Introduction
Defined benefit pension plans promise to pay a monthly income to
each participant for the remainder of the participant's lifetime or for
the lifetimes of both the participant and his or her spouse. Money is
deposited into a trust fund, is invested by the pension plan trustees,
and is periodically withdrawn by the plan administrator to pay retirees
their monthly benefits. In the United States, the minimum amount to be
deposited into the trust fund is based on an annual actuarial valuation
performed by an enrolled actuary under the terms of the 1974 Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).
In addition to providing actuarial services under ERISA, actuarial
service providers also can earn income by providing an employer with
*Theodore Konshak is an emolled actuary with Negotiated Pension Plans, Ltd.
Mr. Konshak's address is: Negotiated Pension Plans, Ltd., 1107 Wilson Avenue, Green
Bay, WI 54303-4206, USA.
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a wide variety of services including, but not limited to, recordkeeping
services for defined contribution pension plans and consulting services
on the legal requirements of the pension plan.
This paper reviews the required disclosures of the emolled actuary
under ERISA and the confidentiality provisions of the Professional Code
of Conduct of the Society of Actuaries to determine if the statutory
standards of ERISA are being subverted, inadvertently or otherwise, by
these professional standards.

2 Enrolled Actuaries and Plan Auditors
Corporate pension plans are classified into two general types based
on whether the provisions of the plan define the deposits or the withdrawals:
• In a defined benefit plan, the plan provisions define a series of
monthly withdrawals payable during the lifetime of the participant. The minimum deposit under federal law is determined by
an actuarial valuation performed by an emolled actuary.
• In a defined contribution plan, the plan provisions define the deposits than can and will be made. Withdrawals are these deposits
and the investment earnings on these deposits. Defined contribution plans do not require the services of an emolled actuary
because the deposit is specified by the terms of the plan.
A pension plan auditor examines the financial statements of the
pension plan. In addition to determining whether the money is actually there, the pension plan auditor reviews the statement of where the
money has gone. Both defined benefit and defined contribution pension
plans with at least 100 participants require the services of an auditor.
Under ERISA administrators of pension plans must engage both an
emolled actuary and pension plan auditor on the behalf of all plan participants. For emolled actuaries, this is the actual language of Section
103(a)(4)(A) of ERISA.
Engagement on the behalf of all plan participants is a legal requirement to ensure the impartiality of actuarial determinations and the integrity of pension plan audits. The accuracy of audited pension records
should not reflect the effort an employer is willing to exert. The minimum deposit required under federal law should not reflect the amount
the employer currently is willing to contribute. Impartiality of actuarial determinations and integrity of pension plan audits are duties and
obligations of the emolled actuary and pension plan auditor.
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The administrators of pension plans who hire the enrolled actuary
and pension plan auditors are fiduciaries under Section 21 (A) of ERISA.
This means plan administrators must discharge their duties solely in
the interest of plan participants (Section 404(a)(1) of ERISA). Fiduciaries are the responsible parties and may be held legally liable for any
misconduct.
Enrolled actuaries are accredited and regulated by the joint Board
for the Enrollment of Actuaries, a federal board consisting of three
members appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury and two members
appointed by the Secretary of Labor. The joint Board is administered
by an executive director appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury.
Section 3042 of ERISA describes the enrollment of actuaries by the
joint Board:
The joint Board shall, by regulations, establish reasonable
standards and qualifications for persons performing actuarial services with respect to plans to which this Act applies
and, upon application by any individual, shall enroll such individual if the joint Board finds that such individual satisfies
such standards and qualifications ... The joint Board may,
after notice and an opportunity for a hearing, suspend or
terminate the enrollment of an individual under this section
if the joint Board finds that such individual-(l) has failed
to discharge his duties under this Act, or (2) does not satisfy
the requirements for enrollment as in effect at the time of
his enrollment.
The Standards of Performance for Enrolled Actuaries were published
by the joint Board under Title 20, Chapter VIII, Part 901, Subpart C of
the Code of Federal Regulations.
The executive director of the joint Board maintains a roster of all
persons whose enrollment to perform actuarial services under ERISA
has been suspended or terminated. This roster contains the names of
only two suspended enrolled actuaries.
To date the joint Board has devoted most of its limited resources to
the accreditation of enrolled actuaries through examinations and continuing education. Regulation of enrolled actuaries through its standards of performance has not been a priority. These statutory standards of performance may be expanded and be more strictly enforced
if the composition of the joint Board is changed to include representatives of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC).l
1 The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) is the federal agency that insures
the payment of benefits from failed pension plans. As in other insolvency insurance
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A representative of the PBGC presently can participate in discussions of the Joint Board, but cannot vote on any issues. As the minutes
of the March 15, 1995 meeting of the Joint Board indicate, the PBGC
has attempted in the past to obtain voting representation on the Joint
Board. Umeasonable actuarial determinations of the variable rate premium paid by corporate sponsors to the PBGC could intensify their
efforts to obtain such representation.

3 Actuarial Codes of Conduct
3.1

Professional

Actuarial organizations publish codes of professional conduct to
govern the relationship between consulting actuary and client!employer.
The professional codes of conduct of virtually every actuarial organization in the United States are identical to the Code of the Society of Actuaries. Uniformity is necessary because the Actuarial Board for Counseling and Discipline (ABCD) enforces these actuarial codes of conduct
for the professional actuarial organizations sponsoring its activities.
The following is from Precept 10 and Annotation 10-1, respectively,
of the Code of Professional Conduct of the Society of Actuaries (1996)2:
An actuary shall not disclose to another party any confidential information obtained through professional services performed for a principal (Le., client or employer) unless authorized to do so by the client or employer or required to do so
by law. "Confidential information" refers to information not
in the public domain of which the actuary becomes aware in
conjunction with the rendering of professional services to a
principal. It may include ... information which the actuary
has reason to believe that the principal would not wish to be
divulged.

3.2

Criminal

Under Title I, Section 103(d) of ERISA the results of the annual actuarial valuation are to be disclosed on an actuarial statement prepared by
pools sponsored by the federal government (e.g., the FDIC for banks and the FSLIC for
savings and loan associations), the PBGC is financed by premiums paid by the corporate
sponsors of the defined benefit pension plans covered under the program.
2 Society of Actuaries. 1996 Society of Actuaries Yearbook. Schaumburg, Ill.: Society
of Actuaries, 1996.

Konshak: Disclosure and Confidentiality Requirements

163

the enrolled actuary (Le., the Schedule B prepared by the enrolled actuary and attached to the annual Form 5500 filed by the plan administrator). Section 103(d) of ERISA also requires the disclosure of information
including, but not limited to, a statement of actuarial assumptions and
methods used to determine costs and justifications for any change in
those actuarial assumptions or methods. Section 103(d)(13) of ERISA
requires disclosure of "such other information as may be necessary to
fully and fairly disclose the actuarial position of the plan."
Section 1027 of the Criminal Codes states:
Whoever, in any document required by Title I of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (as amended
from time to time) to be published, ... knowingly conceals,
covers up, or fails to disclose any fact the disclosure of which
is required by such title or is necessary to verify, explain,
clarify, or check the accuracy and completeness any report
required by such title to be published ... shall be fined not
more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both.
ERISA created an enrolled actuary engaged on behalf of all plan participants, imposed duties and obligations under ERISA on that enrolled
actuary, and subjected him or her to the standards of the Joint Board for
the Enrollment of Actuaries. Professional actuarial organizations also
have standards governing the relationship between consulting actuary
and client/employer. Confidentiality and full disclosure are examples
of when the duties of the enrolled actuary are diametrically opposed to
the standards of professional actuarial organizations.

3.3

Contrast to Pension Plan Auditor

Under the terms of Section 103(a)(3)(A) of ERISA the pension plan
auditor examines the books and records of the pension plan under generally accepted auditing standards. In contrast, actuarial services are
not performed under ERISA according to generally accepted actuarial
standards. That term does not appear and would not have to appear
in ERISA because the Joint Board for the Enrollment of Actuaries establishes the standards for enrolled actuaries.
The statement preceding the enrolled actuary's signature on Schedule B (Form 5500) makes no reference to generally accepted actuarial
standards:
To the best of my knowledge, the information supplied in
this schedule and on the accompanying statements, if any, is
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complete and accurate and, in my opinion, each assumption
used in combination represents my best estimate of anticipated experience under the plan. Furthermore, in the case
of a plan other than a multiemployer plan, each assumption used is (a) reasonable (taking into account the experience of the plan and reasonable expectations) or (b) would,
in the aggregate, result in a total contribution equivalent to
that which would be determined if each such assumption
were reasonable. In the case of a multiemployer plan, the
assumptions used, in the aggregate, are reasonable (taking
into account the experience of the plan and reasonable expectations).
Because actuarial determinations under ERISA are calculated according to standards established by the JOint Board for the Enrollment of
Actuaries and not according to the standards of the actuarial profession, enrolled actuaries have no legal basis for citing any actuarial standard under the Code of Professional Conduct of the Society of Actuaries or any other actuarial organization. Auditing standards have legal
recognition and standing under ERISA. The standards of professional
actuarial organizations do not enjoy such recognition or standing.

3.4

Consequences of Suspension

One of the two suspended enrolled actuaries on the joint Board roster is currently a trustee of a major actuarial foundation. The other
continues to be a consulting pension actuary with a major employee
benefits consulting firm and was the discussion leader at a workshop
on public employee retirement systems at an annual enrolled actuaries
meeting. 3
At least in these two cases employment and status within the actuarial profession were not adversely impacted by suspension as an enrolled actuary. Legally the statutory standards of the joint Board take
precedence. In practice, does the lack of detrimental consequences
for suspension as an enrolled actuary suggest minimal respect for the
statutory standards of the joint Board?
3Under the separation of powers doctrine, pension plans sponsored by state and
local governments (Le., public employee retirement plans) are exempted from the requirements of ERISA, a federal law, and their actuaries therefore do not have to be
enrolled by the Joint Board.
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Table 1
Changes in Actuarial Assumptions and Techniques
Number of Changes
Type of Change
Actual Reported Justified
Investment Return
8
5
2
2
Retirement Ages
4
1
Salary Increase
7
5
3
2
Terminations of Employment
7
2
2
1
Disabilities
0
Deaths
7
3
2
2
Payment of Plan Expenses
3
1
13
1
Funding Method Changes
14
Other
5
3
1
Total
57
36
13

4
4.1

Changes in Actuarial Assumptions & Techniques
The Study

Section 103(d) of ERISA and the instructions for completing Schedule B require the enrolled actuary to attach a statement of actuarial
assumptions and techniques, a statement of the changes in actuarial
assumptions and techniques, and a statement justifying those changes
in actuarial assumptions and techniques. In a study of a sample of 20
pension plans that changed actuarial consulting firms, Konshak (1995)4
tabulated the number of actual, reported, and justified changes. These
results are reported in Table 1. The asset values of the pension plans
sampled range from $207 million to $16 million.
The actual changes in presented in Table 1 are obtained by comparing the statement of actuarial assumptions and techniques attached
to the 1993 Schedule B to the similar statement attached in the 1992
Schedule B. Reported changes and justifications are tabulated from the
1993 attachments to Schedule B.
4Konshak, T. Financial Effect of Actuarial Marketing Practices on the Solvency of
Corporate Pension Plans: First Annual Study. (A Research Report). Green Bay. Wis.:
Negotiated Pension Plans, Ltd., 1995. A copy of this study can be obtained by writing
directly to the author.
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According to the analysis of 1993 and 1992 Schedule B attachments
there were 57 changes in actuarial assumptions and techniques required to be reported and justified. Thirty-six of these changes were
reported by the enrolled actuary on the current Schedule B attachment.
Only 13 of the reported changes (12 changes in actuarial assumptions
and one change in actuarial techniques) were justified by the enrolled
actuary.
The practice of failing to disclose and justify changes in actuarial
assumptions and techniques is either incompetence (enrolled actuaries
certify to their familiarity with those portions of ERISA relating directly
or indirectly to the responsibilities of an enrolled actuary on the Form
5434-A application for their triennial renewal of enrollment) or a knowledgeable concealment (corporate pension plan actuaries choose not to
be governed by these provisions of ERISA). In any event, these individuals have failed to discharge their duties under the terms of ERISA.

4.2

An Example of a Justification

Although most of the justifications for changes in actuarial assumptions and techniques are not immediately verifiable, one justification
from the Konshak study will be analyzed for reasonableness.
The assumed rate of future employment terminations was changed
and justified by the enrolled actuary solely on the basis of prior plan
experience: "The ultimate withdrawal rates were increased by a factor
of 10 in order to better reflect actual plan experience." Enrolled actuaries who change actuarial assumptions and techniques in this study,
however, normally would not have a personal and intimate knowledge
of the prior plan experience. Pension plans in this example changed
actuarial service providers.
The prior experience of the pension plan can be established by studying individual participant records if available from the prior enrolled actuary or corporate sponsor. Corporate sponsors, however, generally are
unwilling to incur the substantial expense of performing such a study.
The corporate sponsor in this case changed actuarial service providers
to reduce its actuarial expenses and provided that as the reason for the
change in enrolled actuary on the Schedule C (Form 5500) filed with
the federal government: "Change due to receipt of more competitive
bid from another actuary firm."
The change in the assumed rate of future terminations of employment was the only change in actuarial assumptions or techniques made
by the new enrolled actuary, and this assumption change significantly
decreased the minimum deposit payable under federal law. The expla-
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nation for the change in enrolled actuary implies an experience study
would not have been performed due to cost considerations and suggests another reason for the change in withdrawal rates: cutting costs
for the corporate sponsor.

5

Resolution of Conflicting Values

Pension actuaries believe they can balance their roles as consultants
to the employer (subject to the standards of the Code of Professional
Conduct) with their duties and obligations as enrolled actuaries (subject to the requirements of ERISA and the standards of the Joint Board).
Technically, the previously quoted section of the Society of Actuaries'
Code of Professional Conduct relating to confidentiality does not conflict with the statutory requirements of ERISA: "An actuary shall not disclose to another party any confidential information obtained through
professional services ... unless ... required to do so by law." A written
disclaimer in the Code, however, can not erase a sentiment to maintain
confidentiality through superficial rather than full disclosure.
The justification quoted in the previous section for the change in
withdrawal rates could have been subjected to a peer review. If an experience study had been performed, a peer reviewer could have avoided
the aforementioned challenge to the reasonableness of this justification by suggesting its inclusion: "Based on the results of an experience
study, the ultimate withdrawal rates were increased by a factor of 10
in order to better reflect actual plan experience." None of the assumption changes made by the other enrolled actuaries included in my study
were justified in terms of an experience study.
If an experience study had not been performed, a peer reviewer
could make two criticisms. First, the rate of increase, "by a factor of 10,"
will draw the attention of the reader and should be eliminated. Second,
even though the statement preceding the enrolled actuary's signature
on the Schedule B necessitates consideration of both prior and expected
experience by requiring reasonable assumptions "taking into account
the experience of the plan and reasonable expectations," this assumption change should have been justified solely in terms of the expected
future experience of the plan. Drawing attention to the prior plan experience makes a regulatory request for data and a challenge based on
that prior plan experience more likely. If the justification were changed
according to these recommendations, it would be consistent with the
justifications provided by the other enrolled actuaries reviewed by the

168

Journal of Actuarial Practice, Vol. 4, No.1, 1996

Konshak study: "The withdrawal rates were increased to better reflect
the expected future experience of the plan."
Of the 12 actuarial assumption changes justified by the enrolled
actuaries included in the Konshak study, nine were justified solely on
the basis of the expected future experience of the plan. Two of the
assumption changes were justified both in the terms of the prior and
the expected future experience of the plan (consistent with the enrolled
actuary's statement on the Schedule B). Only the justification being analyzed was justified solely in terms of prior plan experience. None of
the enrolled actuaries supplied evidence or any specific information to
support their assertions.
By failing to introduce the uncertainty involved in predicting the future experience of the plan, the justification analyzed in Section 4.2
above lacks the vagueness of the other justifications reviewed by the
Konshak study and therefore could be subjected to a challenge on its
reasonableness. By maximizing vagueness and minimizing specifics,
the other justifications reflect a sentiment to conceal under the confidentiality provisions of the Code of Professional Conduct rather than a
sentiment to disclose under the statutory requirements of ERISA.

6

Conclusions

The codes of conduct of professional actuarial organizations and
their standards of actuarial practice are irrelevant for the enrolled actuary performing actuarial services under ERISA. Actuarial codes and
standards can only confuse the issue and provide opportunities to subvert, inadvertently or otherwise, the intent of statutory standards. Giving any credibility to the confidentiality provisions of any professional
actuarial code would be irresponsible and contrary to the disclosure
requirement of federal law.
Enforcement from federal agencies is a reasonable and expected result for those pension actuaries who believe their professional codes of
silence are above the law. This enforcement to date has been passive
and lacking, but the Joint Board may actively search for enrolled actuaries failing to discharge their duties under ERISA when the PBGC has
more influence with the Joint Board.
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Discussion of Theodore Konshak's "Disclosure and
Confidentiality Requirements of Corporate Pension
Plan Actuaries"
Richard Daskais*
Mr. Konshak's paper expresses concerns that enrolled actuaries
are not properly discharging their duties to pension plan participants
in choosing actuarial assumptions. The paper cites an apparent conflict
between the disclosure requirements of ERISA and the confidentiality
requirements of the actuarial professional organizations' codes of conduct.
I do not believe the examples cited in the paper show that actuaries rely on the codes' confidentiality requirements to avoid disclosure
required under ERISA. I believe the short justifications of assumption
changes offered in the examples are consistent with the nature of the
reporting of assumptions required on Schedule B and its attachments.
At worst, the lack of justification (or a justification that is too short) is
simply benign negligence on the part of the enrolled actuary; unfortunately, this negligence does not present a favorable view of the actuarial
profession.
The paper implies that when plan sponsors change enrolled actuaries, the reason is often to reduce their contributions to pension plans.
While this may sometimes be the case, I believe the more important
abuses by enrolled actuaries in their choices of assumptions occur when
the actuary knows his or her client's wishes and reflects these wishes
in his or her choice of assumptions; no change in enrolled actuary is
required. The most common abuse, in my opinion, is to choose conservative assumptions that are far from the actuary's best estimate in
order to produce large deductible contributions. Conservative assumptions are used for small plans (often simply tax shelters for the principal participant or participants) and for larger plans whose costs are

* Richard Daskais, F.s.A., F.CA., has been a consulting actuary specializing in pensions since 1957, except for a period from 1985 to 1989 when he was a vice president of
Goldman, Sachs & Co. He was a member of the firm Daskais and Walls, Inc. in Chicago
from 1966 to 1984.
Mr. Daskais' address is: 1174 Shellburn Lane, Ventura CA 93001-4055, USA.
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passed to customers (e.g., plans of regulated utilities and government
contractors).
My opinion of larger plans is based on my experience since the early
1970s in two areas: doing projections to analyze asset allocation policy
where it was clear that the middle of the range of expected investment
returns was much greater than the enrolled actuary's assumed investment return and consulting for government agencies on the level of
pension cost reimbursement to contractors. In none of these activities
was I or a colleague at my firm the enrolled actuary for the pension
plan. Because of confidentiality responsibilities to clients (which may
dismay the author), I cannot cite specific examples.
The paper refers to the "lack of detrimental consequences" for actuaries who have been disciplined by the Joint Board; i.e., there was
apparently no discipline by actuaries' professional organizations. An
important reason for the failure of the professional organizations to
discipline is that there are significant disincentives for an individual to
institute disciplinary proceedings against an actuary who has violated
the organizations' codes of professional conduct. At best, there may be
a major investment of time, and at worst the individual may find himself or herself a defendant in a defamation suit. Unfortunately, I have
no easy solution to this problem; I am confident that the organizations'
relevant committees have considered it.

Brian A. Jones *
Mr. Konshak's paper provides a useful summary of data from a
1995 study of the 5500 Schedule B of 20 pension plans. I do not find
the rest of the paper equally useful, and I do not believe the author
supports his conclusions. Specifically:l
The codes of conduct of professional organizations and their
standards of actuarial practice are irrelevant for the enrolled
actuary performing actuarial services under ERISA. Actuarial
codes and standards can only confuse the issue and provide
opportunities to subvert, inadvertently or otherwise, the intent of statutory standards.
Not so. The Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) binds all members of sponsoring organizations, and violation can lead to discipline.
* Brian A. Jones is an enrolled actuary and a member of a number of actuarial organizations and of the New York and D.C. Bars.
Mr. Jones's address is: 10 Clinton Street, Brooklyn NY 11201, USA.
1 Unless otherwise stated, all quotations are taken from Mr. Konshak's paper.
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To the extent that the CPR would conflict with any applicable law or regulation, it specifi-cally states that "the requirements oflaw or regulation
shall take precedence." There cannot, therefore, be any real conflict between the two. If an observer purports to find such subversion in the
text of the CPR, he or she simply has not read or understood it. If an
actuary were to cite the CPR to justify such subversion, he or she would
be perverting it.
The assertion that the "standards of professional actuarial organizations do not apply to enrolled actuaries" is simply incorrect (unless,
of course, it is confined to enrolled actuaries who are not members of
the sponsoring organizations). Repeated assertions in the body of the
paper do not make it any less incorrect. Any broad claim such as this
requires only one hypothetical to refute it: would the author seriously
maintain that if an actuary found that a participant for whom he or she
expected to compute a joint and survivor annuity was not, in fact, married to the apparent spouse, he or she could trumpet that fact to the
world on the ground that ERISA and associated regulations do not discuss confidentiality and the CPR cannot apply? Any such actuary could
and would be disciplined under the CPR. I doubt that a court would
hold that the Joint Board's standards pre-empted the entire CPR.
Giving any credibility to the confidentiality provisions of any
professional actuarial code would be irresponsible and contrary to the disclosure requirement of federal law.
Federal law takes precedence under the CPR. The issue of the superiority of federal law in the event of conflict is never reached. Giving
credibility to confidentiality provisions in a way that conflicts with applicable law would be contrary to the CPR as well as federal law.
Enforcement from federal agencies is a reasonable and expected result for those pension actuaries who believe that
their professional codes of silence are above the law.
The paper offers no support for the notion that actuaries hold such
a belief. All that is demonstrated is a lack of written justification for
assumption changes on some Schedule Bs. The work may be sloppy,
but I doubt whether it is motivated by the confidentiality provisions
of the CPR. There is nothing in the body of the paper to suggest any
"sentiment to maintain confidentiality through superficial rather than
full disclosure." (Indeed, it is not clear whether the alleged sentiment is
being attributed to a limited number of actuaries or to the drafters of
the CPR.)
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Again, in discussion of two suspensions, the author asks whether
"the lack of detrimental consequences for suspension as an enrolled
actuary suggest[s] minimal respect for the statutory standards of the
Joint Board?" Is it not likely that the relevant professional bodies simply
decided that there was no need to impose any additional penalties on
these two people beyond the Joint Board's action?
This enforcement to date has been passive and lacking but
the Joint Board may actively search for enrolled actuaries
failing to discharge their duties under ERISA when the PBGC
has more influence with the Joint Board.
The author is entitled to his opinion, and some may agree. It seems
unlikely that if PBGC does increase its influence with the Joint Board,
however, it will put much emphasis on issues of client confidentiality.

Authors' Reply to Discussion
An example involving actuarial services performed under ERISA may
clarify the difference in opinion. Under the Standards of Performance
for Enrolled Actuaries published by the Joint Board at 901.20(h):
An enrolled actuary shall provide written notification of the
nonfiling of any actuarial document he/she has signed upon
discovery of the non- filing. Such notification shall be made
to the office of the Internal Revenue Service, the Department
of Labor, or the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation where
such document should have been filed.

The corporate sponsor proudly notifies the enrolled actuary of the
alteration and subsequent filing of an actuarial document the enrolled
actuary signed and certified. The Code of Professional Conduct of the
Society of Actuaries has materiality prOvisions under its Annotation 141. The Joint Board's Standards of Performance for Enrolled Actuaries
have no materiality provisions.
If you fail to notify based on immateriality, you have used the sentiment of the Code of Professional Conduct to subvert the standards
of the Joint Board. Let those governmental agencies decide if it is immaterial. Because enrolled actuaries are engaged on behalf of all plan
participants, you are traveling down the wrong path if your decision is
based on the potential response of that corporate sponsor ("they're going to call me a whistle-blower and ... "). Because the enrolled actuary
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is an individual person under ERISA Section 3042, it is not a decision to
be made by the actuarial consulting firm on its own behalf. And last,
there is nothing to decide under 901.20(h).
Immateriality is a defense. Confidentiality is more of an underlying
sentiment used to eliminate or diminish the need for a defense. Is the
failure to justify actuarial assumption changes due to benign neglect?
Sloppiness? These excuses would be more readily accepted if enrolled
actuaries did not benefit from those mistakes.
When the enrolled actuary is changed, the plan administrator must
provide an explanation for the change on the Schedule C attached to
the Form 5500. The prior enrolled actuary must also be given a "Notice to Terminated Enrolled Actuary" containing the explanation for the
change as disclosed on the Schedule C. The notice instructs the prior
enrolled actuary to supply his or her comments on this explanation
directly to the Office of Enforcement of the Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration, U.S. Department of Labor. Will the prior enrolled
actuary be influenced by the confidentiality and professional courtesy
provisions of the Code?
The joint and survivor annuity example presented by one of the
discussants, Brian A. Jones, is not an actuarial service performed under ERISA. Hopefully Mr. Jones (or one of his non-actuarial associates)
would inform the plan administrator of these facts. The plan administrator would need this information to properly discharge his or her
duties under ERISA.
Is the success of saying "I didn't hear that!" contingent upon a sense
of confidentiality?

